A brief history of Palestinian Christian communities from the 1830s to 1939, from the Ottoman empire to the end of the Arab Revolt.

 

(Being an except from my longer history of the Palestinian Christian communities, found at https://colinbarnesblog.blogspot.com/2022/05/a-history-and-theological-reflection-of.html)

Ottoman days

 

The religious basis of the Muslim/Christian relationship within the Ottoman Empire; Dhimmi status – general observations.

 

The pact between the Muslim ruler and the non-Muslim communities which regulated under what conditions they would be permitted to continue within the Muslim state. “The basis of the contract was the recognition by the Dhimmis of the supremacy of Islam and the dominance of the Muslim state, and their acceptance of a position of subordination, symbolized by certain social restrictions and the payment of a poll tax (jizya).[1]

 

Reforms, repression etc

 

All this changed, at least theoretically, starting in 1836. After centuries of Islamic persecution, the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms established full equality for all citizens. This caused a massive social upheaval. “For the first time in the history of any Muslim state, in 1839 the Ottomans implicitly accepted a revolutionary political equality of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. They declared this equality more explicitly in 1856 and finally, announced it constitutionally in 1876. The jizya, or poll tax on non-Muslims, was abolished in 1855. A concept of secular Ottoman citizenship was introduced in 1869. The Ottoman purpose in this massive ideological and legal reordering of the empire or Tanzimat was clear: it was to stave off further European intervention and to consolidate imperial power.”[2]

 

Suddenly the Christian community was upwardly mobile, urbanizing and generally doing rather well. “Christians benefited economically more than their Muslim neighbours and became more confident in their social and religious expression.”[3] This improvement was due both to the disproportional impact of western mission schools, and more broadly, because the reforms removed the artificial constraints from the Christian community, restraints which were never on the Muslim majority. “By the end of the nineteenth century, the situation of Christians had markedly improved.”^[4] In Mandate Palestine, for example, an absolute majority of the new, urban middle class were members of the Christian communities, even though these communities made up only 11% of the total population.[5]

 

This offended[6] the Ottoman Muslim majority deeply.[7] In their mind, the reforms opposed the natural, historical and religious order of things. This provoked the Muslim majority against them.[8] In 1897, (after the Tanzimat reforms had been revoked) in the Ottoman towns of Yozgat and Sason, local officials “perceived a hint of assertiveness and a wish for equality” among the Armenian Christian minority. This “alarmed the Palace considerably,” and in both cases, local Muslims responded with “unprecedented ferocity” to what they viewed as “mortal threats.”[9] After a massacre of Christians in 1895 “Muslim women came to jeer and laugh at the sufferers.”^[10]

 

“The relaxing of the millet laws by Egypt in the 1830s, and the Tanzimat reforms of 1839 and 1856, whilst giving new freedom to Christian and other non-Muslim communities, destabilized Christian–Muslim relations.²⁶ “The reforms allowed freedom of worship, and granted equal political status to the ahl aldhimma. Given the number of Jews and Christians in government service, and the economic advantages and higher education that many possessed, many Muslims feared that equal status would damage the Islamic character of the state and endanger the dominant position of Muslims in administrative circles. Taking advantage of this new freedom, simple acts such as the ringing of Church bells or public Christian processions helped result in serious Muslim riots against Christians in Aleppo and Damascus in 1850 and 1860.”[11]

 

 

As Colonel P. Campbell, A Visit to Israel's Holy Places (1839) wrote; “The Mussulmans [of Syria-Palestine], … deeply deplore the loss of that sort of superiority which they all and individually exercised over and against the other sects. … from the bottom of his heart he believes and maintains that a Christian, and still more so a Jew, is an inferior being to himself.”^[12]

 

This will also be seen in 1853, with the Muslims of Nablus; “They shouted ‘look at the Dragoman sitting on a chair – kill him, kill him. Did you ever see a Christian like that before?’” The depth of the deep-seated fury at seeing non-Muslims assuming the rights equal to Muslims remains a bedrock issue to this day. (See for example the rage inspired by non-Muslims praying on the Temple Mount.)

 

Foreign factors

 

Larger patterns imposed themselves upon this local scene. With the decline of Ottoman fortunes, western nations had ‘appointed’ themselves as the protectors of different Christian communities within the Ottoman empire. There was some genuine cause for concern on the part of Muslims. Christian majority provinces were able to secede from the Ottomans empire with western support. Prime examples, Greece in 1830 with Russian, French and British aid, and Bulgaria 1878 with Russian help. Indeed, the Tanzimat reforms themselves were often seen as a concession to the Christian European powers, privileging Christians and promoting Christian separatism.[13] “Tensions between Muslims and Christians became particularly acute during the Balkan Wars and the war against Italy. Both were represented as a religious war of Muslims against Christians, and many Muslims identified local Christians with the Empire's enemies.”^[14] Note that Western interference on behalf of various Christian communities was often an exasperating mixture of altruism and self-interest.[15] By using marginalized communities to further their own goals, foreign powers exaggerated their already precarious position, and left them open to attack from the offended majority.[16] Foundational to this was the fact that, under Islam, Christians had been robbed, raped and treated like filth. Had they simply been treated reasonably, there would have been no grievance for the Christian west to intervene over/exploit.

 

Looking more locally, in 1840 European powers forced Muhamad Ali to relinquish control of Syria and Palestine back to the Ottomans. In return, the Ottomans reluctantly conceded to Russia a claim to be the protector of the Orthodox Christians in the area. In 1851, France likewise claimed to be the protector of the Catholic Christians in the Holy Land. These rival claims then became the immediate cause of the Crimean War, as Russia in 1853 demanded that the Sultan favour the Orthodox over the Catholics, and the Sultan, backed by France and Britain, refused. In this atmosphere, it is perhaps unsurprising that in 1841, “Christians in Syria circulated a petition calling on Europe to place Palestine under Christian rule!”^[17] and “this fostered a great deal of resentment among Muslims, many of whom began to suspect local Christians of conspiring with their European co-religionists to dominate the Ottoman Empire, not only economically, but politically as well.”^[18] One can see why the Muslim majority would feel this, although again, had they simply treated their minorities with respect, none of this would have occurred. One cannot blame the Christians for wanting to escape the horrors of Ottoman rule!

 

The Muslim and Christian communities also often differed over politics and foreign affairs. A British report from 1904 about the Sino-Russian war stated, "the Christians with very few exceptions [were] fervently praying for the success of Russia [their protector] … by contrast, the sympathies of most Muslims, were with Japan [because it opposed Russia].”^[19] Russia had helped return Syria/Palestine to Ottoman rule, but the Muslims deeply resented the price that had to be paid, and the humiliation of needed such help in the first place. In 1911, Christians of Haifa were likewise accused of disloyalty concerning the Italian occupation of Tripoli.

 

Palestine, 1830 +

 

Several years before the beginning of the Tanzimat reforms, in 1831, the Egyptian governor, Muhammad Ali “freed the Christians and Jews from their second-class citizenship.”[20] This equality caused deep resentment within the local Palestinian Muslim community. It provoked Muslim communal violence against the local Christians “because of the efforts of the Egyptians to give equality to the Christian communities.”[21] The landmark 1834 Palestinian revolt against Muhammed Ali was indeed “a bloody attempt to stave of the momentous changes.”[22] Due to the Ottoman reliance on European powers to regain these lands from Ali however, these liberties nevertheless would be reinstated even after they reverted to Ottoman control.

 

The 1834 Peasant’s Revolt.

 

Described as the first of the three struggles which defined modern Palestinian society, the Peasants Revolt had a number of causes, and multiple effects. On one level, it was a revolt against an unpopular Egyptian rule, and the taxes and conscription they had enforced on the country. Significantly, it also had a fundamental sectarian basis – the Egyptian ruler, in an attempt to enlist the political support of Britain and France, had made all subjects equal under the law. As previously noted, such equality infuriated the Muslim majority community, who viewed it as blasphemous. The Revolt therefore targeted both the Egyptian governance, and also the ‘illegitimate beneficiaries’ of that governance, the Christian and Jewish communities (see earlier for its effects on Jewish communities). Beyond even that reasoning, a time of civil unrest presented sections of the Muslim community with the opportunity to rob, ransack and rape, and the despised dhimmi communities were the traditional and obvious targets for such activities.

 

“following the uprising attacks broke out on the weaker members of Palestinian towns, namely the Jews and Christians.”^[23]

 

This pillaging again revealed the fundamental disharmonies and fractures present within the traditional wider Palestinian society. Muslims, Christians and Jews were neither equal nor friendly. Again, if intercommunal relations were as good as they now tell us, why were Jews and Christians singled out in a time of unrest for rape and destruction? If intercommunal relations were so good, why would the granting of equal rights be any big deal??

 

It is a profound indictment that the celebrated first act of Palestinian self-determination was an attack by its Muslim majority upon its Christian and Jewish communities.

 

From the 1850s onwards, news of large scale, continuing massacres of Christians in other parts of the Ottoman empire made the Palestinian Christians increasingly nervous. The American Protestant missionary, Henry H. Jessup, wrote that; "the new liberties granted to the Christian sects, their growth in wealth, the appointment of their prominent men to foreign consular offices... all these and other causes had kindled [among the Muslims] fires of fanatical hatred."^[24] Disturbances in Aleppo in 1850 targeting Christians and Mosul in 1854, targeting Christians and Jews, were seen as attempts by the traditional Muslim community to restore their old position. It was this same desire which contributed to massacres of the Maronite Christians in Lebanon in 1860 (20,000 killed, 380 Christian villages and 560 churches destroyed), the Christian communities in Damascus (also in 1860, 25,000 killed), and the Armenian Christians (1894-1896, 1915-1916 – over 1.5 million killed). Concerning the Maronite massacres; “Bitter conflicts between Christians and Druzes, which had been simmering under Ibrahim Pasha’s rule (mostly centred on the firmans of 1839 and later more decisively, of 1856, which equalized the status of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, the former resenting the implied loss of superiority) resurfaced under the new emir.”^[25] Even closer to home, “the establishment of European consulates in Jerusalem in the middle of the nineteenth century was greatly resented by local Muslims.”^[26] As the Rev. Arthur George Harper Hollingsworth wrote in 1852; “No Christian is secure against insult, robbery, and ruin.”[27]

 

In 1838, the British representative in Jaffa put forward the case that Britain should guarantee the rights of Protestants and Jews in Palestine. “Britain is the natural trustee for both of them.”^[28] Lord Palmerston likewise thought that Britain could assume the role of protector of the Jews in Palestine, and that would grant them similar rights as those exercised already by France and Russia.

 

At the 1856 peace conference which ended the Crimean War, the Ottomans were forced to confirm the equality of all citizens under the law and guarantee full freedom of worship. While this equality “was not carried out in practice”^[29] the “Muslims of Jerusalem in 1856 accused the Sultan of treachery for his being submissive to the dictates of foreigners, and for not applying Muslim law strictly on Christians and Jews.”^[30]

 

In 1858 James Finn wrote; “In continuing to report concerning the apprehensions of Christians (in Jerusalem) from revival of fanaticism on the part of the Mahometans, I have the honour to state that daily accounts are given me of insults in the streets offered to Christians and Jews, accompanied by acts of violence. ... there is no clear case yet known of a Christian’s evidence being accepted in a court of justice, or in a civil tribunal against a Moslem. … only a few days ago, his Beatitude, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch was returning through the streets from the Cadi’s court of judgement … but had to pass through a gauntlet of curses hurled at his religion, his prayers, his fathers etc.,”^[31]

 

In 1858 the two villages of Zebabdeh and Likfair (where the inhabitants are Christian) “were utterly sacked, men and women stripped even to their shirts and turned adrift. This was done by the people of Tubas and Kabatieh ... and no redress or punishment has yet been given by the military force. I need not say that none is afforded by the civil authority, himself a factious leader.”^[32]

 

Also in 1858, a Greek Orthodox construction and renovation was destroyed in Gaza.^[33]

 

Local Christians were viewed as being disloyal, and as being a serious weak link, which aggressive foreign powers could exploit for their own advantage. This in turn provoked further attacks on the local Christians. For example, following sectarian violence in Lebanon in 1860, the French sent in troops and forced the Ottoman Sultan to grant the Maronites self-autonomy.^[34] It was outrage at this which led to the massacre of 25,000 Christians in Damascus. At a result of the 1860 conflict in Lebanon, “tensions were also raised in other coastal cities such Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre, but their proximity to European warships in the Mediterranean helped maintain calm. Nonetheless, Tyre and Sidon were at the brink of civil war due to violence raging between Sunni and Shia residents and Christian refugees fleeing the war. Hundreds of Christians opted to leave Syria altogether, boarding ships to Malta or Alexandria. In the Galilee, peace was maintained by a local Bedouin chieftains, such as Aqil Agha, who assured Christians in Nazareth and Acre of his protection. However, in the village of Kfar Bir’im near Safed, three Christians were killed by Druze and Shia Muslim raiders, while the mixed village of al-Bassa was also plundered. A violent incident occurred between a Muslim and Christian man in Bethlehem, ending with the latter being beaten and imprisoned.” The authorities maintained calm in Jerusalem and Nablus “by introducing additional security measures.” In Nablus, the Ottoman governor was keen to maintain order, but his garrison was too small to ensure security in the city. That is, he needed more troops to protect the local Christians from the local Muslims. Instead, “many Christians pooled money together to pay for protection by local Muslims, who formed an ad hoc police force. [to protect them from the Muslim majority in the city]”^[35]

 

Following a later episode of sectarian violence in Crete, Muslims in Damascus again threatened the local Christians, who, according to one missionary account, began fleeing "by the hundreds to the mountains and Beirut, fearing a repetition of the massacre of 1860.^[36]

 

Ottoman Muslims continued to view the world through a religious lens. News of the 1875-78 Balkan Wars was “relayed to the Muslim population throughout the empire as a sign of yet another Christian onslaught against Islam. The intensified draft of soldiers into the ranks of the Turkish army and the pressure of added taxation to pay for the wars, carried out with great cruelty, caused the population to blame all Christians, including Christian Arabs, for their suffering.”^[37] Note that taxation and drafting of soldiers were also prime causes of the 1834 rebellion.

 

Historical memory of the Crusades and more recent events informed this resentment on behalf of the local Muslims. “The visit of a French consul almost a hundred and fifty years earlier, in 1701, had produced similar outrage. Then, the local notables had responded with a petition stating that, "our city is the focus of attention of the infidels" and that "this holy land [could be] occupied as a result of this, as has happened repeatedly in earlier times."^[38]

Jews and Christians were also not allowed under Ottoman rule to build houses of worship, a ruling upheld in Jerusalem as late as 1838.^[39]

 

In general, Muslims were unwilling to accept Christians in positions of authority. For example, James Finn noted that the body-guards employed by consulates needed to be Muslims, as these might "safely strike or lay hands on an unruly Moslem, or arrest him if a thief, which a Christian could not [do] without provoking a riot if not worse."^[40] Palestinian (Muslims) resisted the edict establishing religious equality so strongly it had to be put in place very slowly, over a number of years. Outbreaks of intercommunal violence often followed its implementation.^[41] “Muslim-Christian riots are found to have occurred every decade or so and disturbances between the communities were common.”^[42]

In the 1890s, Ottoman soldiers closed down Anglican church schools in Jaffa (for an unknown period of time), and the governor announced that he would not be responsible if Muslims attacked Christians.^[43]

 

Within Ottoman Palestine, Muslims and Christians were not the same, and their relationships prior to Zionism were not perfect. In reality, the different elements in the community were separated in their social relations by unbridgeable gulfs.

 

Interestingly, in 1995 CPT leader Arthur Gish records going to St Georges in Jerusalem and meeting with “Palestinians who identified themselves as Christians.” “When they heard we are living in Hebron, they couldn’t believe it. They informed us that Hebron is Muslim, and no Christian can live with Muslims.”^[44] Seemingly unaware of his immense privilege as an American citizen, Gish seems to have treated this local advice with distain.

 

The example of Nazareth

 

As with everywhere else, the Christians of Nazareth were not allowed by the local Muslim authorities to repair or renovate their churches. In 1636, Catholic priests “were incarcerated by Muslims, who insisted that the church must remain the same as in ancient times.”^[45] In 1696, the Christian community of Nazareth fled “in the face of persecution” but returned the next year.^[46]

 

Standing up to Muslim violence guaranteed a pogrom. In 1708, there “was a brawl between the Christians and the Muslims of Nazareth; the covenant was pillaged again, and abandoned for a year.”^[47] After better relations in the mid-1700s, relations again deteriorated; [after 1775] “it was especially bad on Fridays after prayer when Muslims, often villagers in town for the Friday sermon, would riot and attack Christians.”^[48] The early Anglican priest, Michael Kawar mentioned in his autobiography that anti-Christian riots in Nazareth had forced his father to flee to Lebanon in the 1820s.^[49] Relations were again reported to be better in the mid- 1820s. Note however that even in the good times, things could go suddenly bad, as when the Muslims in 1828 entered the church on Easter Sunday and robbed the Christian women of their jewellery.

 

The unproved accusation of blasphemy was always a frightening threat. In 1828 a Christian girl was accused by a Muslim boy she had rebuffed of insulting Mohammad. She was killed by tying her to a horse and dragging her through the streets.^[50] This would have served as a lesson to all other Christian girls not to resist a Muslim man. Also in 1828, according to the Palestinian Rafiq Farah (an Archdeacon Emeritus of the Jerusalem Diocese of the Anglican Church); “The Arab Christians suffered a great deal under the rule of Abdullah Pasha, the governor of the Acre district of Galilee (1819-1831). He pulled down the Carmelite monastery on Mt Carmel, incited the Muslims of Nazareth to attack the Christians in 1828 and forced Christian and Jewish women not to dress like Muslim women.”^[51] In the Peasants Revolt of 1834, the Christians of Nazareth sided with the Egyptians (who had given them full civic rights).^[52] In 1864, relations were again described by Tobler as generally good, but added; “from time to time there were always occasional dark spots.”^[53] 

 

Writing in 1876, P.J. Newman noted that Christians comprised three quarters of the population of Nazareth, and that as a consequence; “the Christians assert and defend their rights. In nearly all other parts of Palestine, the Christians are cringing and fearful.”^[54] In 1881, some Muslim notables of Nazareth demanded the slaughter of the Christians, but this was rejected by the local sheikh.^[55]

 

The expulsion of Protestants from Nablus, 1856 

 

“whereas many villages in the district of Nablus have a few Christian families located in each, such families were subjected in every direction to plunder and insults.”^[56]

 

On the 3^rd of November 1853, the local Greek Orthodox beat the local Protestants in their schoolhouse, “and drove them out of the premises.” At a general meeting called by the Governor, the Mufti signalled to the crowd outside who thought the meeting was to oppose the Greek Orthodox. They therefore shouted “as to the necessity of destroying Christian Churches, or at least of diminishing their privileges and lowering their doors and windows. They shouted ‘look at the Dragoman sitting on a chair – kill him, kill him. Did you ever see a Christian like that before?’ (The Dragoman [interpreter/guide] was a Protestant from Syria.) The Mufti then drew up a fatwa that; “it is against the honour of the Moslem religion to permit Christian Churches to be erected, but only to tolerate such as were found in the country at the time of the Mohammedan Conquest.” He continued that Protestants should not be allowed to worship in any place of general meeting, and even in their own homes not above three together, and in a subdued voice. The local governor was then ordered by the Pasha in Jerusalem that the Protestants were not to meet again for prayer in the school room and were forbidden a special room for worship.^[57] The sight of an Arab Christian sitting in a chair(!) was enough to drive them into a killing rage!

 

In 1855, Muslim mobs attacked a Greek church, the Protestant missionary house and school.[58] R. Farah comments on the Nablus riots; “On the 4^th of April, 1856, a fanatic Muslim mob at Nablus, who were incited by their leaders after the Sultan gave all Ottomans equality before the law … attacked the Christians in Nablus, especially the Protestants. They had to flee the town; their homes were ransacked and at least two were killed. The persecutions stopped after 1865.”^[59] (The Christians of Damascus were massacred by Muslims in 1860 for the same reason.[60])

 

In 1858 James Finn reported; “the house of the Christian priest (Greek) was taken in his absence and his stores of grain and oil for his household during the winter were taken, not to be consumed by the soldiers (for that would entitle the owner to a claim on the Government) but were mixed into one heap .. by the Muslims of the city and thrown into the street. I feel myself more and more to be warranted in attributing the riots of Nablus in 1856 to an anti-Christian feeling. In conclusion, I have the honour to quote the perpetual expression of the Christians in Palestine, that their lot has become far worse since the termination of the Russian war than it was before that period extending back to 1831.^[61]

 

The Nablus Protestants sent their own petition (“The humble Petition of the Protestants of Nablous”) to the Sultan. In it, they spoke of “their afflicted and calamitous state … the injuries inflicted on them, the loss of their freedom, the insecurities of their lives, property and families, all of which they presently endure (and for the previous 5 months). Since the issue of the Firman (February 1856) declaring religious liberty, the Mohammedans of Nablus have been filled with rage against the Christians, insulting his majesty the Sultan and crying; ‘No obedience to a creature who causes disobedience to the creator.’” On Friday, April 4^th, most of the Ulamahs of Nablus assembled in one of the Mosques … after this the call was given by one of them going through the streets; “Oh religion of Mohammad, attack the Christians.” At the same time, all the Mohammedans being assembled for prayer, the Ulamahs stopped the Muazzins and made them come down from the Minarets, saying there shall be no prayers for the religion of Muhammad is dead.” They aroused the populace “to fury, that they might fall upon the Christians.” They destroyed the school of bishop Gobat, and the attached chapel. They also killed a number of Christians, burying one boy in lime. The shouts of the mob were “frightful, together with those of the females who shrieked on the terraces to excite and encourage them.” The Greek Orthodox “from fear, have appeared outwardly satisfied with the Mohammedans, and have made no claim [of] satisfaction for the injuries done.” [That is, the local Christians, from fear, did not even attempt to gain compensation through the court, but simply accepted the murder, violence, robbery and destruction of property they had been subjected to. Such was their life under Muslim rule. Note also the cry from the crowds that if they are unable to persecute Christians, then Islam is dead.]

 

The entire Protestant community were forced to flee Nablus; “They have continued to regard the Protestants with an evil eye.” The Petition concluded; “The Mohammedans make no distinction between the Christian nations, in their general hatred and enmity against that religion.” “The injury done is not to your humble servants alone … your humble petitioners have become a proverb and a taunt to all who are round about, everywhere now if a Christian disagrees with a Mohammedan, the later say to him we will do to you as it has been done in Nablus, and therefore in numerous places Christians have been maltreated since this disturbance.”^[62]

 

The Jerusalem Protestant community (including Nicolayson) sent a separate appeal on behalf of the Christians of Nablus. In it, they noted that; “the fury of the rioters was indiscriminately directed against all Christians without distinction … the Greeks church together with the house of the Greek priest were … ransacked.” They likewise mentioned the firman of 1856 as having “inflamed” the local Muslims. Speaking on behalf of “the Protestant communities in Palestine and Syria” they continued “We are fully sensible of the necessity of the greatest caution, forbearance and prudence on our part towards the Moslems in avoiding every demonstration that would needlessly irritate their pride, prejudice and jealousy.”[63]

 

“Most Muslims were having difficulties coming to terms with the idea of non-Muslims as political equals.”^[64] That is not to say friendly relations were absent, or areas of commonality did not exist,[65]  but the relations between the two communities remained difficult, as both tried to adapt to the changing situations. Small village inter-faith relations were paradoxically more personal and more traditional. Local Christians were generally not supportive of Western missionary activity.

 

Obstacles to Dhimmi Emancipation in Palestine

 

When fears of a new war with Russia surfaced, Finn recorded that the Muslim street believed that “every Moslem was to consider as his enemy every native Christian, or at least those who had any relations with Russia (Greeks and even Armenians). The timorous and panic-stricken Christians helped forward this idea by the very excess of their fears. They had not the sense to conceal their dread of a probable approaching massacre in which scenes of horror and bloodshed were to be enacted, such as their fathers had endured in consequence of the war of Greek independence about thirty years before.  … Fear had been suckled with their mother’s milk, in days gone by, and now it overpowered them. If this was the case in Jerusalem, … it was tenfold worse in all distant towns and villages.”^[66]

 

“A great change had passed over the land, as well as Jerusalem, with respect to toleration of religion in the existing generation, not only caused by (the Ottoman reforms of 1838) but also by the surviving effects of previous Egyptian dominion between 1832 and 1840, which had swept away much of the bigotry and tyranny of former ages. There has been since 1845 a profession of equality for all religions in the administration of local government, and   certainly less of insult and injury from the Moslem populace to the Christians. Their functionaries were no longer endured as intruders into Christian houses for food, lodging and money, remaining there till their demands were satisfied. Christian women were not now dishonoured with impunity of the offenders [as was the norm earlier]. Levies of money at any irregular time or place without reason assigned, were no more suffered. Christians were not now pushed into the gutters of the streets by every Moslem taking up the best part of the pavement and with a scowl crying out, “Shemmel-ni ya keleb” neither were Christians debarred from riding horses or wearing cheerful colours. … Christians had felt in 1852 much more secure in life and goods than their fathers had been.” James Finn.^[67]

 

Christians then were starting to benefit socially and economically, but still retained the memories and the fears of what had been commonplace only a few years before (“Fear had been suckled with their mother’s milk, in days gone by, and now it overpowered them.”). As the experience of Christian communities in the rest of the Ottoman Empire would show, these fears were terrifyingly valid.

 

Tanzimat – a reflection

 

Romans 7:10 I found that the very commandment that was intended to bring life actually brought death.

 

The Tanzimat reforms gave the Christian communities something to lose. After centuries of no civil rights, of humiliations, robberies rapes etc, now they were educated, socially upward and doing well. They knew the horrors they had escaped from and were desperate to retain these new rights/freedoms. They now had something to lose. And when push came to shove, if pushing the Jews under the bus would endear them to the Muslims, it was a price they were prepared to pay. They had never liked the Jews anyway, and it was expedient that the Jews should die to preserve Christians gains.

 

The Tanzimat were also a reflection of Ottoman weakness. The product of both western pressure and also of a desire to emulate the more powerful west, they infuriated the Moslem majority who were the core constituency and powerbase of the empire. This was why the reforms were discarded in 1878, and a new/old policy of explicitly favouring the Muslim community was brought back. The anger engendered by the reforms would feed directly into the Armenian massacres of 1894-1924.[68] That is, the Tanzimat reforms, by granting liberty to the minorities, first allowed them to flourish, but this in turn created the conditions which ended in their massacre.

 

It was this perceived weakness, visible in the shrinking land area of the empire, which itself spurred on the Arabs and others to abandon Ottomanism and seek their own destiny apart from Turkish rule. In many ways, Arab nationalism was in fact another expression of that same underlying weakness. For numerous Muslim Arabs, it was a frustration with the Young Turk's secularising tendencies that led them to become Arab nationalists.^[69] Many Muslims viewed the Ottoman cries of “Jihad” as a cynical exploitation of Islam coming so late in the game. For too many years, their reform efforts had worked to undermine religion as a governing principle; as such, they had lost a great deal of their credibility among Muslims. Arab nationalism was viewed by many as the best way to reassert Muslim supremacy. As a result, from around 1908 many Muslims joined Arab nationalist movements, and there was increased Muslim involvement in the nationalist movement. This was particularly evident in the emphasis given the idea of resurrecting an Arab caliphate. The British promoted these for their own self-interest (as a weapon to weaken the Ottomans). Younger Palestinians soon also saw in Arab unity the best possible defence against Zionism.

 

Ongoing effects

 

“Despite the abandonment of the Millet system in the 19th century, the ‘culture’ of the system still influences the customs and expectations of communal dynamics in the region today.”[70] As has already been seen (“Fear had been suckled with their mother’s milk, in days gone by, and now it overpowered them.”^[71]) and will be seen repeatedly in the following pages, there has been a cumulative effect of a thousand years of persecution, humiliation and massacre. Writing in 2021, Andrew Ashdown notes “Despite the fact that the massacres resulting from the Tanzimat reforms took place over 150 years ago, they have left a lasting memory. In one of the Christian villages that was attacked and suffered sectarian murder at the hands of jihadi groups during the recent conflict, a villager said to me: ‘We are afraid that this will happen again. They attacked us a hundred years ago. They have turned against us now. And we are afraid that they will wait for the next opportunity to do the same again’. I have heard similar comments in different parts of Syria.”[72] Even in so called good times, or good decades, there is a fragility and fear foundational to the Christian communities experience of living in Muslim majority lands. They remain a small, shrinking and despised minority. As the Palestinian Christian Al-Sakakini wrote in 1932 concerning his status in the eyes of the Muslim majority; “if I were to struggle with a Moslem who is less founded in knowledge and heritage than I, I would not doubt that they would prefer him to survive … No matter how high my standing may be in science and literature, no matter how sincere my patriotism is, no matter how much I do revere this nation, even if I burn my fingers before its sight, as long as I am not Muslim, I am naught."^[73] Arab Christians, including Palestinian ones, are aware of their communal history, and very aware of the tenuous nature of the peace and prosperity they may be experiencing. Push the limits, be identified with the West (even though they are indigenous) or just be in the wrong place in a time of increased Muslim emotions, and fears of mass violence resurface. One reads of “the talk” that black parents give their children in America, and Jewish parents give their children world-wide. Christian parents in Muslim lands also rightly pass down their fears and nightmares. Awad describes how beneath the rich history of plurality for eastern Christians, there hides a “parallel history of suffering, uncertainty, fear, pressure, difficulty, death and perpetual strife for survival as a minority in a non-Christian majority world.”[74] Christian strategies of Arab nationalism and anti-Zionism cannot be fully understood apart from this overwhelming fear, a fear which for obvious reasons is rarely mentioned in public. That said, the 1800 years of local Christian persecution and contempt for the Jewish community needs likewise, shamefully, to be recognised. For far too many, the sight of Jews happy, free and prospering is as deep an offence, as profoundly ‘wrong’ as it is to the Muslim majority.  

 

 

World War 1

 

The period immediately prior to the First World War saw a worsening of the situation of Christians in the Ottoman Empire. There was an intensification of Islamic sentiment, much of it in reaction to the loss of the greater part of the Empire's European (that is, Christian) territories. Consequently, Muslims were also increasingly sceptical as to where the loyalty of the Empire's Christians truly lay.^[75] An article appearing in the Greek Orthodox Filastin in Jaffa accused Muslims of religious fanaticism and of behaving in a hostile manner towards non-Muslims, an attitude stemming in large part apparently from a belief that Christians were not loyal Ottoman citizens. In Palestine overall, relations between the two communities were tense. The Spanish consul in Jerusalem reported in 1914 that the Christian residents were profoundly frightened.[76] One visiting European wrote that in mixed towns, Muslim and Christian children rarely befriended each other, and it was not uncommon to hear Muslim children singing disparagingly of the Christian faith.^[77] Elsewhere within the Ottoman empire, Christians were being slaughtered.

 

All this exploded during the actual war. The Ottoman government officially described it as a jihad (returning to their core constituency). The Young Turks had, in the period leading up to the war, begun to encourage feelings of loyalty towards the Ottoman Empire among its Muslim subjects by appealing to religious sentiment. During the same period, the Young Turks sought to discredit reformists by characterizing them as agents of Christian powers. It was reported in 1913 in an Egyptian paper that an Arabic-language pamphlet entitled `al-Haqq yä alte' ('Truth [God] Will Triumph') was being circulated in Syria with the aim "to stir up Moslem fanaticism by stigmatising all the Christians of Turkey as secret agents of Europe and the betrayers of the Moslem fatherland.”^[78] Across the empire, Christians were increasingly attacked. Armenians (1.5 million murdered), Syrian Orthodox in Anatolia, Nestorian Christians, Jacobites and Chaldaeans were all targeted. Lebanon’s Christian population also suffered greatly.

 

During the war, hundreds of thousands died of starvation in Lebanon, Damascus etc.[79] In 1915, two Anglican priests and many of their congregation were deported from Palestine to Ufra in Turkey, near where the Armenian massacres took place.[80]

 

The Christians in Palestine could not but be aware of these terrible events, and fearful for their own safety. Their response was generally to try and stress their Arabism as a common, uniting identity. For example, when approached by a delegation of Orthodox clergy and laity arriving from Jaffa in March 1914, with the purpose of forming a political party that would look after Christian interests, Khalil al-Sakakini responded that, “if your aim is political, then I do not approve it, because I am an Arab first of all, and I think it preferable that we should form a national party to unite all the sons of the Arab Nation, regardless of religion and sects, to awaken national feelings and become imbued with a new spirit.”^[81] The Christian Arab attachment to Arab nationalism began therefore under Ottoman rule, under fear of Muslim massacre, both before and during the war, and remained vitally relevant during and after the British colonial rule.

 

A New Identity – Arab nationalism

 

On 30 October 1918, the campaign in the Middle East officially came to an end. Turkish rule and Ottomanism, had collapsed. The details of its successor, Arab nationalism had yet to be worked out. The British took over a society which was profoundly disunited. Sir Mark Sykes Arab Latin Catholic advisor, Yiisuf Albina (himself a resident of Jerusalem), described the situation in Palestine at the beginning of the British military administration as "a pot-pourri of sects and heterogeneous elements bearing an innate hatred against each other and in perpetual conflict against themselves."^[82]

 

“Arab Christians joined the emerging Palestinian National movement in the hope of breaking the yoke of their marginality in a Muslim society.”^[83]

 

Palestinian Arabs, Christian and Muslim, were both attracted to Arab nationalism. Each viewed it quite differently however and sought contradictory outcomes. The Christians hoped for a secular version which would guarantee their rights as Arabs, regardless of their religion (as an enshrinement of the Tanzimat equality) while the Muslim majority viewed it as a means to return to the pre-Tanzimat days of total Muslim dominance – as a total repudiation of the Tanzimat. Given the overwhelming disparity in their numbers and power, this discontinuity was never going to end well for the Christians.

 

So, after the Ottoman empire, rather than just returning to being disparate religious communities, millets (“we are Muslim, or Christian or Jewish”) for the Christian community, secular nationalism (“We are ALL Arabs [except you Jews]!”) was a way of securing their place in the wider society, of protecting their new-found freedoms/equality/prosperity. Secular Arab nationalism was also the solution being offered by the Western, Christian powers that they were close to. The push for Arab nationalism came initially from the Greek Orthodox, supported by the Melkites. They put much effort into trying to craft a broader Arab identity which would encompass and unify it’s various Christian and Muslim components. “The Arab Christians wholly identified themselves with their Muslim countrymen.”^[84] Greek Orthodox community leader Khalil al-Sakakini frequently met with the Grand Mufti, Haj Amin al-Husseini. “This religious unity would prove to be an essential goal of Palestinian Christians throughout the mid-20^th century.”^[85] Al-Sakakini was an “ardent anti-Zionist and Palestinian nationalist.”

 

Palestinian Christians hoped for a role in determining the actual character of the state. Shomali lists the five aspects of the Arab cultural revival in Palestine, and Christian Arabs were leaders in the first four; education, the printing press, literary clubs and newspapers.[86] Stalder writes that, “benefiting from the educational opportunities presented [by Western missionaries] to them, they [Christian Arabs] were active in their role in the incipient Arab Awakening and subsequent rise of Arab nationalism.”[87]

 

For very different reasons, Muslim Arabs were also attracted to nationalism. Many Muslims saw Arab nationalism as a means to restoring Islamic government (as opposed to the secularism of the Young Turks). This was particularly evident in the emphasis given the idea of resurrecting an Arab caliphate. Pan-Arabism was attractive, but with Islam as its core.

 

At the same time, many Muslim Arab nationalists were sceptical of Christian intentions.  For an Arab Muslim, to be an Arab was to be a Muslim. The two concepts were identical. The Arabic speaking Christian minority were seen as definitely inferior, possibly traitors, at best a defective anomaly. 'Arif al-'Arif, a prominent Muslim nationalist, stated that in his view, the so-called unity with Christians had had no practical foundation; moreover, the Christians had preferred to cooperate with the British, who are Christian like them.^[88] Many in the Muslim majority still viewed Christians as uppity and disloyal, a pro-western 5^th column (a view formed during Ottoman days). Clearly, these negative views would be exacerbated during the Mandate.

 

So, both Muslims and Christians came to support Arab nationalism. Their unity was essentially a profoundly temporary marriage of convenience. So, why have a marriage at all?

 

Enter the Zionists. As noted, Zionism not only gave them a common enemy, it greatly increased the Christians value re soliciting outside, Western Christian help. Their faith gave them access that the Muslim community simply did not have. It was a common threat forcing them both together. "The Christian editors of Falistin would call on all Palestinians, both Muslim and Christian, to unite against Zionism on grounds of local patriotism."^[89] Zionism both provided a means of showing their loyalty to the Arab nation, and also, due to initial British support of the Zionists, handed them the task of influencing both the British government and British [Christian] public opinion. Anti-Zionism was great for Palestinian Christians! And this at a time when Christian Arabs were having their loyalty questioned, their identity as Arabs doubted, and their ties to the West mistrusted! It was expedient to throw the Jews under the bus to save their own community. John 11:50. The Muslim community likewise [for pragmatic and short-term political reasons] sought to include the Christian community “hoping to use their Palestinian Christians’ religious heritage to appeal to British Christians for support against Zionism.”^[90] 

 

Many Christians indicated a preference for indefinite British rule. Once it became clear that British rule also entailed Zionism, Christian support for an independent Palestine increased. The Muslim threat was greater, but they preferred Muslim Arab rule to Jewish. While British colonialism may have gone, the bargain continues to have currency to this day, as Muslim Palestinians see value in using the Palestinian Christians to undermine American Christian support for Israel. Even as Christian communities across the Middle East are decimated, the Palestinian Christians continue to seek out their own security on the basis, not of their faith, but of their utility to the Muslim majority. With the collapse of their numbers, their influence has shrivelled. There is no organic reason to grant them any rights, their only value remains as a means of soliciting Western support for the Arab cause. Without that, they are nothing. 

 

Choosing teams

 

In the brief interregnum between Ottoman and British rule, the possibility of a union with Syria (initially under French mandate) was briefly floated (by the French). The reactions to this by different sections of Palestinian society was instructive. It was supported by the more extreme Muslims, who would later coalesce around the Haj Amin al-Husseini. This was because Muslims saw a single, larger state as the basis of pan-Arabic, Muslim nation. That is, many Muslims saw Arab nationalism simply as a means of returning to an Islamic government. A specifically Palestinian nationalism was not a priority here. As one British officer noted, support for complete independence was strongest among "extreme and more fanatical Moslems.”^[91] Union with Syria was also supported by the Latin Catholics, though for very different reasons. Latin Catholics favoured union with Syria because it was to be a French mandate, and the French were pro-Catholic. It was a false alliance between contradictory short- and long-term objectives, as indeed was the opposite alliance of conservative Muslims and the Greek Orthodox. Supporting the British mandate, were the traditional Palestinian, moderate Muslim leadership, led by the al-Nashashibis, whose rivalry with al-Husseini would dominate Palestinian politics throughout the Mandate and beyond. The Nashashibis wanted to retain their own power, and not be subject to Damascus. Supporting them were the Greek Orthodox and Protestant communities. They again however hoped for a permanent mandate, but as a protection against Muslim rule. Note that within Syria itself, the same dynamic existed; “the Catholic denominations that ‘by and large welcomed French rule,’ and the Orthodox Christian communities that ‘sought to strengthen ties to their Muslim compatriots in the name of Syrian and Arab identification.’”[92] In each case, the Orthodox went with the Arab identity party, and the smaller Catholic and Protestant communities supported their respective colonial backers. All alliances were deeply pragmatic and would drift, attracted to success, as the Mandate progressed. The different Christian communities would throw their increasingly irrelevant support behind which ever Muslim party was either the most nationalistic/secular, or, finally, which ever was simply the least Islamic. In today’s terms, that translates as supporting the Palestinian Authority rather than Hamas.

 

This temporary convergence of interests was seen in the Jaffa Muslim-Christian Association, where both Muslims and Christians (Protestants as well as Orthodox) specifically requested British protection. One British official noted, a "strong combination of Christian and enlightened Moslems [called] for local autonomy under the guidance of one of the great Powers with a view to future independence as soon as the country [was] able to stand alone."^[93] Overall, Christians but not Muslims supported the idea of some form of continuing mandatory control over complete independence – memories of the massacres of Christians under the Ottomans persisted! This became immediately evident during a special meeting of the Jerusalem MCA, convened in early 1919, for the purpose of putting together a delegation to represent them at the First Syrian Congress. The Orthodox representatives were initially so opposed to an independent Arab government that they refused to send any delegates at all, and only agreed in the end in order to avoid friction between the two communities. A general perception existed among Christian Arabs that the British were pro-Muslim, and the French, pro-Christian.^[94]

 

This confusion of attitudes continued into the Mandate. Many Christians liked and profited from the Mandate[95], although other sources state that; “most Christians remained staunch opponents of the British.”^[96] Throughout the Mandate, Christians tended to rally for the Nashashibi clan (the National Party), who were moderate, middle class, urbanised, and whose leader had a Christian wife, against the Husseinis, led by the Mufti, Amin al-Husseini, head of the Supreme Muslim Council.^[97] But again, many Christians, especially the Orthodox, supported the Mufti. The heads of the Syrian Orthodox, Coptic, Armenian and Greek Orthodox all supported the Mufti’s nomination. Interestingly, these were all expatriate leaders. In 1924, Christian Protestant editor Bulus Shihada condemned anti-Judaism but supported anti-Zionism (all the while receiving money from Zionist organisation.^[98]) Note also his comment; “There is no liberation for us except if Muslims and Christians are Arab before all things.”^[99] Throughout the Mandate, the Christians were confused, pragmatic, united only in opposition to Zionists, and in a growing commitment to Arab nationalism as the only other option for them.

 

For the Muslims, “national unity was important, but it had to be based on acceptance of the superior status of the countries Muslim majority.”^[100] In the first Arab congress of 1913 Nadhra Mutran, a Christian, remarked that “the Arab’s pride of race takes precedence over religion.”[101] This is a profoundly un-Christian sentiment, and yet even this compromised formulation would fail to satisfy Arab Muslims, who would repeatedly show greater integrity in this respect. Note the following discussion between two of the founders of the Syrian Ba'athist Party; Anton Saadeh, a Muslim, said to the Communist Christian Michel Aflaq “Your slogan is ‘One Arab nation with One Eternal Mission’; one Arab nation, very well.  But what is the eternal mission, if not Islam? –which has nothing to do with you, Christian that you are!”[102]

 

Both Muslims and Christians opposed the Balfour Declaration and the Zionist movement and viewed them as a threat. A British official in 1919 wrote; “In brief, practically all Moslems and Christians of any importance in Palestine are anti-Zionist, and bitterly so.”^[103] For some observers, the mere fact of Muslim-Christian unity was a measure of just how serious a danger both considered Zionism. As one visiting European commented, "[t]he fact that Moslems and Christians were working together for a common cause was a sign that the nation was roused by what was felt to be a common danger, and that there were men ready to sink all differences of outlook in the effort to win through.”^[104] Muslims and Christian converged over their opposition to Zionism. (Luke 23:12 “That day Herod and Pilate became friends--before this they had been enemies.”) Christians like Najib Nassar, George Antonius and Emil Habibi spearheaded the anti-Zionist movement in the first decades of the 20th century, both as political activists and publishers of Arab newspaper in Palestine. According to Haiduc-Dale, the Christians themselves “were unified only in their opposition to Zionism.”^[105] He also speaks of the “consistent Christian opposition to Zionism.”

 

It was into this atmosphere that the King-Crane Commission arrived in Jaffa on 10 June 1919. It travelled throughout Syria and Palestine. In Palestine, the one point on which both Muslim and Christian communities could agree was their opposition to Zionism.

 

In 1920 a letter of protest was issued from Nazareth denouncing Zionism. Before the meeting, As’ad Mansur, the Anglican priest “explained that because the Jews had rejected the Messiah, the land had been taken from them, and the Talmud taught the Jews to prevent strangers from entering the land as long as they had the power to do so.” Mansur then used this to suggest that while the Arabs had the power, they too should use it to prevent the strangers, or Jews, from entering the land.[106]

“Arabness is the space of the Palestinian Christian faith and this faith needs Arabness for its human depth.” This leads the Palestinian churches to develop an Arabist rather than a biblical theology. Such an approach cannot avoid xenophobic anti-Zionism and anti-Israelism.[107]

Muslim Christian Associations – the best it ever gets for Palestinian Christians

 

Because of this mutual opposition to Zionism, the nationalist movement was initially characterised by a sense of unity between Muslims and Christians. This was most pronounced in the formation of the Muslim-Christian Associations (MCAs), the first of which was established in Jaffa in March 1918. They articulated the core political demands of the Palestinian Arabs; opposition to the Jewish `National Home' and to Jewish immigration. They were described by Cohen as “the hard kernel of the Palestinian Arab national movement.”[108]

 

The MCAs would result in the formation of the Arab Executive. Christian Arabs were well represented within the MCAs, and it was probably they who had prompted their establishment. For the majority of Palestine's Arabs, this was the first experience of political collaboration between Christians and Muslims. Overall, Christian representation exceeded their proportional numbers in Palestine. Muslim Christian Associations hoped to use their members’ Christian heritage to appeal to British Christians against Zionism.

 

1918-1922 was dominated by the MCAs, and thereby marked by attempts to give Christians an equal position. The first Muslim Christian association in Jerusalem met in March 1918. Christians were welcomed by the Muslims who wanted;

 

1. a national (inclusive) body, 
2. their greater education and
3. their contacts with the Christian west.

 

For moderate Muslims, the shock of Christian (British) rule created a genuine moment of unity. However, even in the politically moderate MCAs, Christians as well as Muslims were required to take an oath on the Qur'an in addition to the one made on the national covenant. Importantly, they immediately sought to garner international support among western Christians, mostly British and American, against the Zionist program. They sent delegations to the Vatican, the Archbishop of Canterbury etc. They demanded the forbidding of land sales to Jews, and the limiting or ceasing of Jewish immigration. Note the Christianised wording of this 1919 statement by the Jaffa MCA; “From over the Mt of Olives Christ gave salvation life and peace to the world and all the world owes its life to this sacred source. Will therefore the British nation … give free hand to the Zionists so they may pour death and vengeance from over that sacred place on both the Muslims and Christians of Palestine?”^[109] In 1920, the heads of five Christian churches in Nazareth wrote protesting to the deputy British governor.[110] The Palestinian Women’s Movement also formed their first national committee in 1920. "We are Muslim and Christian women, we do represent the rest of the Palestinian Women, we do protest seriously against the British Policies."[111] They also took part in the Jaffa riots of May 1921, in opposition to Jewish immigration.

 

Joint political opposition to Zionism was already evident when in 1922, Churchill’s White Paper called for "the establishment of a Legislative Council containing a large proportion of members elected on a wide franchise.”^[112] The Arab population in general rejected this proposal, as, by including within it Jewish members, it was viewed as implicit acceptance of Zionism. Christians participated fully in the 1923 MCA boycott of proposed legislative council.[113] Indeed, in Haifa and Jaffa, two cities with substantial Christian populations, their attitude towards the elections was more extreme than that of Muslims; there, no Christian secondary electors were nominated at all.

 

Even during periods of tension between Muslims and Christians, delegations sent abroad had an over-representation of Christians. Their purpose was to make the case for Arab nationalism in terms agreeable to the West. Orthodox George Antonius, in his extremely popular book The Arab Awakening, described the Arab Revolt in clearly secular nationalistic terms. This was how sympathetic Westerners liked/wanted to see it (like the “Arab Spring”).

 

Sadly, the British viewed the local churches as divided, petty and squabbling. “The feelings between Catholics Orthodox and Protestants were too strong to overcome.” “Unhappily, faction plays a large part in the life of the Christian east.”^[114] Fights between different denominations involving beer bottles and chamber pots were also described. Beyond that, the Christian leaders had demonstrated early on their opposition to Jewish immigration, a core commitment of the Mandate. These Christians placed themselves in opposition to the Mandate, and were seen as troublemakers, hopelessly fragmented, and inflammatory (not as peacemakers, a blessing etc). The British simply refused to monitor the Christian courts, despite constant complaints of corruption and inefficiency.

 

Under the British Mandate, the Christian community was prospering, but also feeling nervous. With a new, Christian imperial power in charge, concerns of disloyalty were heightened, but so paradoxically was their practical value as a go-between. In fact, this paradox served to render the Christians even more eager to prove their loyalty and their worth to the Muslim majority. Predominantly, their support was needed to combat western support for Zionism. It was their mutual opposition to Jewish settlement that enabled this un-natural alliance to both exist and continue. Christian Arabs had already comprised almost half of the delegates to the 1913 Arab Congress in Paris. They wanted to prove their loyalty to the Arab/Muslim majority, who viewed them with suspicion, but who were also coming to appreciate their utility as advocates of the Arab position to the Christian British government (as they saw it), and also to the wider British Christian community. This has remained the case till this day.

1921+The Muslim Supreme Council – Islam reasserts itself, Christians immediately cave

 

The establishment in 1921 of the Muslim Supreme Council (just two years after the establishment of the British Mandate), and the acceptance of the Grand Mufti as the national leader by Christians and the Mandate government weakened the MCAs and meant Christians were “drawn back to their marginality.”[115] The Christian minority had failed to impose its more secular vision on the majority. They had lost the best chance they had to actually influence the events around them. Arab nationalism became increasingly Islamic, and the Christian community tried to accommodate this increasingly unfavourable reality. Arab nationalism now gave pride of place to Muslim Arabs. The Muslim celebration of Nabi Musa was accepted as a National holiday.[116] Islam was dominant, but Christians were still valued.

 

Christians themselves quickly recognised the need to acknowledge the special place of Islam in a shared Arab heritage. Najib Nassar (Protestant ex Orthodox), editor al-Karmil wrote that Arabs were divided into 2 groups;

 

• those who accepted Muhammad’s religion, and
• those who accepted his gospel in everyday life and national commands but remained true to their original religion. Arab Christians celebrated Muhammad’s birthday[117] – the greatness of Muhammad formed the basis of Arab national emergence.^[118]

 

Kimmerling has claimed that “Islam’s rise in the emerging national movement was not lost on Palestinian Christians. In part they responded by joining in acts whose origins lay in Islam but that came to be reinterpreted as national events-the development of a kind of civil religion…Some Christians even began to speak of Islam as a national Arab culture that they, too, could embrace.” George Antonius remarked on the “genius of the Prophet Muhammad.” [119]  The majority of Arab Christians continued to identify themselves with the Muslim majority, while at the same time wanting to preserve their Christian communal identity. They tried to prove themselves good Arab nationalists, bearing “the deficiency for being non-Muslims.”[120]

 

Freas makes an important point; “Their ability to role as far as shaping Arab identity was largely predicated on to what extent they were able to appropriate Islam as a part of their own national heritage. At minimum, this meant trying to redefine Islamic festivals as nationalist ones-not only the Nabi Musa festival, but even the Prophet's Birthday; at most, a relinquishing of one's faith and conversion to Islam.”[121]

 

Nor was this behaviour confined to Palestinian Arab Christians. The Syrian Christian, Michel Aflaq, founder of the Baath Party, wrote; “Muhammad was the epitome of all the Arabs, so let all the Arabs today be Muhammad … Islam was an Arab movement and its meaning was the renewal of Arabism and its maturity … [even] Arab Christians will recognise that Islam constitutes for them a national culture in which they must immerse themselves so that they may understand and love it, and so that they may preserve Islam as they would preserve the most precious element in their Arabism.”[122] Leaving aside Muhammad’s personal history, given that he taught as absolute doctrines which directly contradicted Christianity (Jesus as son of God, Jesus death on the cross etc) this idea itself directly contradicts Christian scripture; “But even though we, or an angel from heaven, should preach to you a gospel contrary to that which we have preached to you, let him be accursed.” (Galatians 1:8) Given Muhammad’s personal history, in this context especially the battle of Khaybar and its continual referencing my modern Muslims as license to attack Jews, this quote from a Christian Arab is even more horrific.

 

The question for Palestine’s Christians was “to what extent was nationalism becoming a euphemism for apostacy?”

 

The Nabi Musa celebrations

 

The Christian participation in the nationalized Nabi Musa[123] celebrations make an interesting example of this. As previously noted, it was mainly the Orthodox who began to join in this Muslim festival.[124]

 

“Particularly during the early part of the Mandate, when Muslim-Christian solidarity was still strong, Christians were inclined to participate in the Nabi Musa celebration. Though ostensibly a religious festival, it quickly came to serve as a symbol of Muslim-Christian solidarity. …It thus had about it the air of a national holiday, and this is in fact how many Christians saw it. Christian Arabs generally came out to watch the festival's conclusion in Jerusalem [as they were not allowed to enter the actual sanctuary]. In her memoirs, Hala al- Sakakini, Khalil al- Sakakini’s daughter, recalled with great fondness sitting by St. Stephen's Gate to welcome the procession. She characterised the event largely in nationalistic terms: “Everywhere you could see the Arab flag with its green, red, white and black colours: fluttering high above the heads. The scene filled us with enthusiasm and national pride. Every now and then strong young men would link their arms together and, forming circles, would start dancing the dabkeh and singing. It was thrilling to watch and wonderful for the spirit. Although the Nabi Musa feast was supposed to be a religious occasion, it was in fact a national day in which all the Arabs of Palestine, Christians and Muslims alike, shared.”[125]

 

Christians may have had to accept second class status, not going on the actual march, or being allowed into the sanctuary, but the genuine happiness of her account cannot be doubted.

 

The festival also (as seen above) became increasingly nationalistic, a fact which in no way compromised its Islamic roots. In 1920 [several years before the above recollection], the climax of the celebrations turned violent, in what has become known as “the Nabi Musa riot.” “The crowd returning from Nabi Musa into Jerusalem reportedly shouted ‘Independence! Independence!’ and ‘Palestine is our land, the Jews are our dogs!’ Arab police joined in applause, and violence started. The local Arab population ransacked the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem. The Torath Chaim Yeshiva was raided, and Torah scrolls were torn and thrown on the floor, and the building then set alight. During the next three hours, 160 Jews were injured. Khalil al- Sakakini witnessed the eruption of violence in the Old City: ‘[A] riot broke out, the people began to run about and stones were thrown at the Jews. … The riot reached its zenith. All shouted, "Muhammad's religion was born with the sword". … I immediately walked to the municipal garden. … my soul is nauseated and depressed by the madness of humankind.’"[126]

 

Violence was welcomed and often encouraged at such Muslim events. “For many Muslims, nationalist sentiment often found its strongest expression during Islamic religious festivals.”[127] Even the Palestine Communist Party felt it necessary at its Seventh Congress to call for increased propaganda efforts at the mosques during Friday prayers and at popular religious festivals such as the Nabi Musa festival, noting that it was "during such mass celebrations that the fighting capacity of the fellahin [was] appreciably aroused."[128]

 

Sadly, this violence does not seem to have dampened Orthodox Christian participation in it. The year after the riot, signs reading “Moslems and Christians are brothers” were held, and a Christian, Jubran Kosma, spoke in favour of Arab farmers and against Zionism.[129]

 

Orthodox Christians were apparently happy to continue participating in a festival which had seen Jews murdered and their holy places trashed. This in itself is horrific but notice also two additional problems. The festival celebrates the Muslim tomb of Moses. Deuteronomy 34:6 “And Moses the servant of the LORD died there in Moab, as the LORD had said. He buried him in Moab, in the valley opposite Beth Peor, but to this day no one knows where his grave is.” According to their own Scriptures, Moses is not buried there.[130] They are participating in a festival whose basis contradicts their own religion. They were prepared to sacrifice fidelity to their faith for a chance to show solidarity with the Muslim majority.

 

The second, more pragmatic problem was one they were well aware of. A Muslim crowd, once aroused, could very easily turn against Christians as well as against Jews. As the Muslim/Christian detente of the early 1920s fractured, in 1928, thousands of Muslims on the pilgrimage chanted “down with the Missionary Conference” (which was taking place in Jerusalem at the same time), and also “down with the missionaries.”[131] In 1931, the Nabi Musa festival, “once considered an expression of Muslim-Christian unity, now became an occasion during which agitators ‘urged the multitude to fall upon the Jew and Christian infidels and slay them.’"[132] The Orthodox were debasing their own religion and selling their birthright for worthless dreams. In the end, they would have nothing. This could be seen as a minor affair, but given Jesus view of the Torah (Matthew 5:18), and the increasing difficulties Palestinian Christians were having honouring the Old Testament as God’s word, celebrating a blatant contradiction of its teachings for the sake of unity with Muslims was a really bad idea.

 

Frantzman sees parallels between the Palestinian Christian behaviour here and the embrace of Communism by the Jews of Eastern Europe. Like the Palestinian Christians, the Jews formed a national minority historically discriminated against, but within several social niches, they embraced communism to blur the lines between them and the majority, as Communism, like Arab nationalism, promised to erase communal identity.[133]

 

The Christians had made themselves prominent in the nationalist movement, and they wished to prove their loyalty to a greater Arab nation. The Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husayni while leading an explicitly Islamic nationalism, was also eager to enlist Christians as loyal and useful dhimmis. He was quoted as saying “We even feel ourselves called upon to protect the Holy Places of the Christians.”

 

“The Mufti was not the originator of the Muslim-Christian Associations (MCAs) that began to pop up beginning in 1918, but he worked hard to collaborate with them. MCAs were established in many major cities, primarily Jerusalem, Jaffa and Nablus. The MCAs were prominent in the establishment of the Palestinian Arab Congresses (first in January 1918), worked with the King-Crane commission in 1919 and helped create the Arab Executive in December 1920. Ann Lesch claims that they declined in the late 1920s, were revived in the early 1930s but were then taken over by radicals and militants and lost their Christian flavour.”[134]

 

Note also that as well as liberal nationalism, another type of nationalism was also growing in Europe. Fascist nationalism, with its emphasis on power, its anti-Semitism and its opposition to Britain would become a very attractive alternative for many Arabs (all the more so because of the good German ties from Ottoman days).

 

The 1921 Jaffa riot

 

“On May 1, 1921 . . . hundreds of Arabs rampaged through the streets of Jaffa with clubs, knives, metal bars, and pistols. With an unstoppable drive for murder, the rioters stabbed helpless Jews to death, cruelly beat infants and the elderly, raped women and girls, and burned and looted anything they could get their hands on. Forty-three Jews died that day, and many others were wounded or died later on from their injuries.”^[135] The riot mainly involved Muslim Arabs and Jews.

 

Murderous mob violence was celebrated and never repented of.[136] It underwrote all of the Muslim communities demands, “give us what we want, or else.” In general, the Christian community struggled with this violence. Aversion to it impeded their desire to participate fully in the cause. Historically, they had good reason to fear Muslim violence, and their religious scruples against it often seemed to be an unwanted hinderance. It has also become a standing reproach from the Muslim community, who saw in their reticence signs of disloyalty. During the Second Intifada, many Muslims complained of the lack of Martyrs [suicide bombers] from the Christian population.[137]   

 

This reticence was unfortunately by no means absolute. The Anglican missionary C. Martin reported on the Arab riots in Jaffa in 1921; “A large number of the Jews are terror stricken … Unfortunately for the work, Arabs, who call themselves Christians, united with the Moslems in their endeavours to shed Jewish blood, so we have the unpleasant task of explaining and apologising for the falseness of this un-Christlike Christianity.”^[138] Makhoul, on the basis of very little, also and disturbingly writes; “We can also say that there was a Muslim-Christian solidarity in the Jaffa riots.”[139]

 

Continued Christian opposition to Jews and Zionism

 

In November 1923, Frederick Kisch, head of the Palestine Zionist Executive, wrote to the High Commissioner that Christians were “intensely hostile,” and decrying their “undue influence over administrative machinery.”^[140] “One Zionist in 1925 lamented; ‘Christians are, from first to last, our deadly enemies … Catholic or Greek Orthodox or Protestant, they have one thing in common: a fanatical religious hatred of the Jews. … Muslims generally do not hate the Jew to the extent to which the Christians hate him … whereas it would be hard to find a case of real friendship between a Christian and a Jew, sincere friendship between a Moslem and a Jew is far from being a rare thing.’”^[141] Two years to the day after the 1921 riots, Filastin ran a front page editorial entitled Martyrs Day; “One hundred brave sons of Palestine became martyrs – and now Palestine sees them as having died for the sake of salvation. … The memory of that day … restores … our enthusiasm and pushes us forward.”^[142] This is a disturbing and profoundly Islamic usage of the word “martyr.” Why would a Christian paper say that Muslims dying fighting Jews were martyrs? 1922, Arab Christians called for an economic boycott of the Jews, but this was not adopted by the Arab Executive Committee, which believed it to be unrealistic. Christians were again ahead of the crowd, leading the charge for anti-Semitism!!

 

Other Jews thought there might be some hope; in 1922 a member of the Zionist Executive wrote that “we should try to bring the Protestant and Orthodox Arabs to our side, as anti-Semitism in Christian circles was mainly originating from Rome.”^[143]

 

Writing in 1923 D.G. Hogarth found that “the alliance between Moslems and Christians is not too stable; interests of Moslem landowners and Christian traders are by no means identical; Christian supporters of the pan-Arab movement in Syria, as in Palestine, has been decidedly lukewarm, and a pro-Turkish or pan-Islamic movement could find no Christian backing whatever.  The influence of the Islamo-Christian Society on the country as a whole can easily be exaggerated.  … the cause of Christian hostility to the Zionists is Jewish competition. As shopkeepers, craftsmen, skilled laborers, traders, the Jews are the rivals of the local Christians.”[144]

 

In November 1924, Najib Nassar wrote a series of articles appearing in al Kamil, addressed to the Pope. He tried to draw the attention of the world to the dangers of Jewish immigration and land purchases. He warned the country would soon become empty of Christians and Muslims. He ended with a call to Western Christendom, headed by the Pope, to come to the aid of Eastern Christendom, in saving the Christian character of Palestine and the sanctuaries sacred to both the Muslim and Christian world.^[145]

 

In 1925, the mufti of Gaza, Muhammad al-Husseini, issued a fatwa that Jews had ceased to be a protected minority (dhimmies). Christians who aided them would therefore be expelled from the country, and Muslims who aided them had abandoned their faith, and would not be permitted their wives or a Muslim burial.[146] This ruling was affirmed and expanded upon in the first assembly of Muslim religious scholars in Palestine in 1935. Hajj Amin was the first to sign it. A short time after this, in February of the same year, a congress of Christian Arab clergy issued their own declaration forbidding the sale of land to Jews. As Cohen notes; “the sanctity of land was not restricted to Christianity’s holy sites but applied to the entire country; whoever sells or speculates in the sale of any portion of the homeland is considered the same as one who sells the place of Jesus’ birth or his tomb and as such will be considered a heretic against the principles of Christianity and all believers are required to ban and interdict him.”[147]

A marriage of convenience

For diverse reasons, Muslim/Christian relations during the Mandate were reasonable, but not ideal. Interestingly, there was more anti-Christian feeling when Zionism was less threatening, showing again the importance of anti-Zionism as an external unifying factor.

 

In 1923, more Jews left Palestine than arrived. This led to a cooling of relations between the Christians and Muslims. The Muslim community started making demands on the Christians. They believed that Christians were faring much better than Muslims under the Mandate. In particular, Christians were getting too many government jobs. As a result, they were accused of dual loyalty to Britain. In 1923, Samuel noted that he was "continually receiving representations on the question of the small number of Muslims employed in positions of responsibility."^[148] These demands would continue and get stronger as the Mandate wore on. [Due mainly to their westernized missionary school education, Christian Arabs dominated the urbanized middle class. Around 50,000 Arabs lived in the bourgeoise neighbourhoods of the three principle cities, of these, 35-40,000 were Christians. They also did dominate government jobs. At a time when Christians comprised 9% of the population, in 1921, they occupied 2/3rds of government jobs, this figure falling to ½ by 1938.^[149]]

 

Adnan Abu-Ghazaleh has recalled that “the visibility of Christian officials aroused the suspicions of Palestinian Muslims, who accused the British of favouring the Christians community and of trying to elevate its economic and social position at the expense of that of the Muslims. Thus Palestinian society became more divided along religious lines during the Mandate.”[150] Christian education resulted in success but too much success gave rise to accusations of collaboration or favouritism.[151] Successful, visible Christians were an enduring offence to Muslims.

 

In 1923, with Jewish immigration stalled, a Palestinian state suddenly seemed possible. Christian concerns about how an actual Arab state might treat non-Muslim minorities took on greater urgency. As Hourani expresses it, Christians could never "be certain that Arab nationalism would not turn out to be a new form of Islamic self-assertion."^[152] After 1924, Arab nationalism become increasingly Islamic, but Christians remain committed to it, or emigrated.

 

This lessening of the “Zionist threat” between 1923-27 allowed each side (Christian and Muslim) to view each other more clearly. Muslim nationalism became more Islamic (“we don’t need you”), the Christians found British rule to be more attractive (“please stay and protect us from the Muslims”). These discoveries impacted on how both groups then faced the renewed Zionist activity from 1928 onwards.

 

In the final analysis, the Christians of Palestine would rather be wiped out by the Moslem Arabs than thrive with the Jews, because when push came to shove, they were Arabs first, and Christians second. They chose nationalism over faith.[153] In 1923, the Zionist Executive believed that Arab Christians working in the British administration were responsible for the harassment and firing of moderate/sympathetic Arab officials, including the dismissal of the mayor of Haifa, Hasan Shukri, who believed that the Jews were a blessing and not a curse to the Arab people.[154]

 

Indeed, faith became the handmaid to their wider Arab nationalism; they were prepared to place its deepest truths and symbols at its service. Again, see the modern abuse of Christmas and Easter by these churches and their Western allies for examples of this continuing problem. [Christmas is about the separation wall near Bethlehem, Easter about Palestinian suffering.] Seeking the praises of men, they do not even realise that their fellow Muslims despise them for so degrading their own religion. The Hajj is neither cancelled in protest, nor re-defined in terms of Palestine.

 

Now, most Muslims were certainly sincere in their commitment to an Arab state inclusive of Christians. The vast majority of Muslims had simply not thought through the question beyond vague assurances (and a false mythology) that the situation of Christians (as with other 'People of the Book') had always been secure under Islam.[155] Christians had little leverage in this respect. They were becoming marginalized. Most Muslims were quite happy to make common cause with their Christian compatriots, even while seeing their Arab identity as something inherently 'Islamic.'

 

Al-Sakakini noted bitterly that; “if the people love me and respect me, it is because they think that I am nearer to Islam than to Christianity, because I am wealthy in the Arabic language, because they fancy that I am a conservative and will not depart from Oriental customs under any circumstances. But if I were to struggle with a Moslem who is less founded in knowledge and heritage than I, I would not doubt that they would prefer him to survive … No matter how high my standing may be in science and literature, no matter how sincere my patriotism is, no matter how much I do revere this nation, even if I burn my fingers before its sight, as long as I am not Muslim, I am naught."^[156] Christians were finding it increasingly necessary to take a radical a stance against the Government. Otherwise, they were suspect.

 

Coinciding with the movement's Islamisation was indeed a growing Islamic hostility towards Christians. Even while working together, most Muslims definitely viewed them as inferior. During the latter part of 1932, Christians were subjected to sporadic attacks by gangs of Muslims in a number of Palestinian towns, and in Lydda, a church was desecrated. As noted by one British official in January 1933; "the existing discord between Moslems and Christians in this country [was] only kept beneath the surface by the constant efforts of political leaders.”^[157] In November 1932, the Congress of the Educated Muslim Young Men was established. From the start, it took a strong anti-Christian tone. Alfred Rok, a Melkite, member of the Arab delegation to London, an associate of the Mufti and later member of the Arab Higher Committee, referred to the Young Men's Muslim Association in Jaffa as the "root of the evil."^[158] When some Muslims, writing in the newspaper al-J'ami ah al-Islamiyyah, blamed the Christians for their lack of jobs, the Christians in turn blamed the Jews[159] (echoes of the 1840 Damascus “Blood Libel.”)

 

Wider problems

 

It was not only the Christian Arabs of Palestine that were experiencing problems. The situation of Christians throughout the Middle East had again begun to deteriorate. Sporadic massacres of Christian broke out across the former Ottoman empire. With the pull-out of the British in Iraq in 1930, for example, anti-Christian sentiment swept the country. Attacks on the Assyrian Christians in the north culminated in the machine-gun massacre of hundreds of Assyrian men, women and children by the Iraqi army at Simayl in 1933. The Nestorians were forced to flee into French Syria. In 1937, a massacre of Christians in 'Amuda would lead to a strong movement for local autonomy and even independence, led by the Syrian Catholic Patriarch.^[160] The Christians in Palestine watched, and drew their own lessons.

 

At the extreme, in 1926 Khalil al-Sakakini urged Palestinian Christians to convert to Islam for the sake of unity in the national movement. On October 5 of 1930, the editor of al-Karmil, Najib Nassar likewise wrote a series of articles asserting that the only solution to the 'disputes' between Muslims and Christians was that "the Christians adopt the Islamic faith. In this way the constant conflicts which hinder the development of the national movement [would] be brought to an end.”^[161] Arab Orthodox Khalil Iskandar al-Qubrus in 1931 issued a pamphlet entitled “A Call on the Christian Arabs to Embrace Islam.”^[162] In it, he denounced European Christianity as a corrupt religion and accused European monks and missionaries of sowing discord between Palestine's Muslims and Christians. By contrast, he described Islam as a benevolent and egalitarian religion, and concluded by calling on all Arab Christians to become Muslim "in order to free them from the trivialities of the foreigners and to rid them of their corruption.” Note that calls, or threats that Palestinian Christians will convert to Islam if Western churches are not more anti-Zionist have continued from then, through the 30s and 40s up to the present. It is the attitude of those who do not know the Gospel (Mark 10:28, Philippians 3:8). They needed to choose the praises of God not men! To their shame, they chose rather to conform to this world. Friendship with this world does not work! In their 1937 “Letter to the bishops of London,” the Anglican PNCC wrote; “After the fate of the Armenians, the Greeks of Asia Minor, the Assyrians, the Abyssinians and the Arabs of Palestine, the faith of our Christians is also being shaken … in the value of Christianity itself …we are greatly afraid that the tide of nationality will carry many off their feet into unbelief or apostacy. … Palestine has become a theatre of politics where people have little thought for anything else. This is making the work of the Church well-nigh impossible.”[163]

 

Many Muslims were also becoming increasingly anti-Christian. The Hizb al-Istiqldl (Independence – Arab nationalist) Party organised a demonstration in Nablus protesting the dedication of the Y. M. C. A. in Jerusalem.[164] The Palestinian journalist Muhammad Tawil wrote in 1930 attacking the Christians and the MCAs and what he viewed as “the unnatural bond the nationalist movement had created between them and the Muslims. … Christians had joined the nationalist movement only to advance their own narrow interests.”[165] Many Muslim nationalists including Hajj Amin al-Husseini, were concerned about the growing hostility towards Christians. They considered it vital to present a united front to the British, and attempts were made to ease tensions.

The Missions Conference  

At the end of March 1928, an international conference of Protestant missionaries convened in Jerusalem. Muslim agitation began even before the Conference had started. [They wanted to pick a fight.] Demonstrations took place throughout Palestine for the duration of the Conference. At the Nabi Musa pilgrimage, which took place almost concurrently with the Conference, thousands of Muslims chanted 'down with the Missionary Conference.”^[166] A week after the conference, Muslims in Jerusalem closed their shops in protest against the Conference and against missionary activity in general.

 

An important goal of the Conference, stated by Dr. Mott at the opening meeting, was the promotion of greater cooperation between the churches of the East and West, so that the "missionary enthusiasm which characterized the churches of early Christianity [might be] set free."^[167] A common theme was the special role of indigenous churches in promoting Christianity in their home-countries. Most Christian Arabs in Palestine rejected the idea and several articles appeared in Christian run newspapers equating missionary activity with colonialism. Not a single Christian from Palestine attended the Missionary Conference.^[168] [Again, note that in the 2018 CATC conference in Bethlehem, a local bishop proclaimed; ‘we do not convert Muslims.’]

 

Shamefully, the Conference showed that when push came to shove, the local churches would absolutely refuse to do anything which would antagonise the Muslim majority, especially on such a sensitive matter as conversion.[169] They would refuse to obey the clear and urgent command of the one they called master (Matthew 28:18-20). Local churches would not preach the Gospel but would preach Arab nationalism.

 

As the 1920s progressed, Palestinian nationalist activity in general increasingly took on a religious character. It became more centred round Islamic institutions such as the mosques the YMMAs and the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC). Muslims were also increasingly expressing their grievances in religious terms. For example, the belief that they were being discriminated against ‘as Muslims’ with respect to government positions. By the end of the 1920s, nationalist demonstrations were also increasingly being organised around the Friday prayers at mosques.^[170]

1929 Western Wall riots Islam supreme, Christians submissive

 

The decisive event as far as the nationalist movement's Islamisation, however, would not involve Christians at all. The 1929 Riots began in August of that year at the Western Wall. The disturbances soon spread to the rest of Palestine. The worst attacks took place in Hebron, where more than sixty Jews were murdered, and the rest forced to flee. By 30 August, the disturbances had finally come to an end.^[171] To quote from Wikipedia; “The riots took the form, in the most part, of attacks by Arabs on Jews accompanied by destruction of Jewish property. During the week of riots from 23 to 29 August, 133 Jews were killed and between 198–241 others were injured, a large majority of whom were unarmed and were murdered in their homes by Arabs, while at least 116 Arabs were killed and at least 232 were injured, mostly by the British police while trying to suppress the riots, although around 20 were killed by Jewish attacks or indiscriminate British gunfire. During the riots, 17 Jewish communities were evacuated.”[172]

 

The Western Wall Riots had a major impact on the internal political struggle within the Arab leadership, increasing the power of Haj Amin al-Husseini. They again intensified religious sentiment among Muslims and showed that religious sensibilities ran a good deal deeper than nationalistic ones. There was virtually no Christian involvement. In a few cases, they helped to limit the violence. The city of Acre, for instance, was largely spared the worst of it thanks to the actions of the Christian Arab District Officer there. Wasserstein however noted that “Christian involvement was slight.  Indeed, we may properly call these riots Muslim-Jewish rather than Arab-Jewish since Christians in general remained ostentatiously neutral.”[173]

“For Christian Arabs, the riots presented a dilemma. On the one hand, they were under great pressure to demonstrate their solidarity with their Muslim compatriots. On the other hand, many found it difficult to condone the religiously fanatical violence of the incident. Such fanaticism might just as easily be directed against them. Muslim chants during the rioting of ‘Friday... death to the Jews; Saturday, death to the Christians... and Sunday, death to the Government officials’ must have been concerning. At the same time, they also felt the need to show some support. The Christian press therefore put the blame on the Jews. Additionally, they stressed the incident's nationalist aspect.”[174]

This stressing of the “nationalistic aspect” of what was clearly primarily a religious dispute over the Western Wall would see the Christian community capitulate to the Muslim majority to the point where Muslim Palestinian religious demands became by definition nationalist demands. Did this extend to the Muslim ban (still in effect during this time) on Jews and Christians praying in the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron? It did, and still does extend to supporting the ban on Jews (and Christians) praying on the Temple Mount. Palestinian Christian support for this ban has been restated in 2021.[175]

 

On the 27^th of October, 1929, the president of the Arab General Assembly, Yacoub Farraj (an Orthodox Christian), stated; “The Buraq (Western Wall) is a purely Moslem Place and is part of the Masjid al-Aksa. The rights of the Moslems in the Buraq are indisputable. … In the cause of the Buraq the Moslems and Christians are one and the same racially, nationally and politically.”[176] Filastin editor Issa el-Issa signed and published a similar statement declaring that” ‘Moslems and Christians alike are concerned [about al- Buraq] from a national, patriotic and political point of view.”[177]

 

In a joint letter to the Arab Executive, “Muslim, Christian and Druze representatives from Shefaʿamr (where there was a Christian majority) gave the issue a nationalist interpretation by confirming their support for Arab claims to al-Buraq and blamed British inaction for allowing the violence to erupt. The ‘Christians and Muslims of Birzeit’ (another largely Christian village) sent a telegram to the high commissioner protesting the government’s position. Those branches of the MCA still in operation also filed protests in support of Arab claims. Christians certainly wanted to make it clear to the wider Palestinian population that they stood behind Muslim concerns about Zionist designs for the Western Wall and temple area. … Episcopal lawyer Mughannam Mughannam was among the signatories of an Arab Executive telegram to the high commissioner declaring the innocence of all Arabs in the August violence. Husseini supporter, Arab Executive member and head of the Christian Committee for the Relief of Moslem Sufferers at Jaffa, Alfred Rok (a Latin Christian) also organised a meeting of Muslims and Christians in Jaffa to send formal protests to the Colonial Office.”[178]

 

Palestinian Christian testimonies to the Shaw Commission also “asserted Muslim ownership of the Wailing Wall as an integral part of al-Aqsa Mosque. The Supreme Muslim Council made much of these supposedly unbiased testimonies, complaining after the release of the Commission's findings that ‘the Moslem side [had] procured unbiased witnesses, Palestinian Christians as well as foreigners, including Priests, Monks and guides to prove that [Jewish claims to the Wailing Wall were unfounded]... [but] the Commission [had] paid no heed to such evidence although the majority of these witnesses were impartial non-Moslems, Palestinians as well as foreigners.’"^[179]

 

Christian Arabs began to recognise the need to accommodate this decidedly Muslim concern. Articles began to appear in the Christian press explaining why Christians should care about the Muslim holy sites on nationalistic grounds. They argued that Islam was an 'Arab' religion, and since the Christians living in Palestine were Arabs, they had a duty to respect Islam and preserve its holy places.[180] They kowtowed to the violent majority and became dhimmis once again.

 

This marked an important moment for the Christians. Their hopes of promoting a largely secular nationalism had failed. Dreams of equality and a common cause with the Moslems likewise. Till then, it had been possible for Christians to see for themselves a role in helping to direct the nationalist movement; in shaping the nature of Arab identity and in determining the nature of any future Arab state. From this point on, Christians would become increasingly marginalized, able to do little beyond following the lead set by their Muslim compatriots. “There had always been a concern that aroused Muslim feeling might turn against them. But from now on, there was no way to prevent Muslim leaders from using religion as a means of appealing to the masses. The only way for Christians to maintain a role for themselves within the nationalist movement was to somehow demonstrate that a special relationship existed between them and Islam. By the end of the 1930s, Christian Arabs would be more concerned with trying to define their relationship to Islam than with defining a model of Arab identity intrinsically inclusive of non-Muslims.”^[181] “For many months the national movement focused on a specifically Islamic issue. Christian identification with the nationalist movement required a greater willingness to accept Islam, rather than Arabism, as a central focus of the movement. … An important result of these riots was that the Zionist–Arab conflict became a Jewish–Muslim conflict in the eyes of many Palestinians.”[182]

 

In the aftermath of the riots and the murder of 133 Jews, 120 men were arrested and charged either with murder or with abetting murder. Of these, 62 (some of whom were accused of murder), were then acquitted. The remaining 58 were found guilty of murder, and 26 of these were sentenced to death. As an act of clemency, and to avoid further violence, 23 of these then had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment. Only three Arab men, who were accused of committing “particularly brutal murders” were hanged. The executions occurred on June 17, 1930; a day that has come to be known as “Red Tuesday” in Palestinian history. There was a general strike throughout Palestine, and Arab crowds gathered in the town squares. At 8 o’clock, the first prisoner was hung. Church bells rang throughout the country[183], and Muslims recited the Surat al-Fatiha, the first verse of the Koran. At the conclusion of the hangings, the bodies were handed over to their families, and a funeral procession of thousands followed them to the Acre cemetery, led first by school children, followed by members of the Muslim-Christian Association.[184] That is, the Palestinian churches and Muslim-Christian Associations honored the Muslim murderers of Jewish civilians.  

 

The Palestinian Christian’s response to these deadly attacks by Muslims upon Jews was to support the Muslims. One hundred and thirty three Jews were murdered by Muslims, and the Palestinian Christians justified it. Romans 1:32 “Although they know God's righteous decree that those who do such things deserve death, they not only continue to do these very things but also approve of those who practice them.”

 

They were on the side of the Moslems, and they supported the Muslim claim to the Western Wall. Once again, speaking “as Christians” they towed the Muslim line, and white-washed murder. They were Arabs first, Christians second or purely in a community sense. They conformed to this world. Note recently (September 2015) Naim Ateek has echoed the Muslim charge that “the settlers are out of control, they are assaulting the Haram area on a continual basis.”[185]

 

The murder of al-Bahri

 

This obsequiousness spread; In September 1930, Jamil al-Bahri, a Melkite Christian, journalist, editor of the newspaper al-Zuhur and noted playwright, was murdered by Muslims over a land dispute in a cemetery. Rashid al-Haj Ibrahim, the superintendent of the Haifa Waqf and member of the Arab Executive, and Ramzi Amir, the Secretary of the local Young Men's Muslim Association were formally charged with instigating the offending mob, 15 of whom were later charged with murder. To make matters worse, a Muslim policeman present at the scene had helped some of the Muslims involved escape. “Strangest of all was when both Rashid al-Haj Ibrahim and Ramzi Amir, while being transferred from the Police Station to the Court Magistrate after having turned themselves in, expressed a preference that the Christian policeman accompanying them in the car be replaced by a Jew.”^[186] Local Moslems defended the murder and gave “fiery speeches” that the Christians were a “corrupt race.”^[187] Violence spread to Jaffa, and the Christians were afraid it would mushroom, as it had in Lebanon in the previous century.

 

This then was a serious threat to Muslim/Christian harmony. A local Christian had been murdered by the head of the Waft, this murder was aided by a Muslim policeman, and defended by local Muslim community, in anti-Christian terms. Would the Christian community simply accept the murder of one of its own, or would they stand up and demand better? Sadly, they responding to Muslim violence just as they had been forced to do for the past 1400 years. The main Christian voices (especially the Arab Orthodox) utterly abandoned the Catholic victim and re-pledged their support for the Muslim majority.^[188]

 

Individual Christians and Christian leaders in private, did respond differently. Immediately following the murder, the British Government began receiving petitions from Christian Arabs disavowing any connection with the national movement as well as with Muslims.[189] The following year, the High Commissioner commented that; “Christian Arab leaders ... have admitted to me that in establishing close political relations with the Moslems the Christians have not been uninfluenced by fear of the treatment they might suffer at the hands of the Moslem majority in certain eventualities.”[190]

 

The Melkites did attempt to make a unified response. The New York Times reported that following al-Bahri’s death, they “immediately sought to build a pan-Christian coalition.” Melkite and Latin Catholic leaders met at the home of Melkite Archbishop Gregorios Hajjar to solidify a Christian stance against Muslims. The Society of Christian Youth in Haifa, a group with clear ties to the Melkites, “wrote a strongly worded letter to the Mandatory government complaining that the Arab leadership was not taking the situation seriously.” The Society rejected the leadership of the Arab Higher Committee (led by Islamic leader Haj Amin al-Husayni). They asserted that the British could better serve the Christians interests, and declared their desire “to have [their] rights protected by the mandatory power to whom [they] swear allegiance.”[191]

 

This nascent protest was utterly rejected by the rest of Palestine’s Christian communities. The Orthodox Christian leaders were infuriated. “Christian Arabs don’t support any group of Christians who try to view the Haifa event as a purely sectarian occurrence,” declared ʿIsa al-Bandak, editor of Bethlehem’s Swat al-Shaʿb. The Filastin editor ʿIsa al-ʿIsa, blamed the Zionists. Even the Catholic Christian Khalil Sabbagh insisted that “All Christians of Tulkarm disapprove of the work of the group of men in Haifa and their absurd demands. [The Christians] declare publicly their support for the path of unity of Muslims and Christians under the Arab Executive of Jerusalem.”[192] Haiduc-Dale summarized; “Whether because of AHC intervention or the Melkites’ inability to garner Christian support, Muslim–Christian relations did not spiral into violence.”

 

The local Christians largely kept quiet and did nothing about the murder of al-Bahri. They hoped thereby to avoid further violence, and to show the Muslim majority that they were good dhimmis. That you could murder them, and still they would not complain. They also hoped that this silence would prove their greater commitment to the nationalist cause. “Orthodox Christian insistence on nationalist over communal identification was a common occurrence during the British Mandate period. … the overwhelming public narrative pushed by Arab Christians throughout the Mandate was that Christians fully embraced their nationalist credentials.”[193]

 

This contrasts greatly with the response and self-respect of the Druze community. “When the Revolt of 1936–1939 fully ceased, the Druze were quick to remember the persecution they had faced at the hands of largely Muslim rebel groups and sought to strengthen their ties to the Zionists.”^[194] Indeed, the Druze subsequently allied themselves with Israel in 1948. Christians did not draw similar conclusions. Many Christians still saw Arab Nationalism and Communism as their best bets towards full membership in Arab society. For them Zionism offered no advantages.^[195]

 

The supposed Muslim/Christian unity was always paper thin. The Christian al-Zuhour (formerly edited by al-Bahri) ran an article strongly questioning the value of supposed Muslim-Christian unity. Zionist Executive Chairman, Frederick Kisch, wrote on October 3, 1930; “if the Christian Arabs now realize that they have been unwise to stimulate Moslem fanaticism, I believe that such a change of attitude is for their own eventual safety.”^[196] In 1932, there was talk in Haifa of Christians boycotting Muslim businesses, and there were street fights between Muslim and Christian youth. Nevertheless, the Mufti likewise continued to value Christian participation in the nationalist movement.

 

The MacDonald Letter

 

On the 13^th of February 1931 the MacDonald Letter reaffirming British support for Jewish migration to Palestine was sent to Chaim Weizmann.[197] In March, a nationalist conference was convened over how best to respond to it. Some members called for a policy of civil disobedience and non-cooperation with the Government. Others suggested that reaction be limited to a political and economic boycott of the Jews. Christians figured prominently among the latter.^[198] That is, Christians remained wary of communal violence (which could turn against them), and again advocated boycotting Jews as they had done in 1920 and 1922.

 

Most Christians continued to favour moderation. The growing bloodshed concerned many of them. They could see that the nationalist movement was becoming increasingly violent and Islamic. Unlike the Druze, they did not consider aligning themselves with the Jewish people. Rather, faced with increasing violence from the Muslim community, and a leadership which continued to advocate for Arab solidarity even as they were attacked, emigration to South America became a common response for the average Palestinian Christian.

 

Infamously, this emigration itself was then blamed, not on the Muslim community (which was also carrying out sporadic attacks upon local Christian communities across the Middle East), but rather on the Jewish community! This had been the case since 1924, when in his “Open Letter to the Pope” (published in his al-Karmil), Najib Nassar warned that Jewish immigration would lead to the complete extinction of the Christian community.[199] This theme was also promoted by the Catholic Church internationally. For example, on July 16, 1921 the New York-based Catholic journal, The Tablet, printed an article with the unbelievable heading "Christians are Menaced by Jews." This cited emigration statistics to prove that Christians were leaving Palestine because they were "tired of Jewish interference." On 14 June 1921 the Pope likewise declared the Vatican's opposition to Zionism and claimed that "the new civil arrangements [in Palestine] aim ... at ousting Christianity from its previous position to put the Jews in its place."[200] Again, this continues to be a common charge made by local Christian leaders to try and minimize Muslim/Christian tensions, and also by foreign Christians who are theologically opposed to a Jewish state.

The World Islamic Conference

In December 1931, two conferences were held. The World Islamic Conference was held on December 7, 1931. It was a personal triumph for Hajj Amin and served to redefine the Palestinian cause as an international Islamic one. He declared that Zionism posed a threat to the Islamic integrity of the third holiest city in Islam. Jerusalem and Palestine became central to the international Muslim world. "[the] aim [of the Conference was] to show to the Zionists a united Muslim front, and to make Muslims all over the world notice the injustice being done to their Palestinian co-religionists.”^[201] Palestine was no longer simply a parochial issue of concern only to Palestinians. Within Arab nationalism, it was an issue for all Arabs (as was Syria and Egypt etc), and as a Muslim issue it was of concern to all Muslims. Arab nationalism was subservient to Islam. This had profound consequences for Arab Christians who supported Arab nationalism. For a Palestinian Muslim, of course Islam had always been the pinnacle of Arab nationalism, but for Arab Christians hoping to avoid a religious definition, it was the end of secular nationalism.

Hajj Amin was genuinely concerned that the Conference should not alienate Palestine's Christian Arabs. It passed a resolution expressing gratitude to Palestine and Transjordan's Christians for having supported the Conference, together with a message of congratulations to the Second Arab-Orthodox Conference, then taking place in Jaffa. In return, many of Palestine's Christian Arabs publicly declared their support for the conference. The nationalist cause was being transformed into an Islamic one, with Christian approval. This change did generate regional support (something the Christians would obviously welcome), but also had the effect of further marginalizing Christian Arabs.

The Second Arab Orthodox Congress took place in Jaffa at the same time. It promoted a strong sense of Arab-nationalism within the Orthodox community. Many felt a sense of common purpose with the World Islamic Conference, then taking place. Indeed, the Arab Orthodox Congress demanded that the Islamic Conference address the authorities on their behalf regarding the election of a new Patriarch. The Orthodox cause "ought to be the cause of all the Arabs, Muslim as well as Christian.”^[202] In response, the World Islamic Conference resolved that "the Orthodox question [be considered] as part of the bigger Arab question, and to draw the attention of the Government to the right of Orthodox Palestinians to elect an Arab patriarch."^[203] The Second Arab Orthodox Congress had sought to redefine a 'church' issue (the question of the succession of the Patriarch) in nationalist terms, the Islamic Conference had done exactly the opposite, redefining the Palestinian/nationalist cause as an Islamic one. Palestinian Christianity had become the handmaid of Palestinian nationalism, which in turn was now revealed as the handmaid of Islam.

Palestinian Christians responded to the World Islamic Conference by highlighting the worldwide Christian significance of Palestine/Jerusalem, as complementary to Palestine's worldwide Islamic significance. This was clearly also an effort to show their own continuing importance, and to shore up their value to the Muslim majority. Arguably, Christians hoped in this way to maintain for themselves a role in the nationalist movement in spite of its increasing Islamisation and their diminishing numbers on the ground. Thus, for instance, many called for an Islamic-Catholic alliance against Zionism. A lengthy editorial in al-Karmil called on Haj Amin al-Husseini to seek out an alliance with the Vatican. In other cases, Palestinian Christians called on Protestant Britain to “wake up and reject Zionism.”[204] Nor were these overtures without success; "The belief that such an alliance was possible was not entirely without basis, as indeed the Vatican had often expressed its concern about Zionism.”^[205] Over the following decades Palestinian Christian pretensions would repeatedly find willing allies in the bad theology of a shamefully large number of Western denominations.

 

Both of these responses, however elevated the religious over the Arab or the Palestinian issue. By stressing the religious element, Palestinian Christians were once again assuming the role of a subservient, minority community. Their hopes of controlling, or even contributing to the definition of who they were within the larger Palestinian community had proved wholly illusionary.

This return to sectarian identities carried with it a whole raft of further ramifications. The Arab claim to Palestine was clear, but the Christian Arab claim to the Holy Land was more complex. As a religious community, their one demographic constant was that they would always be a minority, under either Muslim or Jewish domination. Their past 1400 years of experience could make one wonder on what basis they would agitate for its continuation as opposed to testing the claims of Jewish tolerance. Equally, why should the international Christian community fight to see local Christians placed under Muslim rather than Jewish rule? Religious definitions raised awkward questions! For the Christians (who desperately needed the international support of fellow Christians to show their value to the Muslim community), these questions were then answered on the basis of nationalism. Christianity became subservient to Arab nationalism at precisely the same time that Arab nationalism became subservient to Islam. All ground for mutual respect was gone.

What began as a strategy to safeguard their newfound equality ended in the most traditional and ingrained of relationships; the Christians cow-towing to their Muslim masters and sticking the boot into the Jews. “Muslim and Christian children rarely played with one another and would ‘only unite to persecute the poor little Jews.’"  Matthew 12:43-45 "When an evil spirit comes out of a man, it goes through arid places seeking rest and does not find it. ⁴⁴ Then it says, 'I will return to the house I left.' When it arrives, it finds the house unoccupied, swept clean and put in order. ⁴⁵ Then it goes and takes with it seven other spirits more wicked than itself, and they go in and live there. And the final condition of that man is worse than the first. That is how it will be with this wicked generation."

With that sorted out, beginning in 1933, external factors again became significant. Following the establishment of the Nationalist-Socialist regime in Germany, there was a large jump in Jewish immigration to Palestine, up from 9,553 the previous year to 30,327.

In general, Palestinian Muslims became more extreme, while Palestinian Christians reluctantly followed. As will be repeatedly seen, Christians had very little participation at the street level. This lack of participation, of street cred, was most definitely noticed by the Muslim community, and caused the already crumbling reputation of the Palestinian Christians further massive harm. There were several reasons for this lack of participation;

 

• The majority of demonstrations were organized on Fridays following Islamic prayers.
• Acts of violence were also most likely during Muslim festivals.
• They rightly feared Muslim mobs – they had been eyewitnesses to Muslim violence in Syria and Lebanon in the 1860s, and of the ongoing anti-Christian violence around them, Anatolia 1922 etc. (In 1924, Palestinian Muslims collected for the Turkish victims of the Turkey/Greek war, while the Palestinian Christians collected for the Greek, Christian victims.)
• Groups which linked nationalist feelings with Islamic passions and were more fervent than those organised by the Muslim-Christian Associations (itself a significant and ominous development).

 

In this context, it is important to remember the 1931 blood libel which the Filastin tried to spread. Possibly in response to the growing Muslim charges of lack of involvement in the struggle, this Orthodox paper attempted to ferment a specifically Christian violence against the Jewish community.  

 

On the surface, cooperation between Muslims and Christians continued, though not at the same level as during the early part of the Mandate. Muslim-Christian solidarity was most apparent in women's organisations. For instance, on 15 April 1933 (three weeks after Hitler became dictator in Germany via the passing of the Enabling Act of March 24), Muslim and Christian women organised a coordinated protest against Jewish immigration. In general, however, the great majority of Christian Arabs were not happy with the increased violence and Islamism growing within the Nationalist movement.[206] They were being forced back into a subservient and powerless dhimmitude. As noted, they also continued to emigrate in large numbers.

 

For their part, many Muslims became increasingly anti-Christian. The Istiqlal Party organised a demonstration in Nablus protesting the dedication of the Y M C A in Jerusalem.^[207] Resentment at being ruled by a “Christian” power fed directly into this. In his 1924 letter to the Pope, Nassar had already expressed a concern that the good relations between "Muslims and Christians, who had lived side by side under Muslim rule for hundreds of years, would not survive a further twenty years under Christian rule.”[208]

 

The great majority of Christians still supported political moderation. The Christian-run paper Mirat al-Sharq went so far as to demonstrate a strong willingness to compromise with the Zionists.[209] Other Christians supported the Husseini camp, and a number were appointed to the party bureau for the Palestine Arab Party. These included Alfred Rok (as might be expected[210]), but also Emil al-Gawhri, a Latin Catholic and the Party's Secretary, and Michel 'Azar. This both reflected the historical tendency of Catholics to affiliate with the Husseini family, and the radical politics of these individuals. While the base of Hajj Amin's support was the Muslim peasantry, their inclusion could be seen as an attempt to reach out to the Christians, whom he valued for their contacts with the West.

 

The final factor in the increasing extremism which would lead to the General Strike and the Great Revolt was 'Izz-id-din al-Qassam. Al-Qassam was a militant Islamic reformer who led the Young Men’s Muslim Association based in Haifa. "He preached a reformed and more fundamentalist Islam and believed that only those who were themselves pious could be the salvation of the country.”^[211] He appealed mainly to the rural and urban poor, and led a band based in rural areas outside Haifa. After several years attacking Jewish targets, in October 1935 he killed a Jewish police sergeant, and was himself killed in November 1935 by the British. At his funeral he was hailed as a national hero. His militia band anticipated and inspired the more general Arab Revolt of 1936. His grass roots popularity among conservative villagers and urban poor were immense, and it was these who would provide the backbone of the Arab Revolt. His was an explicitly and exclusively Islamic uprising against both the British and the Jews. Palestinian Christians as such had no role in this.

1936 Arab Revolt –

Spurred by increased Jewish immigration, the Revolt had three specific demands.

(1) the prohibition of Jewish immigration.

(2) the prohibition of the transfer of Arab land to Jews.

(3) the establishment of a National Government responsible to a representative council.

 

The Revolt itself had 3 stages.

 

Stage 1; April to October 1936.

This consisted of a general strike, augmented by attacks against Jews, Jewish property and the government. Led by the Higher Arab Committee (which included two representatives of the Christian communities, the Greek Catholic Alfred Rok (affiliated with Hajj Amin's Palestine Arab Party) and the Greek Orthodox Yaqub Farraj (of the Nashashibi camp, who along with Nashashibi would support the idea of a small Jewish state in 1937[212]).^[213] The 6-month general strike was enforced by local committees, clubs, associations etc. The Strike concluded due to Arab fatigue and the appointment of a royal commission to address Arab concerns.

 

The violence included setting fire to Jaffa’s Jewish quarter, shooting attacks on Jewish civilians, spreading nails on streets, burning Jewish crops etc. It affected the whole country and was significant in the amount of rural/village participation. Foreign involvement from other Arab lands was also important, and included fighters from Syria, Jordan, Iraq as well as diplomatic representations by their governments in support of the Palestinians.

 

Stage 2. Between November 36 and July 37.

A lull while everyone waited for the Peel Commission’s report.

 

Stage 3. July 37 to mid- 1939.

Arab rejection of the Commission’s report led to renewed violence, starting with the murder of a British official, Lewis Andrews, in Nazareth. The AHC was outlawed, and rural, peasant leaders took over control of the revolt. The extremist/moderate Hussaini/Nashashibi rift came out into the open. This in turn led to the Nashashibi’s (including his Orthodox supporters) withdrawing from the AHC, and even to the forming of “peace bands” to fight the AHC (with Zionist support). Calls were heard for a Jihad and much of the rebellion was encouraged by preaching from the mosques. By 1938, Britain had lost control of major areas of countryside. This in turn led to a change in High Commissioners (with the appointment of Sir Harold MacMichael), and a British military crackdown.

 

By the summer of 1938, most of the Palestinian highlands were in rebel hands, and by September, even in the urban centres, government control had virtually ceased. As the Revolt progressed, its religious character became increasingly prominent. “As noted by the High Commissioner, Harold MacMichael, the leaders of the revolt were ‘more and more stressing the religious aspect of their struggle.’"[214] It was generally in the name of Islam, often as expressed by religious functionaries, that the masses were called upon to support the revolt and join its ranks. Much was made of alleged insults to the Qur'an and mosques by British troops. Likewise, it was asserted with great frequency that the Muslim Holy Places would be lost if Zionism were allowed to prevail.[215] The peasantry had never endorsed a secular brand of nationalism. As observed by the High Commissioner, 'among the village population Moslem religious sentiment is a stronger, more unifying and more universal sentiment than Arab nationalism.”[216] In any case, for most, their sense of Arab identity was defined primarily by its association with the period of 'Islamic glory,' when the Arabs were exalted as the carriers of the Islamic faith. In general, it would seem that, at least over time, the Revolt had the effect of heightening tensions between Muslims and Christians.^[217] 

 

The subsequent British military victory plus British diplomatic concessions led to its demise. The May 1939 White Paper limited Jewish migration and decided against partition.

 

The Paper was itself rejected by the Mufti, but the Palestinians were exhausted. Up to 200 Jews and 4,500- 5,000 Arabs died in total. A large number of Arabs (1200) were killed by Husseini's faction, which killed more Arabs than Jews. By the end of the Revolt, Arab attacks on other Arabs were nearly as common as attacks on British and Zionist forces.[218] Vast numbers of trees which had been planted by the Jews were also destroyed. On one occasion alone, “50,000 Jewish forest trees” were destroyed.[219]

 

The revolt has come to be seen as one of the rural peasantry allied with the Mufti, against the Zionists and the urban dwellers and those they labelled ‘collaborators.’[220] The roots of the revolt may very well be the formation of rural Fellahin parties in 1924, such as the Nablus Peasant Party and the Hebron Peasant Party. These rural parties were primarily Islamic, and none of them had any familiarity with Christians or the intellectual roots of Arab-nationalism.[221] 

 

Christian Involvement in the Revolt

 

Christian involvement in the General Strike was initially fairly strong. Christian sports clubs helped to direct the strike at the ground level. “British reports in 1936 highlight Arab Christian participation in joint Muslim/Christian rallies (against Jewish immigration etc).”^[222] These occurred in Gaza, Nablus, and Jaffa, with marchers often starting or ending at a church or Orthodox club. Christians also played an important role in perpetuating the general strike.^[223] Leading Christian women were also notable in enforcing the boycott through violence. The Christian mayor of Nazareth was believed to be helping the Mufti’s men and pressing local Christians to assist them. “Occasionally Christian religious leaders also spoke out in favour of the rebellion.”[224] During the Arab Revolt [some] Christian women wore the veil to show unity with Muslims and that Arab culture is unified, despite religious differences. Also during this time, Christians de-emphasised their religion in order to promote Arabic and Arab culture.^[225] In June of 1936 a total of 137 “senior Arab officials” had signed a letter to the Mandatory authorities stating that they were in sympathy with the Arab Higher Committee that was involved with the continuing violence.  Many of these officials were Christians.[226]

 

On August 19, 1936, Christian leaders from across Palestine appealed to the world to recognise the danger of Zionist control of Palestine. They used traditional anti-Semitic arguments to insist that the international Christian community should prevent Jewish immigration, stop them from “defiling” the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem and prevent the neglect of the holy sites that would occur under Jewish rule. “An impressive list of Christian leaders from the Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, Anglican and Maronite communities signed a ‘Call of Palestinian Christians to the Christian World to Save the Holy Places from Zionist danger.’”^[227] In a more local show of interdenominational support, Acre’s Christians united to demand that the government disarm the Zionists.^[228]

 

The Mufti sent a delegation of Orthodox Palestinians to visit eastern European (Orthodox) cities to garner support.[229] He also included Christians in his delegation to London. Most interaction with European leaders at this time was carried out by Christians.

 

The notable exception to this inter communal solidarity was Haifa. This quickly became a source of tension. Muslim-Christian solidarity in Haifa had never been particularly strong. Instead of an MCA, Haifa had from the beginning two separate Muslim and Christian Associations. The Strike placed Arab government officials, the majority of whom were Christian, in a particularly difficult position. While some in the Public Works Department went on strike, they were the exception. The vast majority refused to join in, rather agreeing in the end to relinquish a tenth of their salaries to a strike fund.[230]

 

Christian enthusiasm for the strike diminished after a time, as Christians suffered from the disruption of economic activity more than the Muslim community. Before long, many were resisting compliance. It was also not uncommon that Christians were threatened by Muslim gangs demanding money as a demonstration of their loyalty. Towards the end, Christians were generally reluctant to carry on with the strike, something that again caused tension with the Muslim majority. The Christian-run Filastin was the first newspaper to call for its end.^[231] While supporting the strike fully, the Anglican PNCC refused to resist the British violently, and as a result, were accused by the Muslims of being British spies.[232]

 

While most of the Christian population seems not to have been in favour of violence, early in the revolt, Greek Orthodox al-Sakakini wrote in admiration of a grenade attack on Jerusalem’s Edison theatre, which left three dead; “There is no other heroism like this, except the heroism of the Sheik al-Qassam. … They throw bombs, shoot, burn fields, destroy Jewish citrus groves, topple electric poles. Every day they block roads and every day Arabs display a heroism that the government never conceived of.” And, writing to his son; “Two anonymous heroes, threw a grenade at a passenger train full of Jewish civilians and the British soldiers who were escorting them. Who would have believed there are such heroes in Palestine? What a great honor it is, my Sari, to be an Arab in Palestine.”[233]

 

Concerning the Peel Plan, “For the most part, Christians were opposed to the partition plan, though to a large extent, this reflected the fact that the Galilee, an area heavily populated by Christians, had been allocated to the Jewish state. As soon as the extent of the territory being allocated to the Jewish state became apparent, most Christians came out against it. In the end, the partition plan actually had the effect of closing ranks between Christians and Muslims. Among other things, Christians were concerned about the impact partition would have in dividing what was already a small community.”^[234]

 

This temporary closing of ranks did not last long. After some support for the first stage of the Revolt, very few Christian Arabs participated in the third stage, which was both much more violent, and often openly anti-Christian. Porath argued that the Christians remained “aloof.”[235] Nevertheless, unlike the Druze, the Christian community did not actively resist the rebel groups.^[236] Many Christians simply moved to other countries. For example, during the revolt it was reported that “the rich families of Haifa departed en masse in August 1938.”[237] "The Christians [of Jaffa] had participated in the 1936 -1937 disturbances under duress and out of fear of the Muslims. The Christians' hearts now and generally are not with the rioting," reported the Haganah Intelligence Service.[238]

 

In this atmosphere, Christians increasingly felt a need to demonstrate that they were as committed to the nationalist cause as the Muslims. An article appearing in Filastin in July 1936, for instance, recounted an interview conducted by an American journalist in which a Christian youth indicated emphatically that he stood side by side with his Muslim brothers in his willingness to sacrifice everything for the national cause.[239] While they would not participate in the violence, the churches would issue an ecumenical appeal to the world’s Christians to support the goals of the revolt. The PNCC members “abhorred the tide of Jewish immigration.”[240]

Christian involvement in the various militant groups was minimal. The great majority of the rank-and-file of came from the Muslim peasantry. They were more inspired by Islamic sentiment than secular nationalism.^[241] Porath notes that out of a total of 282 officers, only four were Christian (at a time when Christians were approximately ten percent of the population).

 

Muslim organisations now led the Nationalist struggle. Disturbances, usually violent, were regarded by the Arabs as the primary expression of Arab nationalism. Organising and communications (where the Christians contributed) not so much. Separate Christian organizations were rejected, while common bonds with Muslims (enmity to Zionism) was emphasised. Palestinian Christians participated in the national movement, accepting the marginal and secondary position to which they were doomed as the result of being a religious minority group.[242]

 

Christian/Muslim violence

Controversy over the Missions Conference in 1928 had almost led to a boycott of Christians and now in some places the true feelings of many of the fellahin and other rebels came out.  They directed their slander and curses at the Palestinian Christians, accusing them of being collaborators or not being sufficiently committed to violence.[243] As a result, the Christians found themselves increasingly subjected to harassment and accusations of disloyalty. Relations deteriorated as the Revolt lengthened. Muslims already resented the over-representation of Christian Arabs in the government bureaucracy (jobs[244]), and the presence of foreign Christian missionaries in the country.

Some rebel leaders sought to expand the boycott to also target Christians. As early as December 1936, a group called the “Carriers of the banner of al-Qassam” called for a boycott of Christians; “Oh Muslims, Boycott the Christians. Boycott them. Boycott them.”^[245] They were accused of “a lack of dedication to nationalism.”

While rejection of the Peel partition plan had temporarily closed the ranks between Christians and Muslims, the resumption of the revolt quickly saw a revival of tensions between Muslims and Christians. Muslims became outraged, for example, when Christian priests refused to join in political demonstrations.[246] Some Christian villages refused to supply food and arms to rebel bands. This saw acts of retaliation against them, including the uprooting of vineyards and the raping of two Christian girls.[247] There were scattered attacks on Arab Christians by Muslim gangs.[248] Another Zionist intelligence worker reported that Ahmed Salmeh al- Khalidi, a member of the prominent Muslim Jerusalem family, ‘spoke with terrible unhappiness about the Christians’, arguing that Muslim hatred for Christians far outweighed their hatred of Jews.[249]

The Christian mayor of Bethlehem twice escaped assassination. The Central Committee told the Christian mayor of Ramallah to resign. Christian policemen were killed. According to one British police-officer, it was generally held among Muslims that Christians were traitors to their own people. He described the relationship between the two as being one of “savage and bitter feeling,” Often, a British constable was posted to the house of a Christian Arab to act as a bodyguard. Christian notables were targeted in particular and "were suspected of all manner of anti-Moslem activities, such as helping the British, or even selling land to Jews." The Nabi Musa festival, once considered an expression of Muslim-Christian unity, now became an occasion during which agitators "urged the multitude to fall upon the Jew and Christian infidels and slay them."[250] Christian schools in Jerusalem were harassed and the Terra Santa College was forcibly closed. In 1938 two Christians Arabs were kidnapped in Kafr Yasif, one a government worker and policeman. Christians were murdered in Nazareth and Safad in 1939.[251]

One British official told 1937 Peel Royal Commission that Christians had "come to realise that the zeal shown by the fellaheen ... was religious and fundamentally in the nature of a Holy War against the Christian Mandate and against Christian people as well as against Jews.”[252] Christians were also greatly disturbed when a rebel band marching through the Christian village of Bir Zeit sang “We are going to kill the Christians” instead of the more usual “We are going to kill the British.”[253] Note that in 1938, the Christian editor of Filastin, Isa al-Isa (editor since 1921), had to flee the country due to fears of the Muslim village bands.[254] While very popular, Filastin was viewed by the population as a Christian paper.[255] It nevertheless tried hard to represent and to appeal to the broader community. Likewise, a report from the 6^th of November 1938 refers to “attacks on Christians.”[256]

 

In spite of all of this, the Christian community by and large continued in its support of the nationalist cause. The district commissioner of Jerusalem, Edward Keith- Roach received a letter demanding that the government guarantee the permanent appointment of a Muslim mayor. The letter was signed by two prominent Protestants. The Druze efforts to support the government against the rebels caused a serious rift between them and the Christian minority who inhabited the same towns in Galilee.  “By and large, the Christian community maintained its support for the Palestinian Arab cause despite anti-Christian sentiments and incidents, and [because of] a fear of communal violence.”^[257]

 

“A few even turned against the nationalist movement and supported the British or Zionists outright.”^[258] Selim Ayyub, a Christian Arab, wrote in 1936 to a Zionist leader about Christian participation in the revolt; “80-85% of them were motivated by fear. They lived in mixed quarters and were afraid of the Muslims, but they really had nothing against the Jews.” He also said they preferred British rule to Muslim.[259] This is hard to evaluate. In general, Christians were inclined to blame the Jews for their situation. Thus, for example, the Greek Catholic bishop of Galilee, Yusuf Hajjar, blamed the weakening of the Christian position on Jewish immigration. Certainly, most Christians do seem to have preferred British rule. “Indeed, Christians took almost no part in the 1936–1939 rebellion.”[260]

 

In May 1938, Bishop Hajjar protested to the Mufti concerning “the Arab Christians of Palestine.” Also in May 38, the British district commissioner wrote that bishop Hajjar would speak on behalf of all Arab Christians to the Peel Commission, because “none dared speak for themselves.”^[261] Likewise, the district commissioner for Jerusalem strongly believed in June, 1939 that the Christians were only supportive of Arab nationalism out of self-preservation, that they were “obliged to adopt publicly the policy of the Muslims.”[262] According to Morris, a major reason for the failure of the Revolt was that it ran out of money. He then notes that the wealthy were disproportionately Christian, and reluctant to support the Revolt.[263] Indeed, the Revolt was only able to continue for so long because of Nazi funding given in 1938.^[264]

 

 

The Muslim leadership generally wanted the Christians on side, but at the local level, many gangs were quite independent, and anti-Christian. Hajj Amin and around 200 Muslim members of the Arab leadership did indeed try to counter this general sentiment. How successful they were in this respect is debatable.[265] On at least one occasion, the Mufti reportedly ‘directed mosque preachers throughout the country to preach for peace and brotherhood among Muslims and Christians.’[266] In both Lebanon and Damascus, Palestinian officials intervened to lessen Muslim/Christian tensions.[267] Again in September 1938, the Central Committee forbade the rebels from disturbing “Churches, convents, Patriarchate priests, monks, nuns, either by collecting money or by trespassing on their personal or religious liberty.”[268] Note that the Christian el-Issa was praised by Muslims for writing that “saving Palestine through an Islamic path is closest to saving it through a national road.”^[269] He also called for the turning of the Easter services “into national demonstrations which shall prove to our opponents the power of the Arabs in Palestine.”[270] Note that Christians have again more recently cancelled Easter celebrations in Bethlehem to further nationalistic goals, and corrupted Christmas to become a vehicle of nationalist propaganda. Their faith must serve their nationalism. "No one can serve two masters. Either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will be devoted to the one and despise the other.” (Matthew 6:24).

 

The Round Table Conference

 

With the publication of the Woodhead Partition Commission report in November 1938 declaring partition technically infeasible, and the British government's accompanying announcement to hold a Round Table Conference in London, the Revolt lost momentum and eventually collapsed. The British Government proposed a drastic cutting back of Jewish immigration and land purchases, making future Jewish immigration dependent on Arab consent and the eventual creation of an independent united Palestinian state. Jews were to be given veto-power over the latter as a counterbalance to Arab control over immigration. In the end, the Jewish delegation walked out of the Conference. In lieu of a settlement, the Government issued a White Paper along the lines of what had been proposed during the Conference. What came to be known as the MacDonald White Paper (named after the Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald) was issued on 17 May.

 

The decision by the Higher Arab Committee to take part in a conference in London gave the Christians some temporary leverage with respect to the national movement, as it was considered imperative by the Arab leadership that the HAC should appear representative of a united Palestinian-Arab people. In a startling sign of just how serious the anti-Christian violence had become, when the Christian leadership was asked to downplay the less savoury aspects of the Revolt with respect to Christians, they threatened to send a separate delegation to the London Conference. The threat worked, and at the end of December, the Arab leaders in Jerusalem published a declaration condemning the various anti-Christian acts that had been committed in connection with the Revolt. (At the same time, they attributed such acts to renegade individuals whom they characterised as “rascals.”) Hajj Amin al-Husseini also tried to exert pressure on his followers to behave more tolerantly towards Christians. In the end, the Palestinian Arab delegation sent to the Conference did give the impression of a united front.^[271]

 

After the Revolt, the Palestinians were exhausted, World War 2 was starting, Palestine became a British garrison (a vastly increased troop presence), and the Christian community withdrew into itself, and reflected upon what had just happened. They were aided in this reflection by the generational change in Palestinian Christian leadership which also occurred at this time. Many of the Christian notables had fled, along with the Mufti in the late 1930s. Many others were busy with the Palestinian agenda in London and New York.[272] This reflection could only go so far. Unhappy with the level of street violence they had both witnessed and increasingly experienced, they nevertheless remained committed to the cause of Arab nationalism, and anti-Zionism. This left them needing to prove their loyalty to an increasingly hostile Moslem majority, with no plan B except immigration. It seems that traditional Christian anti-Semitism meant that allying with the Jewish community was never seriously explored by the majority of the community. Indeed, Porath concluded that “In this way they [the rebels] were aided by two basic facts: Christian opposition to Zionism, and Christian self-identification, alongside their community identity, as Palestinian Arabs.”^[273] The revised strategy that emerged was that they would continue to pursue nationalist goals (never really in question) but this time through organizations which were clearly identifiable as Christian. By stressing their religious affiliation as a primary label, they sought to ease communal tensions and draw Muslim attention to their participation in the nationalistic struggle. While an earlier generation of Christian leaders had eschewed such sectarianism, preferring that Christians and Muslims all simply join nationalistic organisations “as Arabs,” the Muslim violence that had been directed towards them necessitated this rethink, and a depressing retreat from their ideal, of Christians and Muslims all fully equal, religious affiliation not even noticed.  

 

Palestinian Christian anti-Semitism and opposition to Zionism remained central in their desire for relevance and integration/acceptance into the wider Muslim society. Nor was this pattern unique to the Palestinian Church. To quote from my book on the Roles of the European Churches and the Holocaust; “much of the Catholic Church in Germany at this time viewed anti-Semitism both as part of the heritage, and also as “a vehicle for keeping in touch with the times.”[274] … This was also true in Austria, where “Members of the Roman Catholic hierarchy were anxious to convince young people that the church had been anti-Semitic centuries before anyone had heard of National Socialism.”[275] The majority of wider/international denominations with which the Palestinian churches were affiliated with were also theologically and institutionally anti-Semitic at this time. While these denominations may have repented of this anti-Semitism re Europe they emphatically have not done so re Israel.

 

Discussion

 

The Christian response to the Arab Revolt was profoundly nuanced and reflected a community which well understood its own identity and self-interest. Palestinian Christians were opposed to both Zionism and to Muslim domination. Christians generally saw the Mandate as a protecting power rather than a repressive yoke. It did not provoke in them the fundamental offence that it did among the Muslim community. The Christians liked British rule, it gave them good jobs, personal safety and the rule of law. They also liked the British. They had been educated in British mission schools, and often worked with and had friends among the British officials. They did not wish to kill them, or to drive British rule out of Palestine, hence their lack of support for the violence against the British during the third stage of the Revolt. The extent to which this divergence from the Muslim community was a thought-out strategy, as opposed to a more intuitive response, is unclear. The Christians had pursued separate foreign policies previously, and for all the hype, were not simply an indivisible part of the Arab nation. Their fallback position of contributing through clearly identifiable Christian organisations was in retrospect a more appropriate strategy. It better allowed for community distinctives.

 

How much should be read into the divergence being over violence? Did this simply highlight a difference of opinion over the British, or did it reveal a more profound rift? As already noted, (see the discussion on the 1921 Jaffa riot), the Palestinian Christian communities have not embraced violence against the Jewish community to the same extent that the Muslim community has, and this is a standing cause of offence to the Muslims. Christian violence is by no means unknown (see George Habash and the PFLP[276]), but a quantitative difference remains evident.

 

Their quarrel with British rule was far more narrowly focused. They wanted Jewish immigration stopped. In pursuance of these aims, they fully supported the general strike, but did not support the accompanying campaign of violence against the British. In these responses, we see the Christian community no longer defining themselves as an indivisible part of the Arab nation, but rather as a distinct subset of it, with their own priorities. Priorities which did not align with those of the Muslim majority. These differences would not be proclaimed from the rooftops, due to their fear of the Muslim mob, but are clearly seen in their actions on the ground. Many of the rioters were poor rural Muslims, while most of the Christians were urbanized and middle class and feared for their own property. At that point, the more crucial question became, would the Muslim middle class, the Nashashibi supporters, join with the mob, or with their own interests in safety and security. In its third stage, the Revolt directly targeted these moderates, and over one thousand were murdered. The Christians who had also failed to join in the violence were likewise targeted. That both moderate Muslims and Christians were relatively wealthy was an added incentive to the Islamic mob. Muslim political leaders tried to limit the damage, but the two communities moved further apart. Note also that when the British did indeed leave, the cause of the friction was removed, but the damage had been done.

 

For the Christian community the focus of the Arab Revolt of 1936-39 was not British rule as such, rather it was specifically related to one issue: Jewish immigration. It is this attitude which must now be considered. This immigration did not happen in a vacuum. By opposing Jewish refugees fleeing from Germany in 1936 onwards, the Palestinian Christian communities also force us to confront their views about;

---

[1] Bernard Lewis, The Middle East, 210. See also Stalder, 84, fn 16 for further reading, as well as Mark Gabriel, Islam and the Jews, 122-23 for the rules of Umar concerning people of the book. “Dhimmi status and payment of the Jizya tax could place great financial strain on Christian communities. The application of Shari’a law on non-Muslims further restricted the personal freedoms of Christians. They wore distinguishing clothes, they were forbidden to practise certain trades and from taking positions of responsibility in politics or the army. They were permitted to worship freely, but processions, public Christian symbols and proselytisation were forbidden. Marriage between Christians and Muslims was only allowed if the Christian party converted to Islam. Conversion the other way around was forbidden.” Ashdown 46.

[2] Hashemi and Postel, 2017, p. 27.

[3] Ashdown, 48.

[4] Freas, 52. Note that the new constitution was brought in on December 23, 1876 and was itself based on the incremental legal reforms which had started in 1836. Two years later, in 1878, the constitution was suspended, parliament dispersed, and the new freedoms curtailed.

[5] Freas, 61.

[6] Non-Muslim happiness has always offended Islam – hence the bombings on Sabbaths, Holy days, weddings, celebrations of any sort etc.

[7] The emancipation of supressed communities generally has this effect on members of the once dominant community. For a shameful parallel, occurring at the same time, in 1843, The Pope noted “the scandal of seeing Jews pretending to be living the same as others.” D. Kertzer, The Popes against the Jews, 84. In 1901, a letter to the Minister of Justice in Germany stated that “one need not be an anti-Semite in order to confirm the fact that a Jew in the role of a magistrate, barrister, notary public, etc. awakens in a German a feeling of loathing ... the very sight of a Jew is at times unbearable.” Tal, Christians and Jews, 142.

[8] “some Muslims, particularly amongst the Ulama, opposed the principle of freedom of worship and feared that the equal status given to Christians would damage the Islamic character of the Ottoman state, and damage their political influence in the government institutions.” Ashdown, 49.

[9] Morris and Ze’evi, 49/50. This led to the massacre of these Armenians.

[10] Morris and Ze’evi, 78.

[11] Ashdown, 16. Quoting from Ma’oz, 2014, pp. 242–243). Ma’oz, M. (2014). Communal conflict in Ottoman Syria during the reform Era: The role of political and economic factors. In B. Braude (Ed.), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire (pp. 241–256). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

[12] Bat Ye’or, 1985; 224.

[13] The Tanzimat reforms were in part at least “meant for international consumption at a time when the Ottomans desperately needed Britain’s help” (Reilly, 2019, p. 56). Ashdown 47.

[14] Freas, 89.

[15] Stalder, 86.

[16] See Lewis, 293., see also the Kurds in Syria 2019.

[17] Freas, 33.

[18] Freas, 32.

[19] Freas, 89.

[20] Farah, 18.

[21] Frantzman, 22.

[22] Kimmerling, 5.

[23] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1834_looting_of_Safed

[24] Freas, 39.

[25] 1860 Mount Lebanon civil war https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1860_Mount_Lebanon_civil_war 

[26] Freas, 33.

[27] Hollingsworth, 4.

[28] Farah, 19.

[29] Rafiq Farah, 11.

[30] Farah, 11.

[31] Raphael Israeli, Green Crescent over Nazareth, 11. (See also Bat Ye’or, 1985; 252.) Taken from the official dispatches of James Finn.

[32] Bat Ye’or, 1985; 254, Israeli, 11. Again, taken from the dispatches of James Finn.

[33] Robson, 19.

[34] Freas, 32. Robson, Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine. 8.

[35] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1860_Mount_Lebanon_civil_war#Massacre_of_Christians_in_Damascus

[36] Freas, 54.

[37] Ruth Kark, American Consuls in the Holy Land. page 245. 

[38] Freas, 33.

[39] Farah, 19.

[40] Freas, 55.

[41] Robson, 19.

[42] Frantzman, 22.

[43] Farah,74.

[44] Arthur Gish, Hebron Journal, 28.

[45] Chad Emmett, Beyond the Basilica: Christians and Muslims in Nazareth, 21.

[46] Emmett, 22.

[47] Emmett, 22.

[48] Emmett, 23.

[49] Farah, 11.

[50] Emmett, 24.

[51] Farah, 12.

[52] Emmett, 24.

[53] Emmett, 25.

[54] Emmett, 29.

[55] Emmett, 29.

[56] Israeli, 11., quoting James Finn.

[57] Bat Ye’or, 1985; 244-5.

[58] Robson, 19.

[59] Farah, 52.

[60] Makhoul, 23.

[61] Bat Ye’or, 1985; 254.

[62] Bat Ye’or, 1985; 246-8.

[63] Bat Ye’or, 1985; 250.

[64] Freas, 54.

[65] For examples, see Robson, 19.

[66] Bat Ye’or, 1985; 235.

[67] Bat Ye’or, 1985; 235.

[68] Morris and Ze’evi, 41/42.

[69] Freas, 95.

[70] Ashdown, 16.

[71] Bat Ye’or, 1985; 235.

[72] Ashdown, 50.

[73] Radai, 499.

[74] Ashdown, 12. Awad, N.G. (2012). And freedom became a public-square: Political, sociological and religious overviews on the Arab Christians and the Arabic Spring. Zurich: Lit Verlag. p. 89.

[75] Freas, 89.

[76] Tom Segev, One Palestine Complete, 15.

[77] Freas, 90.

[78] Freas, 93.

[79] Farah, 83.

[80] Farah, 82.

[81] Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version: And Other Middle Eastern Studies. 339.

[82] Freas, 154.

[83] Daphne Tsimhoni The Arab Christians and the Palestinian Arab National Movement during the Formative Stage, 73.

[84] Tsimhoni, 78.

[85] Brandon Moist, Palestinian Christians and their Identity and Resistance in the Twentieth Century. https://www.armstrong.edu/history-journal-palestinian-christians-and-their-identity-and -resistance-in

[86] Stalder, 87.

[87] Stalder, 88.

[88] Freas, 152.

[89] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falastin_(newspaper)

[90] Robson, Colonialism and Christianity, 47.

[91] Freas, 99.

[92] Ashdown, 51 quoting Reilly, 2019, p. 97.

[93] Freas, 99.

[94] Freas, 101.

[95] Tsimhoni writes that Arab Christians expected an improvement in their situation, and even some preferential treatment as co-religionists of holders of the Mandate.” Tsimhoni, The Status, 166. Saul Colbi notes that the Protestant churches did “exceptionally well in the thirty years of the Mandate, both in numbers and in establishments.” Stalder, 151.

[96] Noah Haiduc-Dale in Arab Christians, 70.

[97] Tsimhoni, 142.

[98] Haiduc-Dale, 69.

[99] Haiduc-Dale, 73.

[100] Haiduc-Dale, 88.

[101] Bretts, Robert Brenton. Christians of the Arab East. 159.

[102] Ori Stendal The Arabs in Israel page 249.

[103] Haiduc-Dale, 41.

[104] Freas, 147.

[105] Haiduc-Dale, 37.

[106] Emmett, 39.

[107] Nerel, 30.

[108] Cohen, Army, 19.

[109] Robson, 42/3?

[110] Haidoc-Dale, 46.

[111] Makhoul, 42.

[112] Freas, 142.

[113] Haidoc-Dale, 47.

[114] Robson 71.

[115] Tsimhoni, 74.

[116] Interestingly, in the 1880s James Finn saw this Muslim festival, held one week before the Orthodox Easter, as a flashpoint between Muslims and Christians. “the influx of devout Moslems was doubtless intended to counterbalance the effect of so many thousands of sturdy Christians being present in Jerusalem.” Finn, 222-223.

[117] In justifying this, the Christian editor of al-Karmil noted that it was Muhammad who had made the Arabs great, and that it was because they had "stopped following his teachings [that] they had become divided and weak and of no account" Al-Karmil, 9 September 1927. Freas, 279.

[118] Tsimhoni, 75.

[119] Frantzman, 49.

[120] Tsimhoni, 75.

[121] Freas, 279.

[122] A. Bostom, The Mufti’s Islamic Jew-Hatred, 24.

[123] "the most important Muslim pilgrimage in Palestine" Gonen, Rivka., Contested Holiness, Ktav Pub & Distributors Inc (2003) 138.

[124] Makhoul, 54.

[125] Freas, 137.

[126] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1920_Nebi_Musa_riots

[127] Noah Haiduc-Dale, 43.

[128] Freas, 305.

[129] Noah Haiduc-Dale, 43.

[130] Tour guides from the Bethlehem Bible College say that it is a Muslim tradition that Moses is buried there, but then proceed to justify this by giving the following as possible explanations; “Moses so much wanted to be in the holy land that his body rolled underground until it reached here. Another explanation is that the holy land is Jerusalem. So he did make it until here but he did not reach Jerusalem.” Given that the Bible specifies that he was buried in Moab, a site in northern Israel is impossible. They are simply trying to accommodate a Muslim falsehood. https://storiesfrompalestine.info/2020/11/16/on-the-road-to-jericho/

[131] Freas, 189.

[132] Freas, 316.

[133] Frantzman, 55.

[134] Frantzman, 55.

[135] https://mosaicmagazine.com/picks/history-ideas/2016/05/remembering-jaffas-forgotten-pogrom/ For a more personal account, see https://www.haaretz.com/1.5114529

[136] It needs to be acknowledged that Islam celebrates violence in a way foreign to Judaism and Christianity. It is not about “winning hearts and minds,” a foreign concept, it is about imposing control. When I was in Pakistan, the leading cleric in a major mosque in Islamabad stated from the pulpit that they would throw acid in the faces of any women who drove a car. One simply cannot imagine any mainstream Pastor or Rabbi making a similar statement from the pulpit.

[137] “The commitment to nonviolence distinguishes the Christian leadership and a large number of Christians from the Palestinian majority.” Christians, Christmas and the Intifada. Drew Christiansen, https://www.americamagazine.org/issue/341/article/christians-christmas-and-intifada “During the second intifada, Palestinian Christians deviated from the mainstream resistance and away from violence and militarization.” Palestinian Christians and the Defence of Equal Human Rights, Yusef Daher. SUR, International Journal for Human Rights, https://sur.conectas.org/en/palestinian-christians-and-the-defence-of-equal-human-rights/

[138] Nerel, 30-31.

[139] Makhoul, 55.

[140] Haidoc-Dale, 27.

[141] Haiduc-Dale, 4.

[142] Tamir Sorek. “Calendars, Martyrs, and Palestinian Particularism under British Rule” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 43, No. 1 (Autumn 2013), pp. 6-23. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2013.43.1.6?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

[143] Haidoc-Dale, 27.

[144] Frantzman, 56.

[145] Freas, 109.

[146] Cohen, Army, 46.

[147] Cohen, Army, 48-50.

[148] Freas, 164.

[149] Radai, 490.

[150] Frantzman, 57.

[151] Frantzman, 61.

[152] Freas, 199.

[153] C.S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters, chapter 7; "Begin by treating his Patriotism as a part of his religion. Then let him, under the influence of his partisan spirit, come to regard it as the most important part. Then quietly and gradually nurse him on to the stage at which the religion becomes merely part of the “cause”, in which Christianity is valued chiefly because of the excellent arguments it can produce in favour of the cause … Once you have made the World an end, and faith a means, you have almost won your man, and it makes very little difference what kind of worldly end he is pursuing. Provided that meetings, pamphlets, policies, movements, causes, and crusades, (partisan political pundits and partisan media, "my addition") matter more to him than prayers and sacraments and charity, he is ours-and the more “religious” the more securely ours."

[154] Cohen, Army, 57, 15.

[155] Freas, 200.

[156] Radai, 499.

[157] Freas, 272.

[158] Freas, 273.

[159] Freas, 274, quoting Filastin, 8 December 1932.

[160] Freas, 274.

[161] Freas, 278.

[162] Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " P. 75. https://christiansandisrael.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/tsimhoni-arab-christians.pdf

[163] Stalder, 164.

[164] Freas, 283.

[165] Cohen, Army, 30.

[166] Freas, 189.

[167] Freas, 191.

[168] Freas, 193.

[169] For a parallel case, from Germany; Julius von Jan, a Confessing pastor who did speak out, also admitted after the war: “We were all of scared of crossing the Nazi regime at its most sensitive point.” R. Gutteridge rightly commented: “it may not unfairly be added that it [love for one’s neighbour] was undeniably one of the most sensitive points where the church itself was concerned.” Barnes, 395.

[170] Freas, 215.

[171] Freas, 218-19.

[172] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1929_Palestine_riots

[173] Frantzman, 19.

[174] Freas, 232-3.

[175] See https://www.facebook.com/eappiukireland/photos/a.787540614697339/3870859693032067/ for a statement in 2021 by the heads of the churches in Jerusalem supporting the “status quo” whereby Christians and Jews are banned from praying on the Temple Mount. For a similar Palestinian Lutheran statement, see https://www.facebook.com/colin.a.barnes.1/posts/4214031271964050:10.

[176] Haiduc-Dale, 101.

[177] Haiduc-Dale, 101.

[178] Haiduc-Dale, 101.

[179] Freas, 235.

[180] Freas, 234.

[181] Freas, 220.

[182] Haiduc-Dale, 110.

[183] Cohen, 244.

[184] Cohen, 245.

[185] "Christians in the Holy Land" with Jonthan Kuttab and Naim Ateek

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O655qVkqNc8 at 31:20.

[186] Freas, 269.

[187] Haiduc-Dale, 114.

[188] Haiduc-Dale, 114.

[189] Yehoshua Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929, 303.

[190] Freas, 283.

[191] Haiduc-Dale, (2015) Rejecting Sectarianism: Palestinian Christians' Role in Muslim–Christian Relations, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 26:1, 75-88, 80.

[192] Haiduc-Dale, 2015, 80.

[193] Haiduc-Dale, (2015) 80.

[194] Haiduc-Dale, 2015, 82.

[195]Frantzman, 75.

[196] Haiduc-Dale, 116.

[197] See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MacDonald_Letter

[198] Freas, 242.

[199] Tsimhoni, 81.

[200] Freas, 116.

[201] Freas, 251.

[202] Freas, 263.

[203] Freas, 263.

[204] Freas, 239.

[205] Freas, 239.

[206] Freas, 281.

[207] Freas, 283.

[208] Freas, 229.

[209] Freas, 289.

[210] Freas, 289.

[211] Freas, 301.

[212] Aidan, Belief and Policy Making in the Middle East. 34.

[213] Freas, 303.

[214] Freas, 312.

[215] Freas, 312.

[216] Freas, 313.

[217] Freas, 315., Frantzman, 70 “The religious aspects of the rebellion further alienated Christians.”

[218] Haiduc-Dale, 148.

[219] Martin Gilbert, The Arab Israeli Conflict, 26.

[220] Frantzman, 68.

[221] Frantzman, 68.

[222] Haiduc-Dale, 146.

[223] Haiduc-Dale 149.

[224] Haiduc-Dale, 159.

[225] Moist

[226] Frantzman, 71.

[227] Haiduc-Dale, 147, 160.

[228] Haiduc-Dale, 147.

[229] Haiduc-Dale, 161.

[230] Freas, 305.

[231] Freas, 306-7, The article appearing 16 September 1936.  See also Filastin, 16 July 1936, concerning attacks on Christian homes in Acre.

[232] Stalder, 164.

[233] Segev, Tom (1999). One Palestine Complete, 365, 368.

[234] Freas, 311.

[235] Haiduc-Dale, 141. He disputes this description as overly simplistic.

[236] Radai middle class 503. During the revolt, similar assaults on the Druze drove the community to seek an alliance with the Zionists. Frantzman, 72.

[237] Frantzman, 68.

[238] Morris, 1948, 13.

[239] Freas, 317.

[240] Stalder, 165.

[241] Freas, 304.

[242] Tsimhoni, 90.

[243] Frantzman, 73.

[244] Freas, 163. “An interesting observation of the situation at the time is that of Ben-Zvi, who argued that through their positions in the administration, Christians were effectively ruling over Muslims.” Freas, 164.

[245] Haiduc-Dale, 131.

[246] Freas, 318.

[247] Freas, 318.

[248] Frantzman, 71.

[249] Haiduc-Dale, 179.

[250] Freas, 316.

[251] Frantzman, 72.

[252] Freas, 318.

[253] Freas, 318.

[254] Mustafa Kabha, Arabic Palestinian Press between the Wars, 103. https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&lr=&id=TmiDDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA126&dq=%22Studies+in+Zionism%22+falastin&ots=4KQJoU5rkE&sig=CJxdVoSw_isizDDAApIFjgPW1fs#v=onepage&q=%22Studies%20in%20Zionism%22%20falastin&f=false

[255] Kabha, 106.

[256] Cohen, Army, 291 n84.

[257] Haiduc-Dale, 155.

[258] Haiduc-Dale, 151.

[259] Haiduc-Dale, 151.

[260] Morris, The Birth, 24.

[261] Haiduc-Dale, 154.

[262] Haiduc-Dale, 167.

[263] Morris, 1948, 83.

[264] Rubin and Schwanitz, Nazis, Islamists and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 97.

[265] Freas, 316.

[266] Haiduc-Dale, 166.

[267] Haiduc-Dale, 166.

[268] Haiduc-Dale, 166.

[269] Haiduc-Dale, 143

[270] Haiduc-Dale, 154.

[271] Freas, 324.

[272] Haiduc-Dale, 171.

[273] Frantzman, 74.

[274] Barnes, They Conspire Against Your People, 26.

[275] Barnes, 27.

[276] While generally viewed as a secular, Marxist group, its founder George Habash, was a Greek orthodox (the founder of the DFLP, Nayef Hawatmeh, was Catholic). A disproportionate number of their membership is also drawn from the Christan community, to the point where Presbyterian missionary Marthame Sanders once related how an Israeli crackdown of the PFLP was viewed by the Christian population of Zababdeh as an attack on Palestinian Christians http://www.saltfilms.net/update.html. As seen, Christians generally preferred secular organisations, and local perceptions often differ from Western analysis. Note also that Anglican priest Elias Khoury was convicted in Israel of carrying explosives for the PLO. These were later used to bomb a supermarket in a Jewish area, and the British Consulate, killing two people, and wounding eleven. When the Israelis allowed him to go to Jordan, he was made Anglican Bishop of Amman, and appointed to the executive council of the PLO.