Dying on Mount Ebal; The past and present reality of the Churches of Palestine – matters for confession and repentance
Tearing away fig leaves.
Jerusalem – ground zero for replacement theology!
Recent Palestinian Christian history
C.
Recent Palestinian Christian history
“Let us recall the destruction of Christian communities under Diocletian in the fourth century, under the Persian invasion in the seventh, under the Muslim Fatimid Caliph Al-Hakim in the tenth, and under Bibars in the thirteenth. Not to mention other cruel regimes, invasions, massacres, plagues and famines. …” [1]
Having been introduced to the various Christian communities, and also looked at their intercommunal relations, we will now look more closely at recent Palestinian Christian history. How did they interact with the wider historical events happening around them? This is not a history of Palestine as such, but of the Christian communities living in it.
Ottoman days
The religious basis of the Muslim/Christian relationship within the Ottoman Empire; Dhimmi status – general observations.
The pact between the Muslim ruler and the non-Muslim communities which regulated under what conditions they would be permitted to continue within the Muslim state. “The basis of the contract was the recognition by the Dhimmis of the supremacy of Islam and the dominance of the Muslim state, and their acceptance of a position of subordination, symbolised by certain social restrictions and the payment of a poll tax (jizya).[2] “The targeted dhimmi community and each individual in it are made to live in a state of perpetual humiliation in the eyes of the ruling community.”[3]
All this changed, at least theoretically, starting in 1836. After centuries of Islamic persecution, the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms established full equality for all citizens. This caused a massive social upheaval. “For the first time in the history of any Muslim state, in 1839 the Ottomans implicitly accepted a revolutionary political equality of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. They declared this equality more explicitly in 1856 and finally, announced it constitutionally in 1876. The jizya, or poll tax on non-Muslims, was abolished in 1855. A concept of secular Ottoman citizenship was introduced in 1869. The Ottoman purpose in this massive ideological and legal reordering of the empire or Tanzimat was clear: it was to stave off further European intervention and to consolidate imperial power.”[4]
Suddenly the Christian community was upwardly mobile, urbanizing and generally doing rather well. “Christians benefited economically more than their Muslim neighbours and became more confident in their social and religious expression.”[5] This improvement was due both to the disproportional impact of western mission schools, and more broadly, because the reforms removed the artificial constraints from the Christian community, restraints which were never on the Muslim majority. “By the end of the nineteenth century, the situation of Christians had markedly improved.”[6] In Mandate Palestine, for example, an absolute majority of the new, urban middle class were members of the Christian communities, even though these communities made up only 11% of the total population.[7]
This offended[8] the Ottoman Muslim majority deeply.[9] In their mind, the reforms opposed the natural, historical and religious order of things. This provoked the Muslim majority against them.[10] In 1897, (after the Tanzimat reforms had been revoked) in the Ottoman towns of Yozgat and Sason, local officials “perceived a hint of assertiveness and a wish for equality” among the Armenian Christian minority. This “alarmed the Palace considerably,” and in both cases, local Muslims responded with “unprecedented ferocity” to what they viewed as “mortal threats.”[11] After a massacre of Christians in 1895 “Muslim women came to jeer and laugh at the sufferers.”[12]
“The relaxing of the millet laws by Egypt in the 1830s, and the Tanzimat reforms of 1839 and 1856, whilst giving new freedom to Christian and other non-Muslim communities, destabilised Christian–Muslim relations. “The reforms allowed freedom of worship, and granted equal political status to the ahl aldhimma. Given the number of Jews and Christians in government service, and the economic advantages and higher education that many possessed, many Muslims feared that equal status would damage the Islamic character of the state and endanger the dominant position of Muslims in administrative circles. Taking advantage of this new freedom, simple acts such as the ringing of Church bells or public Christian processions helped result in serious Muslim riots against Christians in Aleppo and Damascus in 1850 and 1860.”[13]
As Colonel P. Campbell, A Visit to Israel's Holy Places (1839) wrote; “The Mussulmans [of Syria-Palestine], … deeply deplore the loss of that sort of superiority which they all and individually exercised over and against the other sects. … from the bottom of his heart he believes and maintains that a Christian, and still more so a Jew, is an inferior being to himself.”[14]
This will also be seen in 1853, with the Muslims of Nablus; “They shouted ‘look at the Dragoman sitting on a chair – kill him, kill him. Did you ever see a Christian like that before?’” The depth of the deep-seated fury at seeing non-Muslims assuming the rights equal to Muslims remains a bedrock issue to this day. (See for example the rage inspired by non-Muslims praying on the Temple Mount.)
Foreign factors
Larger patterns imposed themselves upon this local scene. With the decline of Ottoman fortunes, western nations had ‘appointed’ themselves as the protectors of different Christian communities within the Ottoman empire. There was some genuine cause for concern on the part of Muslims. Christian majority provinces were able to secede from the Ottomans empire with western support. Prime examples, Greece in 1830 with Russian, French and British aid, and Bulgaria 1878 with Russian help. Indeed, the Tanzimat reforms themselves were often seen as a concession to the Christian European powers, privileging Christians and promoting Christian separatism.[15] “Tensions between Muslims and Christians became particularly acute during the Balkan Wars and the war against Italy. Both were represented as a religious war of Muslims against Christians, and many Muslims identified local Christians with the Empire's enemies.”[16] Note that Western interference on behalf of various Christian communities was often an exasperating mixture of altruism and self-interest.[17] By using marginalized communities to further their own goals, foreign powers exaggerated their already precarious position, and left them open to attack from the offended majority.[18] Foundational to this was the fact that, under Islam, Christians had been robbed, raped and treated like filth. Had they simply been treated reasonably, there would have been no grievance for the Christian west to intervene over/exploit.
Looking more locally, in 1840 European powers forced Muhamad Ali to relinquish control of Syria and Palestine back to the Ottomans. In return, the Ottomans reluctantly conceded to Russia a claim to be the protector of the Orthodox Christians in the area. In 1851, France likewise claimed to be the protector of the Catholic Christians in the Holy Land. These rival claims then became the immediate cause of the Crimean War, as Russia in 1853 demanded that the Sultan favour the Orthodox over the Catholics, and the Sultan, backed by France and Britain, refused. In this atmosphere, it is perhaps unsurprising that in 1841, “Christians in Syria circulated a petition calling on Europe to place Palestine under Christian rule!”[19] and “this fostered a great deal of resentment among Muslims, many of whom began to suspect local Christians of conspiring with their European co-religionists to dominate the Ottoman Empire, not only economically, but politically as well.”[20] One can see why the Muslim majority would feel this, although again, had they simply treated their minorities with respect, none of this would have occurred. One cannot blame the Christians for wanting to escape the horrors of Ottoman rule!
The Muslim and Christian communities often differed over politics and international affairs. A British report from 1904 about the Sino-Russian war stated "the Christians with very few exceptions [were] feverntly praying for the success of Russia [their protector]. By contrast, the sympathies of most Muslims were with Japan [because it opposed Russia.] [21] Russia had helped return Syria/Palestine to Ottoman rule, but the Muslims deeply resented the price that had to be paid, and the humiliation of needed such help in the first place. In 1911, Christians of Haifa were likewise accused of disloyalty concerning the Italian occupation of Tripoli.
Palestine, 1830 +
Several years before the beginning of the Tanzimat reforms, in 1831, the Egyptian governor, Muhammad Ali “freed the Christians and Jews from their second-class citizenship.”[22] This equality caused deep resentment within the local Palestinian Muslim community. It provoked Muslim communal violence against the local Christians “because of the efforts of the Egyptians to give equality to the Christian communities.”[23] The landmark 1834 Palestinian revolt against Muhammed Ali was indeed “a bloody attempt to stave of the momentous changes.”[24] Due to the Ottoman reliance on European powers to regain these lands from Ali however, these liberties nevertheless would be reinstated even after they reverted to Ottoman control.
The 1834 Peasant’s Revolt.
Described as the first of the three struggles which defined modern Palestinian society, the Peasants Revolt had a number of causes, and multiple effects. On one level, it was a revolt against an unpopular Egyptian rule, and the taxes and conscription they had enforced on the country. Significantly, it also had a fundamental sectarian basis – the Egyptian ruler, in an attempt to enlist the political support of Britain and France, had made all subjects equal under the law. As previously noted, such equality infuriated the Muslim majority community, who viewed it as blasphemous. The Revolt therefore targeted both the Egyptian governance, and also the ‘illegitimate beneficiaries’ of that governance, the Christian and Jewish communities (see earlier for its effects on Jewish communities). Beyond even that reasoning, a time of civil unrest presented sections of the Muslim community with the opportunity to rob, ransack and rape, and the despised dhimmi communities were the traditional and obvious targets for such activities.
“following the uprising attacks broke out on the weaker members of Palestinian towns, namely the Jews and Christians.”[25]
This pillaging again revealed the fundamental disharmonies and fractures present within the traditional wider Palestinian society. Muslims, Christians and Jews were neither equal nor friendly. Again, if intercommunal relations were as good as they now tell us, why were Jews and Christians singled out in a time of unrest for rape and destruction? If intercommunal relations were so good, why would the granting of equal rights be any big deal??
It is a profound indictment that the celebrated first act of Palestinian self-determination was an attack by its Muslim majority upon its Christian and Jewish communities.
From the 1850s onwards, news of large scale, continuing massacres of Christians in other parts of the Ottoman empire made the Palestinian Christians increasingly nervous. The American Protestant missionary, Henry H. Jessup, wrote that; "the new liberties granted to the Christian sects, their growth in wealth, the appointment of their prominent men to foreign consular offices... all these and other causes had kindled [among the Muslims] fires of fanatical hatred."[26] Disturbances in Aleppo in 1850 targeting Christians and Mosul in 1854, targeting Christians and Jews, were seen as attempts by the traditional Muslim community to restore their old position. It was this same desire which contributed to massacres of the Maronite Christians in Lebanon in 1860 (20,000 killed, 380 Christian villages and 560 churches destroyed), the Christian communities in Damascus (also in 1860, 25,000 killed), and the Armenian Christians (1894-1896, 1915-1916 – over 1.5 million killed). Concerning the Maronite massacres; “Bitter conflicts between Christians and Druzes, which had been simmering under Ibrahim Pasha’s rule (mostly centred on the firmans of 1839 and later more decisively, of 1856, which equalized the status of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, the former resenting the implied loss of superiority) resurfaced under the new emir.”[27] Even closer to home, “the establishment of European consulates in Jerusalem in the middle of the nineteenth century was greatly resented by local Muslims.”[28] As the Rev. Arthur George Harper Hollingsworth wrote in 1852; “No Christian is secure against insult, robbery, and ruin.”[29]
In 1838, the British representative in Jaffa put forward the case that Britain should guarantee the rights of Protestants and Jews in Palestine. “Britain is the natural trustee for both of them.”[30] Lord Palmerston likewise thought that Britain could assume the role of protector of the Jews in Palestine, and that would grant them similar rights as those exercised already by France and Russia.
At the 1856 peace conference which ended the Crimean War, the Ottomans were forced to confirm the equality of all citizens under the law and guarantee full freedom of worship. While this equality “was not carried out in practice”[31] the “Muslims of Jerusalem in 1856 accused the Sultan of treachery for his being submissive to the dictates of foreigners, and for not applying Muslim law strictly on Christians and Jews.”[32]
In 1858 James Finn wrote; “In continuing to report concerning the apprehensions of Christians (in Jerusalem) from revival of fanaticism on the part of the Mahometans, I have the honour to state that daily accounts are given me of insults in the streets offered to Christians and Jews, accompanied by acts of violence. ... there is no clear case yet known of a Christian’s evidence being accepted in a court of justice, or in a civil tribunal against a Moslem. … only a few days ago, his Beatitude, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch was returning through the streets from the Cadi’s court of judgement … but had to pass through a gauntlet of curses hurled at his religion, his prayers, his fathers etc.,”[33]
In 1858 the two villages of Zebabdeh and Likfair (where the inhabitants are Christian) “were utterly sacked, men and women stripped even to their shirts and turned adrift. This was done by the people of Tubas and Kabatieh ... and no redress or punishment has yet been given by the military force. I need not say that none is afforded by the civil authority, himself a factious leader.”[34] Also in 1858, a Greek Orthodox construction and renovation was destroyed in Gaza.[35]
Local Christians were viewed as being disloyal, and as being a serious weak link, which aggressive foreign powers could exploit for their own advantage. This in turn provoked further attacks on the local Christians. For example, following sectarian violence in Lebanon in 1860, the French sent in troops and forced the Ottoman Sultan to grant the Maronites self-autonomy.[36] It was outrage at this which led to the massacre of 25,000 Christians in Damascus. At a result of the 1860 conflict in Lebanon, “tensions were also raised in other coastal cities such Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre, but their proximity to European warships in the Mediterranean helped maintain calm. Nonetheless, Tyre and Sidon were at the brink of civil war due to violence raging between Sunni and Shia residents and Christian refugees fleeing the war. Hundreds of Christians opted to leave Syria altogether, boarding ships to Malta or Alexandria. In the Galilee, peace was maintained by a local Bedouin chieftains, such as Aqil Agha, who assured Christians in Nazareth and Acre of his protection. However, in the village of Kfar Bir’im near Safed, three Christians were killed by Druze and Shia Muslim raiders, while the mixed village of al-Bassa was also plundered. A violent incident occurred between a Muslim and Christian man in Bethlehem, ending with the latter being beaten and imprisoned.” The authorities maintained calm in Jerusalem and Nablus “by introducing additional security measures.” In Nablus, the Ottoman governor was keen to maintain order, but his garrison was too small to ensure security in the city. That is, he needed more troops to protect the local Christians from the local Muslims. Instead, “many Christians pooled money together to pay for protection by local Muslims, who formed an ad hoc police force. [to protect them from the Muslim majority in the city]”[37]
Following a later episode of sectarian violence in Crete, Muslims in Damascus again threatened the local Christians, who, according to one missionary account, began fleeing "by the hundreds to the mountains and Beirut, fearing a repetition of the massacre of 1860.[38]
Ottoman Muslims continued to view the world through a religious lens. News of the 1875-78 Balkan Wars was “relayed to the Muslim population throughout the empire as a sign of yet another Christian onslaught against Islam. The intensified draft of soldiers into the ranks of the Turkish army and the pressure of added taxation to pay for the wars, carried out with great cruelty, caused the population to blame all Christians, including Christian Arabs, for their suffering.”[39] Note that taxation and drafting of soldiers were also prime causes of the 1834 rebellion.
Historical memory of the Crusades and more recent events informed this resentment on behalf of the local Muslims. “The visit of a French consul almost a hundred and fifty years earlier, in 1701, had produced similar outrage. Then, the local notables had responded with a petition stating that, "our city is the focus of attention of the infidels" and that "this holy land [could be] occupied as a result of this, as has happened repeatedly in earlier times."[40]Jews and Christians were also not allowed under Ottoman rule to build houses of worship, a ruling upheld in Jerusalem as late as 1838.[41]
In general, Muslims were unwilling to accept Christians in positions of authority. For example, James Finn noted that the body-guards employed by consulates needed to be Muslims, as these might "safely strike or lay hands on an unruly Moslem, or arrest him if a thief, which a Christian could not [do] without provoking a riot if not worse."[42] Palestinian (Muslims) resisted the edict establishing religious equality so strongly it had to be put in place very slowly, over a number of years. Outbreaks of intercommunal violence often followed its implementation.[43] “Muslim-Christian riots are found to have occurred every decade or so and disturbances between the communities were common.”[44]
In the 1890s, Ottoman soldiers closed down Anglican church schools in Jaffa (for an unknown period of time), and the governor announced that he would not be responsible if Muslims attacked Christians.[45]
Within Ottoman Palestine, Muslims and Christians were not the same, and their relationships prior to Zionism were not perfect. In reality, the different elements in the community were separated in their social relations by unbridgeable gulfs.
Interestingly, in 1995 CPT leader Arthur Gish records going to St Georges in Jerusalem and meeting with “Palestinians who identified themselves as Christians.” “When they heard we are living in Hebron, they couldn’t believe it. They informed us that Hebron is Muslim, and no Christian can live with Muslims.”[46] Seemingly unaware of his immense privilege as an American citizen, Gish seems to have treated this local advice with distain.
The example of Nazareth
As with everywhere else, the Christians of Nazareth were not allowed by the local Muslim authorities to repair or renovate their churches. In 1636, Catholic priests “were incarcerated by Muslims, who insisted that the church must remain the same as in ancient times.”[47] In 1696, the Christian community of Nazareth fled “in the face of persecution” but returned the next year.[48]
Standing up to Muslim violence guaranteed a pogrom. In 1708, there “was a brawl between the Christians and the Muslims of Nazareth; the covenant was pillaged again, and abandoned for a year.”[49] After better relations in the mid-1700s, relations again deteriorated; [after 1775] “it was especially bad on Fridays after prayer when Muslims, often villagers in town for the Friday sermon, would riot and attack Christians.”[50] The early Anglican priest, Michael Kawar mentioned in his autobiography that anti-Christian riots in Nazareth had forced his father to flee to Lebanon in the 1820s.[51] Relations were again reported to be better in the mid- 1820s. Note however that even in the good times, things could go suddenly bad, as when the Muslims in 1828 entered the church on Easter Sunday and robbed the Christian women of their jewellery.
The unproved accusation of blasphemy was always a frightening threat. In 1828 a Christian girl was accused by a Muslim boy she had rebuffed of insulting Mohammad. She was killed by tying her to a horse and dragging her through the streets.[52] This would have served as a lesson to all other Christian girls not to resist a Muslim man. Also in 1828, according to the Palestinian Rafiq Farah (an Archdeacon Emeritus of the Jerusalem Diocese of the Anglican Church); “The Arab Christians suffered a great deal under the rule of Abdullah Pasha, the governor of the Acre district of Galilee (1819-1831). He pulled down the Carmelite monastery on Mt Carmel, incited the Muslims of Nazareth to attack the Christians in 1828 and forced Christian and Jewish women not to dress like Muslim women.”[53] In the Peasants Revolt of 1834, the Christians of Nazareth sided with the Egyptians (who had given them full civic rights).[54] In 1864, relations were again described by Tobler as generally good, but added; “from time to time there were always occasional dark spots.”[55]
Writing in 1876, P.J. Newman noted that Christians comprised three quarters of the population of Nazareth, and that as a consequence; “the Christians assert and defend their rights. In nearly all other parts of Palestine, the Christians are cringing and fearful.”[56] In 1881, some Muslim notables of Nazareth demanded the slaughter of the Christians, but this was rejected by the local sheikh.[57]
The expulsion of Protestants from Nablus, 1856
“whereas many villages in the district of Nablus have a few Christian families located in each, such families were subjected in every direction to plunder and insults.”[58]
On the third of November 1853, the local Greek Orthodox beat the local Protestants in their schoolhouse, “and drove them out of the premises.” At a general meeting called by the Governor, the Mufti signalled to the crowd outside who thought the meeting was to oppose the Greek Orthodox. They therefore shouted “as to the necessity of destroying Christian Churches, or at least of diminishing their privileges and lowering their doors and windows. They shouted ‘look at the Dragoman sitting on a chair – kill him, kill him. Did you ever see a Christian like that before?’ (The Dragoman [interpreter/guide] was a Protestant from Syria.) The Mufti then drew up a fatwa that; “it is against the honour of the Moslem religion to permit Christian Churches to be erected, but only to tolerate such as were found in the country at the time of the Mohammedan Conquest.” He continued that Protestants should not be allowed to worship in any place of general meeting, and even in their own homes not above three together, and in a subdued voice. The local governor was then ordered by the Pasha in Jerusalem that the Protestants were not to meet again for prayer in the school room and were forbidden a special room for worship.[59] The sight of an Arab Christian sitting in a chair(!) was enough to drive them into a killing rage!
In 1855, Muslim mobs attacked a Greek church, the Protestant missionary house and school.[60] R. Farah comments on the Nablus riots; “On the fourth of April, 1856, a fanatic Muslim mob at Nablus, who were incited by their leaders after the Sultan gave all Ottomans equality before the law … attacked the Christians in Nablus, especially the Protestants. They had to flee the town; their homes were ransacked and at least two were killed. The persecutions stopped after 1865.”[61] (The Christians of Damascus were massacred by Muslims in 1860 for the same reason.[62])
In 1858 James Finn reported; “the house of the Christian priest (Greek) was taken in his absence and his stores of grain and oil for his household during the winter were taken, not to be consumed by the soldiers (for that would entitle the owner to a claim on the Government) but were mixed into one heap .. by the Muslims of the city and thrown into the street. I feel myself more and more to be warranted in attributing the riots of Nablus in 1856 to an anti-Christian feeling. In conclusion, I have the honour to quote the perpetual expression of the Christians in Palestine, that their lot has become far worse since the termination of the Russian war than it was before that period extending back to 1831.[63]
The Nablus Protestants sent their own petition (“The humble Petition of the Protestants of Nablous”) to the Sultan. In it, they spoke of “their afflicted and calamitous state … the injuries inflicted on them, the loss of their freedom, the insecurities of their lives, property and families, all of which they presently endure (and for the previous 5 months). Since the issue of the Firman (February 1856) declaring religious liberty, the Mohammedans of Nablus have been filled with rage against the Christians, insulting his majesty the Sultan and crying; ‘No obedience to a creature who causes disobedience to the creator.’” On Friday, April 4, most of the Ulamahs of Nablus assembled in one of the Mosques … after this the call was given by one of them going through the streets; “Oh religion of Mohammad, attack the Christians.” At the same time, all the Mohammedans being assembled for prayer, the Ulamahs stopped the Muazzins and made them come down from the Minarets, saying there shall be no prayers for the religion of Muhammad is dead.” They aroused the populace “to fury, that they might fall upon the Christians.” They destroyed the school of bishop Gobat, and the attached chapel. They also killed a number of Christians, burying one boy in lime. The shouts of the mob were “frightful, together with those of the females who shrieked on the terraces to excite and encourage them.” The Greek Orthodox “from fear, have appeared outwardly satisfied with the Mohammedans, and have made no claim [of] satisfaction for the injuries done.” [That is, the local Christians, from fear, did not even attempt to gain compensation through the court, but simply accepted the murder, violence, robbery and destruction of property they had been subjected to. Such was their life under Muslim rule. Note also the cry from the crowds that if they are unable to persecute Christians, then Islam is dead.]
The entire Protestant community were forced to flee Nablus; “They have continued to regard the Protestants with an evil eye.” The Petition concluded; “The Mohammedans make no distinction between the Christian nations, in their general hatred and enmity against that religion.” “The injury done is not to your humble servants alone … your humble petitioners have become a proverb and a taunt to all who are round about, everywhere now if a Christian disagrees with a Mohammedan, the later say to him we will do to you as it has been done in Nablus, and therefore in numerous places Christians have been maltreated since this disturbance.”[64]
The Jerusalem Protestant community (including Nicolayson) sent a separate appeal on behalf of the Christians of Nablus. In it, they noted that; “the fury of the rioters was indiscriminately directed against all Christians without distinction … the Greeks church together with the house of the Greek priest were … ransacked.” They likewise mentioned the firman of 1856 as having “inflamed” the local Muslims. Speaking on behalf of “the Protestant communities in Palestine and Syria” they continued “We are fully sensible of the necessity of the greatest caution, forbearance and prudence on our part towards the Moslems in avoiding every demonstration that would needlessly irritate their pride, prejudice and jealousy.”[65]
“Most Muslims were having difficulties coming to terms with the idea of non-Muslims as political equals.”[66] That is not to say friendly relations were absent, or areas of commonality did not exist,[67] but the relations between the two communities remained difficult, as both tried to adapt to the changing situations. Small village inter-faith relations were paradoxically more personal and more traditional. Local Christians were generally not supportive of Western missionary activity.
Obstacles to Dhimmi Emancipation in Palestine
When fears of a new war with Russia surfaced, Finn recorded that the Muslim street believed that “every Moslem was to consider as his enemy every native Christian, or at least those who had any relations with Russia (Greeks and even Armenians). The timorous and panic-stricken Christians helped forward this idea by the very excess of their fears. They had not the sense to conceal their dread of a probable approaching massacre in which scenes of horror and bloodshed were to be enacted, such as their fathers had endured in consequence of the war of Greek independence about thirty years before. … Fear had been suckled with their mother’s milk, in days gone by, and now it overpowered them. If this was the case in Jerusalem, … it was tenfold worse in all distant towns and villages.”[68]
“A great change had passed over the land, as well as Jerusalem, with respect to toleration of religion in the existing generation, not only caused by (the Ottoman reforms of 1838) but also by the surviving effects of previous Egyptian dominion between 1832 and 1840, which had swept away much of the bigotry and tyranny of former ages. There has been since 1845 a profession of equality for all religions in the administration of local government, and certainly less of insult and injury from the Moslem populace to the Christians. Their functionaries were no longer endured as intruders into Christian houses for food, lodging and money, remaining there till their demands were satisfied. Christian women were not now dishonoured with impunity of the offenders [as was the norm earlier]. Levies of money at any irregular time or place without reason assigned, were no more suffered. Christians were not now pushed into the gutters of the streets by every Moslem taking up the best part of the pavement and with a scowl crying out, “Shemmel-ni ya keleb” neither were Christians debarred from riding horses or wearing cheerful colours. … Christians had felt in 1852 much more secure in life and goods than their fathers had been.” James Finn.[69]
Christians then were starting to benefit socially and economically, but still retained the memories and the fears of what had been commonplace only a few years before (“Fear had been suckled with their mother’s milk, in days gone by, and now it overpowered them.”). As the experience of Christian communities in the rest of the Ottoman Empire would show, these fears were terrifyingly valid.
Tanzimat – a reflection
Romans 7:10 I found that the very commandment that was intended to bring life actually brought death.
The Tanzimat reforms gave the Christian communities something to lose. After centuries of no civil rights, of humiliations, robberies rapes etc, now they were educated, socially upward and doing well. They knew the horrors they had escaped from and were desperate to retain these new rights/freedoms. They now had something to lose. And when push came to shove, if pushing the Jews under the bus would endear them to the Muslims, it was a price they were prepared to pay. They had never liked the Jews anyway, and it was expedient that the Jews should die to preserve Christians gains.
The Tanzimat were also a reflection of Ottoman weakness. The product of both western pressure and also of a desire to emulate the more powerful west, they infuriated the Moslem majority who were the core constituency and powerbase of the empire. This was why the reforms were discarded in 1878, and a new/old policy of explicitly favouring the Muslim community was brought back. The anger engendered by the reforms would feed directly into the Armenian massacres of 1894-1924.[70] That is, the Tanzimat reforms, by granting liberty to the minorities, first allowed them to flourish, but this in turn created the conditions which ended in their massacre.
It was this perceived weakness, visible in the shrinking land area of the empire, which itself spurred on the Arabs and others to abandon Ottomanism and seek their own destiny apart from Turkish rule. In many ways, Arab nationalism was in fact another expression of that same underlying weakness. For numerous Muslim Arabs, it was a frustration with the Young Turk's secularising tendencies that led them to become Arab nationalists.[71] Many Muslims viewed the Ottoman cries of “Jihad” as a cynical exploitation of Islam coming so late in the game. For too many years, their reform efforts had worked to undermine religion as a governing principle; as such, they had lost a great deal of their credibility among Muslims. Arab nationalism was viewed by many as the best way to reassert Muslim supremacy. As a result, from around 1908 many Muslims joined Arab nationalist movements, and there was increased Muslim involvement in the nationalist movement. This was particularly evident in the emphasis given the idea of resurrecting an Arab caliphate. The British promoted these for their own self-interest (as a weapon to weaken the Ottomans). Younger Palestinians soon also saw in Arab unity the best possible defence against Zionism.
Ongoing effects
“Despite the abandonment of the Millet system in the 19th century, the ‘culture’ of the system still influences the customs and expectations of communal dynamics in the region today.”[72] As has already been seen (“Fear had been suckled with their mother’s milk, in days gone by, and now it overpowered them.”[73]) and will be seen repeatedly in the following pages, there has been a cumulative effect of a thousand years of persecution, humiliation and massacre. Writing in 2021, Andrew Ashdown notes “Despite the fact that the massacres resulting from the Tanzimat reforms took place over 150 years ago, they have left a lasting memory. In one of the Christian villages that was attacked and suffered sectarian murder at the hands of jihadi groups during the recent conflict, a villager said to me: ‘We are afraid that this will happen again. They attacked us a hundred years ago. They have turned against us now. And we are afraid that they will wait for the next opportunity to do the same again’. I have heard similar comments in different parts of Syria.”[74] Even in so called good times, or good decades, there is a fragility and fear foundational to the Christian communities experience of living in Muslim majority lands. They remain a small, shrinking and despised minority. As the Palestinian Christian Al-Sakakini wrote in 1932 concerning his status in the eyes of the Muslim majority; “if I were to struggle with a Moslem who is less founded in knowledge and heritage than I, I would not doubt that they would prefer him to survive … No matter how high my standing may be in science and literature, no matter how sincere my patriotism is, no matter how much I do revere this nation, even if I burn my fingers before its sight, as long as I am not Muslim, I am naught."[75] Arab Christians, including Palestinian ones, are aware of their communal history, and very aware of the tenuous nature of the peace and prosperity they may be experiencing. Push the limits, be identified with the West (even though they are indigenous) or just be in the wrong place in a time of increased Muslim emotions, and fears of mass violence resurface. One reads of “the talk” that black parents give their children in America, and Jewish parents give their children world-wide. Christian parents in Muslim lands also rightly pass down their fears and nightmares. Awad describes how beneath the rich history of plurality for eastern Christians, there hides a “parallel history of suffering, uncertainty, fear, pressure, difficulty, death and perpetual strife for survival as a minority in a non-Christian majority world.”[76] Christian strategies of Arab nationalism and anti-Zionism cannot be fully understood apart from this overwhelming fear, a fear which for obvious reasons is rarely mentioned in public. That said, the 1800 years of local Christian persecution and contempt for the Jewish community needs likewise, shamefully, to be recognised. For far too many, the sight of Jews happy, free and prospering is as deep an offence, as profoundly ‘wrong’ as it is to the Muslim majority.
World War 1
The period immediately prior to the First World War saw a worsening of the situation of Christians in the Ottoman Empire. There was an intensification of Islamic sentiment, much of it in reaction to the loss of the greater part of the Empire's European (that is, Christian) territories. Consequently, Muslims were also increasingly sceptical as to where the loyalty of the Empire's Christians truly lay.[77] An article appearing in the Greek Orthodox Filastin in Jaffa accused Muslims of religious fanaticism and of behaving in a hostile manner towards non-Muslims, an attitude stemming in large part apparently from a belief that Christians were not loyal Ottoman citizens. In Palestine overall, relations between the two communities were tense. The Spanish consul in Jerusalem reported in 1914 that the Christian residents were profoundly frightened.[78] One visiting European wrote that in mixed towns, Muslim and Christian children rarely befriended each other, and it was not uncommon to hear Muslim children singing disparagingly of the Christian faith.[79] Elsewhere within the Ottoman empire, Christians were being slaughtered.
All this exploded during the actual war. The Ottoman government officially described it as a jihad (returning to their core constituency). The Young Turks had, in the period leading up to the war, begun to encourage feelings of loyalty towards the Ottoman Empire among its Muslim subjects by appealing to religious sentiment. During the same period, the Young Turks sought to discredit reformists by characterizing them as agents of Christian powers. It was reported in 1913 in an Egyptian paper that an Arabic-language pamphlet entitled `al-Haqq yä alte' ('Truth [God] Will Triumph') was being circulated in Syria with the aim "to stir up Moslem fanaticism by stigmatising all the Christians of Turkey as secret agents of Europe and the betrayers of the Moslem fatherland.”[80] Across the empire, Christians were increasingly attacked. Armenians (1.5 million murdered), Syrian Orthodox in Anatolia, Nestorian Christians, Jacobites and Chaldaeans were all targeted. Lebanon’s Christian population also suffered greatly.
During the war, hundreds of thousands died of starvation in Lebanon, Damascus etc.[81] In 1915, two Anglican priests and many of their congregation were deported from Palestine to Ufra in Turkey, near where the Armenian massacres took place.[82]
The Christians in Palestine could not but be aware of these terrible events, and fearful for their own safety. Their response was generally to try and stress their Arabism as a common, uniting identity. For example, when approached by a delegation of Orthodox clergy and laity arriving from Jaffa in March 1914, with the purpose of forming a political party that would look after Christian interests, Khalil al-Sakakini responded that, “if your aim is political, then I do not approve it, because I am an Arab first of all, and I think it preferable that we should form a national party to unite all the sons of the Arab Nation, regardless of religion and sects, to awaken national feelings and become imbued with a new spirit.”[83] The Christian Arab attachment to Arab nationalism began therefore under Ottoman rule, under fear of Muslim massacre, both before and during the war, and remained vitally relevant during and after the British colonial rule.
A New Identity – Arab nationalism
On 30 October 1918, the campaign in the Middle East officially came to an end. Turkish rule and Ottomanism, had collapsed. The details of its successor, Arab nationalism had yet to be worked out. The British took over a society which was profoundly disunited. Sir Mark Sykes Arab Latin Catholic advisor, Yiisuf Albina (himself a resident of Jerusalem), described the situation in Palestine at the beginning of the British military administration as "a pot-pourri of sects and heterogeneous elements bearing an innate hatred against each other and in perpetual conflict against themselves."[84]
“Arab Christians joined the emerging Palestinian National movement in the hope of breaking the yoke of their marginality in a Muslim society.”[85]
Palestinian Arabs, Christian and Muslim, were both attracted to Arab nationalism. Each viewed it quite differently however and sought contradictory outcomes. The Christians hoped for a secular version which would guarantee their rights as Arabs, regardless of their religion (as an enshrinement of the Tanzimat equality) while the Muslim majority viewed it as a means to return to the pre-Tanzimat days of total Muslim dominance – as a total repudiation of the Tanzimat. Given the overwhelming disparity in their numbers and power, this discontinuity was never going to end well for the Christians.
So, after the Ottoman empire, rather than just returning to being disparate religious communities, millets (“we are Muslim, or Christian or Jewish”) for the Christian community, secular nationalism (“We are ALL Arabs [except you Jews]!”) was a way of securing their place in the wider society, of protecting their new-found freedoms/equality/prosperity. Secular Arab nationalism was also the solution being offered by the Western, Christian powers that they were close to. The push for Arab nationalism came initially from the Greek Orthodox, supported by the Melkites. They put much effort into trying to craft a broader Arab identity which would encompass and unify it’s various Christian and Muslim components. “The Arab Christians wholly identified themselves with their Muslim countrymen.”[86] Greek Orthodox community leader Khalil al-Sakakini frequently met with the Grand Mufti, Haj Amin al-Husseini. “This religious unity would prove to be an essential goal of Palestinian Christians throughout the mid-20th century.”[87] Al-Sakakini was an “ardent anti-Zionist and Palestinian nationalist.”
Palestinian Christians hoped for a role in determining the actual character of the state. Shomali lists the five aspects of the Arab cultural revival in Palestine, and Christian Arabs were leaders in the first four; education, the printing press, literary clubs and newspapers.[88] Stalder writes that, “benefiting from the educational opportunities presented [by Western missionaries] to them, they [Christian Arabs] were active in their role in the incipient Arab Awakening and subsequent rise of Arab nationalism.”[89]
For very different reasons, Muslim Arabs were also attracted to nationalism. Many Muslims saw Arab nationalism as a means to restoring Islamic government (as opposed to the secularism of the Young Turks). This was particularly evident in the emphasis given the idea of resurrecting an Arab caliphate. Pan-Arabism was attractive, but with Islam as its core.
At the same time, many Muslim Arab nationalists were sceptical of Christian intentions. For an Arab Muslim, to be an Arab was to be a Muslim. The two concepts were identical. The Arabic speaking Christian minority were seen as definitely inferior, possibly traitors, at best a defective anomaly. 'Arif al-'Arif, a prominent Muslim nationalist, stated that in his view, the so-called unity with Christians had had no practical foundation; moreover, the Christians had preferred to cooperate with the British, who are Christian like them.[90] Many in the Muslim majority still viewed Christians as uppity and disloyal, a pro-western 5th column (a view formed during Ottoman days). Clearly, these negative views would be exacerbated during the Mandate.
So, both Muslims and Christians came to support Arab nationalism. Their unity was essentially a profoundly temporary marriage of convenience. So, why have a marriage at all?
Enter the Zionists. As noted, Zionism not only gave them a common enemy, it greatly increased the Christians value re soliciting outside, Western Christian help. Their faith gave them access that the Muslim community simply did not have. It was a common threat forcing them both together. "The Christian editors of Falistin would call on all Palestinians, both Muslim and Christian, to unite against Zionism on grounds of local patriotism."[91] Zionism both provided a means of showing their loyalty to the Arab nation, and also, due to initial British support of the Zionists, handed them the task of influencing both the British government and British [Christian] public opinion. Anti-Zionism was great for Palestinian Christians! And this at a time when Christian Arabs were having their loyalty questioned, their identity as Arabs doubted, and their ties to the West mistrusted! It was expedient to throw the Jews under the bus to save their own community. John 11:50. The Muslim community likewise [for pragmatic and short-term political reasons] sought to include the Christian community “hoping to use their Palestinian Christians’ religious heritage to appeal to British Christians for support against Zionism.”[92]
Many Christians indicated a preference for indefinite British rule. Once it became clear that British rule also entailed Zionism, Christian support for an independent Palestine increased. The Muslim threat was greater, but they preferred Muslim Arab rule to Jewish. While British colonialism may have gone, the bargain continues to have currency to this day, as Muslim Palestinians see value in using the Palestinian Christians to undermine American Christian support for Israel. Even as Christian communities across the Middle East are decimated, the Palestinian Christians continue to seek out their own security on the basis, not of their faith, but of their utility to the Muslim majority. With the collapse of their numbers, their influence has shrivelled. There is no organic reason to grant them any rights, their only value remains as a means of soliciting Western support for the Arab cause. Without that, they are nothing.
Choosing teams
In the brief interregnum between Ottoman and British rule, the possibility of a union with Syria (initially under French mandate) was briefly floated (by the French). The reactions to this by different sections of Palestinian society was instructive. It was supported by the more extreme Muslims, who would later coalesce around the Haj Amin al-Husseini. This was because Muslims saw a single, larger state as the basis of pan-Arabic, Muslim nation. That is, many Muslims saw Arab nationalism simply as a means of returning to an Islamic government. A specifically Palestinian nationalism was not a priority here. As one British officer noted, support for complete independence was strongest among "extreme and more fanatical Moslems.”[93] Union with Syria was also supported by the Latin Catholics, though for very different reasons. Latin Catholics favoured union with Syria because it was to be a French mandate, and the French were pro-Catholic. It was a false alliance between contradictory short- and long-term objectives, as indeed was the opposite alliance of conservative Muslims and the Greek Orthodox. Supporting the British mandate, were the traditional Palestinian, moderate Muslim leadership, led by the al-Nashashibis, whose rivalry with al-Husseini would dominate Palestinian politics throughout the Mandate and beyond. The Nashashibis wanted to retain their own power, and not be subject to Damascus. Supporting them were the Greek Orthodox and Protestant communities. They again however hoped for a permanent mandate, but as a protection against Muslim rule. Note that within Syria itself, the same dynamic existed; “the Catholic denominations that ‘by and large welcomed French rule,’ and the Orthodox Christian communities that ‘sought to strengthen ties to their Muslim compatriots in the name of Syrian and Arab identification.’”[94] In each case, the Orthodox went with the Arab identity party, and the smaller Catholic and Protestant communities supported their respective colonial backers. All alliances were deeply pragmatic and would drift, attracted to success, as the Mandate progressed. The different Christian communities would throw their increasingly irrelevant support behind which ever Muslim party was either the most nationalistic/secular, or, finally, which ever was simply the least Islamic. In today’s terms, that translates as supporting the Palestinian Authority rather than Hamas.
This temporary convergence of interests was seen in the Jaffa Muslim-Christian Association, where both Muslims and Christians (Protestants as well as Orthodox) specifically requested British protection. One British official noted, a "strong combination of Christian and enlightened Moslems [called] for local autonomy under the guidance of one of the great Powers with a view to future independence as soon as the country [was] able to stand alone."[95] Overall, Christians but not Muslims supported the idea of some form of continuing mandatory control over complete independence – memories of the massacres of Christians under the Ottomans persisted! This became immediately evident during a special meeting of the Jerusalem MCA, convened in early 1919, for the purpose of putting together a delegation to represent them at the First Syrian Congress. The Orthodox representatives were initially so opposed to an independent Arab government that they refused to send any delegates at all, and only agreed in the end in order to avoid friction between the two communities. A general perception existed among Christian Arabs that the British were pro-Muslim, and the French, pro-Christian.[96]
This confusion of attitudes continued into the Mandate. Many Christians liked and profited from the Mandate[97], although other sources state that; “most Christians remained staunch opponents of the British.”[98] Throughout the Mandate, Christians tended to rally for the Nashashibi clan (the National Party), who were moderate, middle class, urbanised, and whose leader had a Christian wife, against the Husseinis, led by the Mufti, Amin al-Husseini, head of the Supreme Muslim Council.[99] But again, many Christians, especially the Orthodox, supported the Mufti. The heads of the Syrian Orthodox, Coptic, Armenian and Greek Orthodox all supported the Mufti’s nomination. Interestingly, these were all expatriate leaders. In 1924, Christian Protestant editor Bulus Shihada condemned anti-Judaism but supported anti-Zionism (all the while receiving money from Zionist organisation.[100]) Note also his comment; “There is no liberation for us except if Muslims and Christians are Arab before all things.”[101] Throughout the Mandate, the Christians were confused, pragmatic, united only in opposition to Zionists, and in a growing commitment to Arab nationalism as the only other option for them.
For the Muslims, “national unity was important, but it had to be based on acceptance of the superior status of the countries Muslim majority.”[102] In the first Arab congress of 1913 Nadhra Mutran, a Christian, remarked that “the Arab’s pride of race takes precedence over religion.”[103] This is a profoundly un-Christian sentiment, and yet even this compromised formulation would fail to satisfy Arab Muslims, who would repeatedly show greater integrity in this respect. Note the following discussion between two of the founders of the Syrian Ba'athist Party; Anton Saadeh, a Muslim, said to the Communist Christian Michel Aflaq “Your slogan is ‘One Arab nation with One Eternal Mission’; one Arab nation, very well. But what is the eternal mission, if not Islam? –which has nothing to do with you, Christian that you are!”[104]
Both Muslims and Christians opposed the Balfour Declaration and the Zionist movement and viewed them as a threat. A British official in 1919 wrote; “In brief, practically all Moslems and Christians of any importance in Palestine are anti-Zionist, and bitterly so.”[105] For some observers, the mere fact of Muslim-Christian unity was a measure of just how serious a danger both considered Zionism. As one visiting European commented, "[t]he fact that Moslems and Christians were working together for a common cause was a sign that the nation was roused by what was felt to be a common danger, and that there were men ready to sink all differences of outlook in the effort to win through.”[106] Muslims and Christian converged over their opposition to Zionism. (Luke 23:12 “That day Herod and Pilate became friends--before this they had been enemies.”) Christians like Najib Nassar, George Antonius and Emil Habibi spearheaded the anti-Zionist movement in the first decades of the 20th century, both as political activists and publishers of Arab newspaper in Palestine. According to Haiduc-Dale, the Christians themselves “were unified only in their opposition to Zionism.”[107] He also speaks of the “consistent Christian opposition to Zionism.”
It was into this atmosphere that the King-Crane Commission arrived in Jaffa on 10 June 1919. It travelled throughout Syria and Palestine. In Palestine, the one point on which both Muslim and Christian communities could agree was their opposition to Zionism.
In 1920 a letter of protest was issued from Nazareth denouncing Zionism. Before the meeting, As’ad Mansur, the Anglican priest “explained that because the Jews had rejected the Messiah, the land had been taken from them, and the Talmud taught the Jews to prevent strangers from entering the land as long as they had the power to do so.” Mansur then used this to suggest that while the Arabs had the power, they too should use it to prevent the strangers, or Jews, from entering the land.[108]
“Arabness
is the space of the Palestinian Christian faith and this faith needs Arabness
for its human depth.” This leads the Palestinian churches to develop an Arabist
rather than a biblical theology. Such an approach cannot avoid xenophobic anti-Zionism
and anti-Israelism.[109]
Muslim Christian
Associations – the best it ever gets for Palestinian Christians
Because of this mutual opposition to Zionism, the nationalist movement was initially characterised by a sense of unity between Muslims and Christians. This was most pronounced in the formation of the Muslim-Christian Associations (MCAs), the first of which was established in Jaffa in March 1918. They articulated the core political demands of the Palestinian Arabs; opposition to the Jewish `National Home' and to Jewish immigration. They were described by Cohen as “the hard kernel of the Palestinian Arab national movement.”[110]
The MCAs would result in the formation of the Arab Executive. Christian Arabs were well represented within the MCAs, and it was probably they who had prompted their establishment. For the majority of Palestine's Arabs, this was the first experience of political collaboration between Christians and Muslims. Overall, Christian representation exceeded their proportional numbers in Palestine. Muslim Christian Associations hoped to use their members’ Christian heritage to appeal to British Christians against Zionism.
1918-1922 was dominated by the MCAs, and thereby marked by attempts to give Christians an equal position. The first Muslim Christian association in Jerusalem met in March 1918. Christians were welcomed by the Muslims who wanted;
- a national (inclusive)
body,
- their greater education and
- their contacts with the
Christian west.
For moderate Muslims, the shock of Christian (British) rule created a genuine moment of unity. However, even in the politically moderate MCAs, Christians as well as Muslims were required to take an oath on the Qur'an in addition to the one made on the national covenant. Importantly, they immediately sought to garner international support among western Christians, mostly British and American, against the Zionist program. They sent delegations to the Vatican, the Archbishop of Canterbury etc. They demanded the forbidding of land sales to Jews, and the limiting or ceasing of Jewish immigration. Note the Christianised wording of this 1919 statement by the Jaffa MCA; “From over the Mt of Olives Christ gave salvation life and peace to the world and all the world owes its life to this sacred source. Will therefore the British nation … give free hand to the Zionists so they may pour death and vengeance from over that sacred place on both the Muslims and Christians of Palestine?”[111] In 1920, the heads of five Christian churches in Nazareth wrote protesting to the deputy British governor.[112] The Palestinian Women’s Movement also formed their first national committee in 1920. "We are Muslim and Christian women, we do represent the rest of the Palestinian Women, we do protest seriously against the British Policies."[113] They also took part in the Jaffa riots of May 1921, in opposition to Jewish immigration.
Joint political opposition to Zionism was already evident when in 1922, Churchill’s White Paper called for "the establishment of a Legislative Council containing a large proportion of members elected on a wide franchise.”[114] The Arab population in general rejected this proposal, as, by including within it Jewish members, it was viewed as implicit acceptance of Zionism. Christians participated fully in the 1923 MCA boycott of proposed legislative council.[115] Indeed, in Haifa and Jaffa, two cities with substantial Christian populations, their attitude towards the elections was more extreme than that of Muslims; there, no Christian secondary electors were nominated at all.
Even during periods of tension between Muslims and Christians, delegations sent abroad had an over-representation of Christians. Their purpose was to make the case for Arab nationalism in terms agreeable to the West. Orthodox George Antonius, in his extremely popular book The Arab Awakening, described the Arab Revolt in clearly secular nationalistic terms. This was how sympathetic Westerners liked/wanted to see it (like the “Arab Spring”).
Sadly, the British viewed the local churches as divided, petty and squabbling. “The feelings between Catholics Orthodox and Protestants were too strong to overcome.” “Unhappily, faction plays a large part in the life of the Christian east.”[116] Fights between different denominations involving beer bottles and chamber pots were also described. Beyond that, the Christian leaders had demonstrated early on their opposition to Jewish immigration, a core commitment of the Mandate. These Christians placed themselves in opposition to the Mandate, and were seen as troublemakers, hopelessly fragmented, and inflammatory (not as peacemakers, a blessing etc). The British simply refused to monitor the Christian courts, despite constant complaints of corruption and inefficiency.
Under the British Mandate, the Christian community was prospering, but also feeling nervous. With a new, Christian imperial power in charge, concerns of disloyalty were heightened, but so paradoxically was their practical value as a go-between. In fact, this paradox served to render the Christians even more eager to prove their loyalty and their worth to the Muslim majority. Predominantly, their support was needed to combat western support for Zionism. It was their mutual opposition to Jewish settlement that enabled this un-natural alliance to both exist and continue. Christian Arabs had already comprised almost half of the delegates to the 1913 Arab Congress in Paris. They wanted to prove their loyalty to the Arab/Muslim majority, who viewed them with suspicion, but who were also coming to appreciate their utility as advocates of the Arab position to the Christian British government (as they saw it), and also to the wider British Christian community. This has remained the case till this day.
1921+The Muslim Supreme Council – Islam reasserts itself, Christians
immediately cave
The establishment in 1921 of the Muslim Supreme Council (just two years after the establishment of the British Mandate), and the acceptance of the Grand Mufti as the national leader by Christians and the Mandate government weakened the MCAs and meant Christians were “drawn back to their marginality.”[117] The Christian minority had failed to impose its more secular vision on the majority. They had lost the best chance they had to actually influence the events around them. Arab nationalism became increasingly Islamic, and the Christian community tried to accommodate this increasingly unfavourable reality. Arab nationalism now gave pride of place to Muslim Arabs. The Muslim celebration of Nabi Musa was accepted as a National holiday.[118] Islam was dominant, but Christians were still valued.
Christians themselves quickly recognised the need to acknowledge the special place of Islam in a shared Arab heritage. Najib Nassar (Protestant ex Orthodox), editor al-Karmil wrote that Arabs were divided into 2 groups;
- those who accepted
Muhammad’s religion, and
- those who accepted his gospel in everyday life and national commands but remained true to their original religion. Arab Christians celebrated Muhammad’s birthday[119] – the greatness of Muhammad formed the basis of Arab national emergence.[120]
Kimmerling has claimed that “Islam’s rise in the emerging national movement was not lost on Palestinian Christians. In part they responded by joining in acts whose origins lay in Islam but that came to be reinterpreted as national events-the development of a kind of civil religion…Some Christians even began to speak of Islam as a national Arab culture that they, too, could embrace.” George Antonius remarked on the “genius of the Prophet Muhammad.”[121] The majority of Arab Christians continued to identify themselves with the Muslim majority, while at the same time wanting to preserve their Christian communal identity. They tried to prove themselves good Arab nationalists, bearing “the deficiency for being non-Muslims.”[122]
Freas makes an important point; “Their ability to role as far as shaping Arab identity was largely predicated on to what extent they were able to appropriate Islam as a part of their own national heritage. At minimum, this meant trying to redefine Islamic festivals as nationalist ones-not only the Nabi Musa festival, but even the Prophet's Birthday; at most, a relinquishing of one's faith and conversion to Islam.”[123]
Nor was this behaviour confined to Palestinian Arab Christians. The Syrian Christian, Michel Aflaq, founder of the Baath Party, wrote; “Muhammad was the epitome of all the Arabs, so let all the Arabs today be Muhammad … Islam was an Arab movement and its meaning was the renewal of Arabism and its maturity … [even] Arab Christians will recognise that Islam constitutes for them a national culture in which they must immerse themselves so that they may understand and love it, and so that they may preserve Islam as they would preserve the most precious element in their Arabism.”[124] Leaving aside Muhammad’s personal history, given that he taught as absolute doctrines which directly contradicted Christianity (Jesus as son of God, Jesus death on the cross etc) this idea itself directly contradicts Christian scripture; “But even though we, or an angel from heaven, should preach to you a gospel contrary to that which we have preached to you, let him be accursed.” (Galatians 1:8) Given Muhammad’s personal history, in this context especially the battle of Khaybar and its continual referencing my modern Muslims as license to attack Jews, this quote from a Christian Arab is even more horrific.
The question for Palestine’s Christians was “to what extent was nationalism becoming a euphemism for apostacy?”
The Nabi Musa celebrations
The Christian participation in the nationalized Nabi Musa[125] celebrations make an interesting example of this. As previously noted, it was mainly the Orthodox who began to join in this Muslim festival.[126]
“Particularly during the early part of the Mandate, when Muslim-Christian solidarity was still strong, Christians were inclined to participate in the Nabi Musa celebration. Though ostensibly a religious festival, it quickly came to serve as a symbol of Muslim-Christian solidarity. …It thus had about it the air of a national holiday, and this is in fact how many Christians saw it. Christian Arabs generally came out to watch the festival's conclusion in Jerusalem [as they were not allowed to enter the actual sanctuary]. In her memoirs, Hala al- Sakakini, Khalil al- Sakakini’s daughter, recalled with great fondness sitting by St. Stephen's Gate to welcome the procession. She characterised the event largely in nationalistic terms: “Everywhere you could see the Arab flag with its green, red, white and black colours: fluttering high above the heads. The scene filled us with enthusiasm and national pride. Every now and then strong young men would link their arms together and, forming circles, would start dancing the dabkeh and singing. It was thrilling to watch and wonderful for the spirit. Although the Nabi Musa feast was supposed to be a religious occasion, it was in fact a national day in which all the Arabs of Palestine, Christians and Muslims alike, shared.”[127] Christians may have had to accept second class status, not going on the actual march, or being allowed into the sanctuary, but the genuine happiness of her account cannot be doubted.
The festival also (as seen above) became increasingly nationalistic, a fact which in no way compromised its Islamic roots. In 1920 [several years before the above recollection], the climax of the celebrations turned violent, in what has become known as “the Nabi Musa riot.” “The crowd returning from Nabi Musa into Jerusalem reportedly shouted ‘Independence! Independence!’ and ‘Palestine is our land, the Jews are our dogs!’ Arab police joined in applause, and violence started. The local Arab population ransacked the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem. The Torath Chaim Yeshiva was raided, and Torah scrolls were torn and thrown on the floor, and the building then set alight. During the next three hours, 160 Jews were injured. Khalil al- Sakakini witnessed the eruption of violence in the Old City: ‘[A] riot broke out, the people began to run about and stones were thrown at the Jews. … The riot reached its zenith. All shouted, "Muhammad's religion was born with the sword". … I immediately walked to the municipal garden. … my soul is nauseated and depressed by the madness of humankind.’"[128]
Violence was welcomed and often encouraged at such Muslim events. “For many Muslims, nationalist sentiment often found its strongest expression during Islamic religious festivals.”[129] Even the Palestine Communist Party felt it necessary at its Seventh Congress to call for increased propaganda efforts at the mosques during Friday prayers and at popular religious festivals such as the Nabi Musa festival, noting that it was "during such mass celebrations that the fighting capacity of the fellahin [was] appreciably aroused."[130]
Sadly, this violence does not seem to have dampened Orthodox Christian participation in it. The year after the riot, signs reading “Moslems and Christians are brothers” were held, and a Christian, Jubran Kosma, spoke in favour of Arab farmers and against Zionism.[131]
Orthodox Christians were apparently happy to continue participating in a festival which had seen Jews murdered and their holy places trashed. This in itself is horrific but notice also two additional problems. The festival celebrates the Muslim tomb of Moses. Deuteronomy 34:6 “And Moses the servant of the LORD died there in Moab, as the LORD had said. He buried him in Moab, in the valley opposite Beth Peor, but to this day no one knows where his grave is.” According to their own Scriptures, Moses is not buried there.[132] They are participating in a festival whose basis contradicts their own religion. They were prepared to sacrifice fidelity to their faith for a chance to show solidarity with the Muslim majority.
The second, more pragmatic problem was one they were well aware of. A Muslim crowd, once aroused, could very easily turn against Christians as well as against Jews. As the Muslim/Christian detente of the early 1920s fractured, in 1928, thousands of Muslims on the pilgrimage chanted “down with the Missionary Conference” (which was taking place in Jerusalem at the same time), and also “down with the missionaries.”[133] In 1931, the Nabi Musa festival, “once considered an expression of Muslim-Christian unity, now became an occasion during which agitators ‘urged the multitude to fall upon the Jew and Christian infidels and slay them.’"[134] The Orthodox were debasing their own religion and selling their birthright for worthless dreams. In the end, they would have nothing. This could be seen as a minor affair, but given Jesus view of the Torah (Matthew 5:18), and the increasing difficulties Palestinian Christians were having honouring the Old Testament as God’s word, celebrating a blatant contradiction of its teachings for the sake of unity with Muslims was a really bad idea.
Frantzman sees parallels between the Palestinian Christian behaviour here and the embrace of Communism by the Jews of Eastern Europe. Like the Palestinian Christians, the Jews formed a national minority historically discriminated against, but within several social niches, they embraced communism to blur the lines between them and the majority, as Communism, like Arab nationalism, promised to erase communal identity.[135]
The Christians had made themselves prominent in the nationalist movement, and they wished to prove their loyalty to a greater Arab nation. The Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husayni while leading an explicitly Islamic nationalism, was also eager to enlist Christians as loyal and useful dhimmis. He was quoted as saying “We even feel ourselves called upon to protect the Holy Places of the Christians.”
“The Mufti was not the originator of the Muslim-Christian Associations (MCAs) that began to pop up beginning in 1918, but he worked hard to collaborate with them. MCAs were established in many major cities, primarily Jerusalem, Jaffa and Nablus. The MCAs were prominent in the establishment of the Palestinian Arab Congresses (first in January 1918), worked with the King-Crane commission in 1919 and helped create the Arab Executive in December 1920. Ann Lesch claims that they declined in the late 1920s, were revived in the early 1930s but were then taken over by radicals and militants and lost their Christian flavour.”[136]
Note also that as well as liberal nationalism, another type of nationalism was also growing in Europe. Fascist nationalism, with its emphasis on power, its anti-Semitism and its opposition to Britain would become a very attractive alternative for many Arabs (all the more so because of the good German ties from Ottoman days).
The 1921 Jaffa riot
“On May 1, 1921 . . . hundreds of Arabs rampaged through the streets of Jaffa with clubs, knives, metal bars, and pistols. With an unstoppable drive for murder, the rioters stabbed helpless Jews to death, cruelly beat infants and the elderly, raped women and girls, and burned and looted anything they could get their hands on. Forty-three Jews died that day, and many others were wounded or died later on from their injuries.”[137] The riot mainly involved Muslim Arabs and Jews.
Murderous mob violence was celebrated and never repented of.[138] It underwrote all of the Muslim communities demands, “give us what we want, or else.” In general, the Christian community struggled with this violence. Aversion to it impeded their desire to participate fully in the cause. Historically, they had good reason to fear Muslim violence, and their religious scruples against it often seemed to be an unwanted hinderance. It has also become a standing reproach from the Muslim community, who saw in their reticence signs of disloyalty. During the Second Intifada, many Muslims complained of the lack of Martyrs [suicide bombers] from the Christian population.[139]
This reticence was unfortunately by no means absolute. The Anglican missionary C. Martin reported on the Arab riots in Jaffa in 1921; “A large number of the Jews are terror stricken … Unfortunately for the work, Arabs, who call themselves Christians, united with the Moslems in their endeavours to shed Jewish blood, so we have the unpleasant task of explaining and apologising for the falseness of this un-Christlike Christianity.”[140] Makhoul, on the basis of very little, also and disturbingly writes; “We can also say that there was a Muslim-Christian solidarity in the Jaffa riots.”[141]
Continued Christian opposition to Jews and Zionism
In November 1923, Frederick Kisch, head of the Palestine Zionist Executive, wrote to the High Commissioner that Christians were “intensely hostile,” and decrying their “undue influence over administrative machinery.”[142] “One Zionist in 1925 lamented; ‘Christians are, from first to last, our deadly enemies … Catholic or Greek Orthodox or Protestant, they have one thing in common: a fanatical religious hatred of the Jews. … Muslims generally do not hate the Jew to the extent to which the Christians hate him … whereas it would be hard to find a case of real friendship between a Christian and a Jew, sincere friendship between a Moslem and a Jew is far from being a rare thing.’”[143] Two years to the day after the 1921 riots, Filastin ran a front page editorial entitled Martyrs Day; “One hundred brave sons of Palestine became martyrs – and now Palestine sees them as having died for the sake of salvation. … The memory of that day … restores … our enthusiasm and pushes us forward.”[144] This is a disturbing and profoundly Islamic usage of the word “martyr.” Why would a Christian paper say that Muslims dying fighting Jews were martyrs? 1922, Arab Christians called for an economic boycott of the Jews, but this was not adopted by the Arab Executive Committee, which believed it to be unrealistic. Christians were again ahead of the crowd, leading the charge for anti-Semitism!!
Other Jews thought there might be some hope; in 1922 a member of the Zionist Executive wrote that “we should try to bring the Protestant and Orthodox Arabs to our side, as anti-Semitism in Christian circles was mainly originating from Rome.”[145]
Writing in 1923 D.G. Hogarth found that “the alliance between Moslems and Christians is not too stable; interests of Moslem landowners and Christian traders are by no means identical; Christian supporters of the pan-Arab movement in Syria, as in Palestine, has been decidedly lukewarm, and a pro-Turkish or pan-Islamic movement could find no Christian backing whatever. The influence of the Islamo-Christian Society on the country as a whole can easily be exaggerated. … the cause of Christian hostility to the Zionists is Jewish competition. As shopkeepers, craftsmen, skilled laborers, traders, the Jews are the rivals of the local Christians.”[146]
In 1925, the mufti of Gaza, Muhammad al-Husseini, issued a fatwa that Jews had ceased to be a protected minority (dhimmies). Christians who aided them would therefore be expelled from the country, and Muslims who aided them had abandoned their faith, and would not be permitted their wives or a Muslim burial.[148] This ruling was affirmed and expanded upon in the first assembly of Muslim religious scholars in Palestine in 1935. Hajj Amin was the first to sign it. A short time after this, in February of the same year, a congress of Christian Arab clergy issued their own declaration forbidding the sale of land to Jews. As Cohen notes; “the sanctity of land was not restricted to Christianity’s holy sites but applied to the entire country; whoever sells or speculates in the sale of any portion of the homeland is considered the same as one who sells the place of Jesus’ birth or his tomb and as such will be considered a heretic against the principles of Christianity and all believers are required to ban and interdict him.”[149]
A
marriage of convenience
For diverse
reasons, Muslim/Christian relations during the Mandate were reasonable, but not
ideal. Interestingly, there was more
anti-Christian feeling when Zionism was less threatening, showing again the importance of anti-Zionism
as an external unifying factor.
In 1923, more Jews left Palestine than arrived. This led to a cooling of relations between the Christians and Muslims. The Muslim community started making demands on the Christians. They believed that Christians were faring much better than Muslims under the Mandate. In particular, Christians were getting too many government jobs. As a result, they were accused of dual loyalty to Britain. In 1923, Samuel noted that he was "continually receiving representations on the question of the small number of Muslims employed in positions of responsibility."[150] These demands would continue and get stronger as the Mandate wore on. [Due mainly to their westernized missionary school education, Christian Arabs dominated the urbanized middle class. Around 50,000 Arabs lived in the bourgeoise neighbourhoods of the three principle cities, of these, 35-40,000 were Christians. They also did dominate government jobs. At a time when Christians comprised 9% of the population, in 1921, they occupied two thirds of government jobs, this figure falling to one half by 1938.[151]]
Adnan Abu-Ghazaleh has recalled that “the visibility of Christian officials aroused the suspicions of Palestinian Muslims, who accused the British of favouring the Christians community and of trying to elevate its economic and social position at the expense of that of the Muslims. Thus Palestinian society became more divided along religious lines during the Mandate.”[152] Christian education resulted in success but too much success gave rise to accusations of collaboration or favouritism.[153] Successful, visible Christians were an enduring offence to Muslims.
In 1923, with Jewish immigration stalled, a Palestinian state suddenly seemed possible. Christian concerns about how an actual Arab state might treat non-Muslim minorities took on greater urgency. As Hourani expresses it, Christians could never "be certain that Arab nationalism would not turn out to be a new form of Islamic self-assertion."[154] After 1924, Arab nationalism become increasingly Islamic, but Christians remain committed to it, or emigrated.
This lessening of the “Zionist threat” between 1923-27 allowed each side (Christian and Muslim) to view each other more clearly. Muslim nationalism became more Islamic (“we don’t need you”), the Christians found British rule to be more attractive (“please stay and protect us from the Muslims”). These discoveries impacted on how both groups then faced the renewed Zionist activity from 1928 onwards.
In the final analysis, the Christians of Palestine would rather be wiped out by the Moslem Arabs than thrive with the Jews, because when push came to shove, they were Arabs first, and Christians second. They chose nationalism over faith.[155] In 1923, the Zionist Executive believed that Arab Christians working in the British administration were responsible for the harassment and firing of moderate/sympathetic Arab officials, including the dismissal of the mayor of Haifa, Hasan Shukri, who believed that the Jews were a blessing and not a curse to the Arab people.[156]
Indeed, faith became the handmaid to their wider Arab nationalism; they were prepared to place its deepest truths and symbols at its service. Again, see the modern abuse of Christmas and Easter by these churches and their Western allies for examples of this continuing problem. [Christmas is about the separation wall near Bethlehem, Easter about Palestinian suffering.] Seeking the praises of men, they do not even realise that their fellow Muslims despise them for so degrading their own religion. The Hajj is neither cancelled in protest, nor re-defined in terms of Palestine.
Now, most Muslims were certainly sincere in their commitment to an Arab state inclusive of Christians. The vast majority of Muslims had simply not thought through the question beyond vague assurances (and a false mythology) that the situation of Christians (as with other 'People of the Book') had always been secure under Islam.[157] Christians had little leverage in this respect. They were becoming marginalized. Most Muslims were quite happy to make common cause with their Christian compatriots, even while seeing their Arab identity as something inherently 'Islamic.'
Al-Sakakini noted bitterly that; “if the people love me and respect me, it is because they think that I am nearer to Islam than to Christianity, because I am wealthy in the Arabic language, because they fancy that I am a conservative and will not depart from Oriental customs under any circumstances. But if I were to struggle with a Moslem who is less founded in knowledge and heritage than I, I would not doubt that they would prefer him to survive … No matter how high my standing may be in science and literature, no matter how sincere my patriotism is, no matter how much I do revere this nation, even if I burn my fingers before its sight, as long as I am not Muslim, I am naught."[158] Christians were finding it increasingly necessary to take a radical a stance against the Government. Otherwise, they were suspect.
Coinciding with the movement's Islamisation was indeed a growing Islamic hostility towards Christians. Even while working together, most Muslims definitely viewed them as inferior. During the latter part of 1932, Christians were subjected to sporadic attacks by gangs of Muslims in a number of Palestinian towns, and in Lydda, a church was desecrated. As noted by one British official in January 1933; "the existing discord between Moslems and Christians in this country [was] only kept beneath the surface by the constant efforts of political leaders.”[159] In November 1932, the Congress of the Educated Muslim Young Men was established. From the start, it took a strong anti-Christian tone. Alfred Rok, a Melkite, member of the Arab delegation to London, an associate of the Mufti and later member of the Arab Higher Committee, referred to the Young Men's Muslim Association in Jaffa as the "root of the evil."[160] When some Muslims, writing in the newspaper al-J'ami ah al-Islamiyyah, blamed the Christians for their lack of jobs, the Christians in turn blamed the Jews[161] (echoes of the 1840 Damascus “Blood Libel.”)
Wider problems
It was not only the Christian Arabs of Palestine that were experiencing problems. The situation of Christians throughout the Middle East had again begun to deteriorate. Sporadic massacres of Christian broke out across the former Ottoman empire. With the pull-out of the British in Iraq in 1930, for example, anti-Christian sentiment swept the country. Attacks on the Assyrian Christians in the north culminated in the machine-gun massacre of hundreds of Assyrian men, women and children by the Iraqi army at Simayl in 1933. The Nestorians were forced to flee into French Syria. In 1937, a massacre of Christians in 'Amuda would lead to a strong movement for local autonomy and even independence, led by the Syrian Catholic Patriarch.[162] The Christians in Palestine watched, and drew their own lessons.
At the extreme, in 1926 Khalil al-Sakakini urged Palestinian Christians to convert to Islam for the sake of unity in the national movement. On October 5 of 1930, the editor of al-Karmil, Najib Nassar likewise wrote a series of articles asserting that the only solution to the 'disputes' between Muslims and Christians was that "the Christians adopt the Islamic faith. In this way the constant conflicts which hinder the development of the national movement [would] be brought to an end.”[163] Arab Orthodox Khalil Iskandar al-Qubrus in 1931 issued a pamphlet entitled “A Call on the Christian Arabs to Embrace Islam.”[164] In it, he denounced European Christianity as a corrupt religion and accused European monks and missionaries of sowing discord between Palestine's Muslims and Christians. By contrast, he described Islam as a benevolent and egalitarian religion, and concluded by calling on all Arab Christians to become Muslim "in order to free them from the trivialities of the foreigners and to rid them of their corruption.” Note that calls, or threats that Palestinian Christians will convert to Islam if Western churches are not more anti-Zionist have continued from then, through the 30s and 40s up to the present. It is the attitude of those who do not know the Gospel (Mark 10:28, Philippians 3:8). They needed to choose the praises of God not men! To their shame, they chose rather to conform to this world. Friendship with this world does not work! In their 1937 “Letter to the bishops of London,” the Anglican PNCC wrote; “After the fate of the Armenians, the Greeks of Asia Minor, the Assyrians, the Abyssinians and the Arabs of Palestine, the faith of our Christians is also being shaken … in the value of Christianity itself …we are greatly afraid that the tide of nationality will carry many off their feet into unbelief or apostacy. … Palestine has become a theatre of politics where people have little thought for anything else. This is making the work of the Church well-nigh impossible.”[165]
Many Muslims were also becoming increasingly anti-Christian. The Hizb al-Istiqldl (Independence – Arab nationalist) Party organised a demonstration in Nablus protesting the dedication of the Y. M. C. A. in Jerusalem.[166] The Palestinian journalist Muhammad Tawil wrote in 1930 attacking the Christians and the MCAs and what he viewed as “the unnatural bond the nationalist movement had created between them and the Muslims. … Christians had joined the nationalist movement only to advance their own narrow interests.”[167] Many Muslim nationalists including Hajj Amin al-Husseini, were concerned about the growing hostility towards Christians. They considered it vital to present a united front to the British, and attempts were made to ease tensions.
The Missions
Conference
At the end of March 1928, an
international conference of Protestant missionaries convened in Jerusalem.
Muslim agitation began even before the Conference had started. [They wanted to
pick a fight.] Demonstrations took place throughout Palestine for the duration
of the Conference. At the Nabi Musa pilgrimage, which took place almost
concurrently with the Conference, thousands of Muslims chanted 'down with the
Missionary Conference.”[168] A
week after the conference, Muslims in Jerusalem closed their shops in protest
against the Conference and against missionary activity in general.
An important goal of the Conference, stated by Dr. Mott at the opening meeting, was the promotion of greater cooperation between the churches of the East and West, so that the "missionary enthusiasm which characterized the churches of early Christianity [might be] set free."[169] A common theme was the special role of indigenous churches in promoting Christianity in their home-countries. Most Christian Arabs in Palestine rejected the idea and several articles appeared in Christian run newspapers equating missionary activity with colonialism. Not a single Christian from Palestine attended the Missionary Conference.[170] [Again, note that in the 2018 CATC conference in Bethlehem, a local bishop proclaimed; ‘we do not convert Muslims.’]
Shamefully, the Conference showed that when push came to shove, the local churches would absolutely refuse to do anything which would antagonise the Muslim majority, especially on such a sensitive matter as conversion.[171] They would refuse to obey the clear and urgent command of the one they called master (Matthew 28:18-20). Local churches would not preach the Gospel but would preach Arab nationalism.
As the 1920s progressed, Palestinian nationalist activity in general increasingly took on a religious character. It became more centred round Islamic institutions such as the mosques the YMMAs and the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC). Muslims were also increasingly expressing their grievances in religious terms. For example, the belief that they were being discriminated against ‘as Muslims’ with respect to government positions. By the end of the 1920s, nationalist demonstrations were also increasingly being organised around the Friday prayers at mosques.[172]
1929 Western Wall riots Islam
supreme, Christians submissive
The decisive event as far as the nationalist movement's Islamisation, however, would not involve Christians at all. The 1929 Riots began in August of that year at the Western Wall. The disturbances soon spread to the rest of Palestine. The worst attacks took place in Hebron, where more than sixty Jews were murdered, and the rest forced to flee. By 30 August, the disturbances had finally come to an end.[173] To quote from Wikipedia; “The riots took the form, in the most part, of attacks by Arabs on Jews accompanied by destruction of Jewish property. During the week of riots from 23 to 29 August, 133 Jews were killed and between 198–241 others were injured, a large majority of whom were unarmed and were murdered in their homes by Arabs, while at least 116 Arabs were killed and at least 232 were injured, mostly by the British police while trying to suppress the riots, although around 20 were killed by Jewish attacks or indiscriminate British gunfire. During the riots, 17 Jewish communities were evacuated.”[174]
The Western Wall Riots had a major impact on the internal political struggle within the Arab leadership, increasing the power of Haj Amin al-Husseini. They again intensified religious sentiment among Muslims and showed that religious sensibilities ran a good deal deeper than nationalistic ones. There was virtually no Christian involvement. In a few cases, they helped to limit the violence. The city of Acre, for instance, was largely spared the worst of it thanks to the actions of the Christian Arab District Officer there. Wasserstein however noted that “Christian involvement was slight. Indeed, we may properly call these riots Muslim-Jewish rather than Arab-Jewish since Christians in general remained ostentatiously neutral.”[175]
“For Christian Arabs,
the riots presented a dilemma. On the one hand, they were under great pressure
to demonstrate their solidarity with their Muslim compatriots. On the other
hand, many found it difficult to condone the religiously fanatical violence of
the incident. Such fanaticism might just as easily be directed against them.
Muslim chants during the rioting of ‘Friday... death to the Jews; Saturday,
death to the Christians... and Sunday, death to the Government officials’ must
have been concerning. At the same time, they also felt the need to show some
support. The Christian press therefore put the blame on the Jews. Additionally,
they stressed the incident's nationalist
aspect.”[176]
This stressing of
the “nationalistic aspect” of what was clearly primarily a religious dispute over
the Western Wall would see the Christian community capitulate to the Muslim
majority to the point where Muslim Palestinian religious demands became by
definition nationalist demands. Did this extend to the Muslim ban (still in
effect during this time) on Jews and Christians praying in the Tomb of the
Patriarchs in Hebron? It did, and still does extend to supporting the ban on
Jews (and Christians) praying on the Temple Mount. Palestinian Christian
support for this ban has been restated in 2021.[177]
On the 27th of October, 1929, the president of the Arab General Assembly, Yacoub Farraj (an Orthodox Christian), stated; “The Buraq (Western Wall) is a purely Moslem Place and is part of the Masjid al-Aksa. The rights of the Moslems in the Buraq are indisputable. … In the cause of the Buraq the Moslems and Christians are one and the same racially, nationally and politically.”[178] Filastin editor Issa el-Issa signed and published a similar statement declaring that” ‘Moslems and Christians alike are concerned [about al- Buraq] from a national, patriotic and political point of view.”[179]
In a joint letter to the Arab Executive, “Muslim, Christian and Druze representatives from Shefaʿamr (where there was a Christian majority) gave the issue a nationalist interpretation by confirming their support for Arab claims to al-Buraq and blamed British inaction for allowing the violence to erupt. The ‘Christians and Muslims of Birzeit’ (another largely Christian village) sent a telegram to the high commissioner protesting the government’s position. Those branches of the MCA still in operation also filed protests in support of Arab claims. Christians certainly wanted to make it clear to the wider Palestinian population that they stood behind Muslim concerns about Zionist designs for the Western Wall and temple area. … Episcopal lawyer Mughannam Mughannam was among the signatories of an Arab Executive telegram to the high commissioner declaring the innocence of all Arabs in the August violence. Husseini supporter, Arab Executive member and head of the Christian Committee for the Relief of Moslem Sufferers at Jaffa, Alfred Rok (a Latin Christian) also organised a meeting of Muslims and Christians in Jaffa to send formal protests to the Colonial Office.”[180]
Palestinian Christian testimonies to the Shaw Commission also “asserted Muslim ownership of the Wailing Wall as an integral part of al-Aqsa Mosque. The Supreme Muslim Council made much of these supposedly unbiased testimonies, complaining after the release of the Commission's findings that ‘the Moslem side [had] procured unbiased witnesses, Palestinian Christians as well as foreigners, including Priests, Monks and guides to prove that [Jewish claims to the Wailing Wall were unfounded]... [but] the Commission [had] paid no heed to such evidence although the majority of these witnesses were impartial non-Moslems, Palestinians as well as foreigners.’"[181]
Christian Arabs began to recognise the need to accommodate this decidedly Muslim concern. Articles began to appear in the Christian press explaining why Christians should care about the Muslim holy sites on nationalistic grounds. They argued that Islam was an 'Arab' religion, and since the Christians living in Palestine were Arabs, they had a duty to respect Islam and preserve its holy places.[182] They kowtowed to the violent majority and became dhimmis once again.
This marked an
important moment for the Christians. Their hopes of promoting a largely secular
nationalism had failed. Dreams of equality and a common cause with the Moslems
likewise. Till then, it had been possible for Christians to see for themselves
a role in helping to direct the nationalist movement; in shaping the nature of
Arab identity and in determining the nature of any future Arab state. From this
point on, Christians would become increasingly marginalized, able to do little
beyond following the lead set by their Muslim compatriots. “There had always
been a concern that aroused Muslim feeling might turn against them. But from
now on, there was no way to prevent Muslim leaders from using religion as a
means of appealing to the masses. The only way for Christians to maintain a
role for themselves within the nationalist movement was to somehow demonstrate
that a special relationship existed between them and Islam. By the end of the 1930s, Christian Arabs
would be more concerned with trying to define their relationship to Islam
than with defining a model of Arab identity intrinsically inclusive of
non-Muslims.”[183] “For many months the national movement focused on a
specifically Islamic issue. Christian identification with the nationalist movement required a
greater willingness to accept Islam, rather than Arabism, as a central focus of
the movement. … An
important result of these riots was that the Zionist–Arab conflict became a
Jewish–Muslim conflict in the eyes of many Palestinians.”[184]
The Palestinian Christian’s response to these deadly attacks by Muslims upon Jews was to support the Muslims. One hundred and four Jews were murdered by Muslims, and the Palestinian Christians justified it. Romans 1:32 “Although they know God's righteous decree that those who do such things deserve death, they not only continue to do these very things but also approve of those who practice them.”
They were on the side of the Moslems, and they supported the Muslim claim to the Western Wall. Once again, speaking “as Christians” they towed the Muslim line, and white-washed murder. They were Arabs first, Christians second or purely in a community sense. They conformed to this world. Note recently (September 2015) Naim Ateek has echoed the Muslim charge that “the settlers are out of control, they are assaulting the Haram area on a continual basis.”[185]
The murder of al-Bahri
This obsequiousness spread; In September 1930, Jamil al-Bahri, a Melkite Christian, journalist, editor of the newspaper al-Zuhur and noted playwright, was murdered by Muslims over a land dispute in a cemetery. Rashid al-Haj Ibrahim, the superintendent of the Haifa Waqf and member of the Arab Executive, and Ramzi Amir, the Secretary of the local Young Men's Muslim Association were formally charged with instigating the offending mob, 15 of whom were later charged with murder. To make matters worse, a Muslim policeman present at the scene had helped some of the Muslims involved escape. “Strangest of all was when both Rashid al-Haj Ibrahim and Ramzi Amir, while being transferred from the Police Station to the Court Magistrate after having turned themselves in, expressed a preference that the Christian policeman accompanying them in the car be replaced by a Jew.”[186] Local Moslems defended the murder and gave “fiery speeches” that the Christians were a “corrupt race.”[187] Violence spread to Jaffa, and the Christians were afraid it would mushroom, as it had in Lebanon in the previous century.
This then was a serious threat to Muslim/Christian harmony. A local Christian had been murdered by the head of the Waft, this murder was aided by a Muslim policeman, and defended by local Muslim community, in anti-Christian terms. Would the Christian community simply accept the murder of one of its own, or would they stand up and demand better? Sadly, they responding to Muslim violence just as they had been forced to do for the past 1400 years. The main Christian voices (especially the Arab Orthodox) utterly abandoned the Catholic victim and re-pledged their support for the Muslim majority.[188]
Individual Christians and Christian leaders in private, did respond differently. Immediately following the murder, the British Government began receiving petitions from Christian Arabs disavowing any connection with the national movement as well as with Muslims.[189] The following year, the High Commissioner commented that; “Christian Arab leaders ... have admitted to me that in establishing close political relations with the Moslems the Christians have not been uninfluenced by fear of the treatment they might suffer at the hands of the Moslem majority in certain eventualities.”[190]
The Melkites did attempt to make a unified response. The New York Times reported that following al-Bahri’s death, they “immediately sought to build a pan-Christian coalition.” Melkite and Latin Catholic leaders met at the home of Melkite Archbishop Gregorios Hajjar to solidify a Christian stance against Muslims. The Society of Christian Youth in Haifa, a group with clear ties to the Melkites, “wrote a strongly worded letter to the Mandatory government complaining that the Arab leadership was not taking the situation seriously.” The Society rejected the leadership of the Arab Higher Committee (led by Islamic leader Haj Amin al-Husayni). They asserted that the British could better serve the Christians interests, and declared their desire “to have [their] rights protected by the mandatory power to whom [they] swear allegiance.”[191]
This nascent protest was utterly rejected by the rest of Palestine’s Christian communities. The Orthodox Christian leaders were infuriated. “Christian Arabs don’t support any group of Christians who try to view the Haifa event as a purely sectarian occurrence,” declared ʿIsa al-Bandak, editor of Bethlehem’s Swat al-Shaʿb. The Filastin editor ʿIsa al-ʿIsa, blamed the Zionists. Even the Catholic Christian Khalil Sabbagh insisted that “All Christians of Tulkarm disapprove of the work of the group of men in Haifa and their absurd demands. [The Christians] declare publicly their support for the path of unity of Muslims and Christians under the Arab Executive of Jerusalem.”[192] Haiduc-Dale summarized; “Whether because of AHC intervention or the Melkites’ inability to garner Christian support, Muslim–Christian relations did not spiral into violence.”
The local Christians largely kept quiet and did nothing about the murder of al-Bahri. They hoped thereby to avoid further violence, and to show the Muslim majority that they were good dhimmis. That you could murder them, and still they would not complain. They also hoped that this silence would prove their greater commitment to the nationalist cause. “Orthodox Christian insistence on nationalist over communal identification was a common occurrence during the British Mandate period. … the overwhelming public narrative pushed by Arab Christians throughout the Mandate was that Christians fully embraced their nationalist credentials.”[193]
This contrasts greatly with the response and self-respect of the Druze community. “When the Revolt of 1936–1939 fully ceased, the Druze were quick to remember the persecution they had faced at the hands of largely Muslim rebel groups and sought to strengthen their ties to the Zionists.”[194] Indeed, the Druze subsequently allied themselves with Israel in 1948. Christians did not draw similar conclusions. Many Christians still saw Arab Nationalism and Communism as their best bets towards full membership in Arab society. For them Zionism offered no advantages.[195]
The supposed Muslim/Christian unity was always paper thin. The Christian al-Zuhour (formerly edited by al-Bahri) ran an article strongly questioning the value of supposed Muslim-Christian unity. Zionist Executive Chairman, Frederick Kisch, wrote on October 3, 1930; “if the Christian Arabs now realize that they have been unwise to stimulate Moslem fanaticism, I believe that such a change of attitude is for their own eventual safety.”[196] In 1932, there was talk in Haifa of Christians boycotting Muslim businesses, and there were street fights between Muslim and Christian youth. Nevertheless, the Mufti likewise continued to value Christian participation in the nationalist movement.
The MacDonald Letter
On the 13th of February 1931 the MacDonald Letter reaffirming British support for Jewish migration to Palestine was sent to Chaim Weizmann.[197] In March, a nationalist conference was convened over how best to respond to it. Some members called for a policy of civil disobedience and non-cooperation with the Government. Others suggested that reaction be limited to a political and economic boycott of the Jews. Christians figured prominently among the latter.[198] That is, Christians remained wary of communal violence (which could turn against them), and again advocated boycotting Jews as they had done in 1920 and 1922.
Most Christians continued to favour moderation. The growing bloodshed concerned many of them. They could see that the nationalist movement was becoming increasingly violent and Islamic. Unlike the Druze, they did not consider aligning themselves with the Jewish people. Rather, faced with increasing violence from the Muslim community, and a leadership which continued to advocate for Arab solidarity even as they were attacked, emigration to South America became a common response for the average Palestinian Christian.
Infamously, this emigration itself was then blamed, not on the Muslim community (which was also carrying out sporadic attacks upon local Christian communities across the Middle East), but rather on the Jewish community! This had been the case since 1924, when in his “Open Letter to the Pope” (published in his al-Karmil), Najib Nassar warned that Jewish immigration would lead to the complete extinction of the Christian community.[199] This theme was also promoted by the Catholic Church internationally. For example, on July 16, 1921 the New York-based Catholic journal, The Tablet, printed an article with the unbelievable heading "Christians are Menaced by Jews." This cited emigration statistics to prove that Christians were leaving Palestine because they were "tired of Jewish interference." On 14 June 1921 the Pope likewise declared the Vatican's opposition to Zionism and claimed that "the new civil arrangements [in Palestine] aim ... at ousting Christianity from its previous position to put the Jews in its place."[200] Again, this continues to be a common charge made by local Christian leaders to try and minimize Muslim/Christian tensions, and also by foreign Christians who are theologically opposed to a Jewish state.
The World Islamic Conference
In December 1931, two conferences were held. The World Islamic Conference was held on December 7, 1931. It was a personal triumph for Hajj Amin and served to redefine the Palestinian cause as an international Islamic one. He declared that Zionism posed a threat to the Islamic integrity of the third holiest city in Islam. Jerusalem and Palestine became central to the international Muslim world. "[the] aim [of the Conference was] to show to the Zionists a united Muslim front, and to make Muslims all over the world notice the injustice being done to their Palestinian co-religionists.”[201] Palestine was no longer simply a parochial issue of concern only to Palestinians. Within Arab nationalism, it was an issue for all Arabs (as was Syria and Egypt etc), and as a Muslim issue it was of concern to all Muslims. Arab nationalism was subservient to Islam. This had profound consequences for Arab Christians who supported Arab nationalism. For a Palestinian Muslim, of course Islam had always been the pinnacle of Arab nationalism, but for Arab Christians hoping to avoid a religious definition, it was the end of secular nationalism.
Hajj Amin was
genuinely concerned that the Conference should not alienate Palestine's
Christian Arabs. It passed a resolution expressing gratitude to Palestine and
Transjordan's Christians for having supported the Conference, together with a
message of congratulations to the Second Arab-Orthodox Conference, then taking
place in Jaffa. In return, many of Palestine's Christian Arabs publicly
declared their support for the conference. The nationalist cause was being
transformed into an Islamic one, with Christian approval. This change did generate
regional support (something the Christians would obviously welcome), but also
had the effect of further marginalizing Christian Arabs.
The Second Arab
Orthodox Congress took place in Jaffa at the same time. It promoted a strong sense
of Arab-nationalism within the Orthodox community. Many felt a sense of common
purpose with the World Islamic Conference, then taking place. Indeed, the Arab
Orthodox Congress demanded that the Islamic Conference address the authorities on their behalf regarding the election
of a new Patriarch. The Orthodox cause "ought to be the cause of all the
Arabs, Muslim as well as Christian.”[202] In response, the World
Islamic Conference resolved that "the Orthodox question [be considered] as
part of the bigger Arab question, and to draw the attention of the Government
to the right of Orthodox Palestinians to elect an Arab patriarch."[203] The
Second Arab Orthodox Congress had sought to redefine a 'church' issue (the
question of the succession of the Patriarch) in nationalist terms, the Islamic
Conference had done exactly the opposite, redefining the Palestinian/nationalist
cause as an Islamic one. Palestinian Christianity had become the handmaid of
Palestinian nationalism, which in turn was now revealed as the handmaid of
Islam.
Palestinian Christians responded
to the World Islamic Conference by highlighting the worldwide Christian significance of Palestine/Jerusalem,
as complementary to Palestine's worldwide Islamic significance. This was
clearly also an effort to show their own continuing importance, and to shore up
their value to the Muslim majority. Arguably, Christians hoped in this way to
maintain for themselves a role in the nationalist movement in spite of its increasing
Islamisation and their diminishing numbers on the ground. Thus, for instance, many called for an Islamic-Catholic
alliance against Zionism. A lengthy editorial in al-Karmil called on Haj Amin al-Husseini to seek out an alliance
with the Vatican. In other cases, Palestinian Christians called on Protestant
Britain to “wake up and reject Zionism.”[204]
Nor were these overtures without success; "The belief that such an
alliance was possible was not entirely without basis, as indeed the Vatican had
often expressed its concern about Zionism.”[205] Over the
following decades Palestinian Christian pretensions would repeatedly find
willing allies in the bad theology of a shamefully large number of Western
denominations.
Both of these responses, however elevated the religious over the Arab or the Palestinian issue. By stressing the religious element, Palestinian Christians were once again assuming the role of a subservient, minority community. Their hopes of controlling, or even contributing to the definition of who they were within the larger Palestinian community had proved wholly illusionary.
This return to
sectarian identities carried with it a whole raft of further ramifications. The
Arab claim to Palestine was clear, but the Christian Arab claim to the Holy
Land was more complex. As a religious community, their one demographic constant
was that they would always be a minority, under either Muslim or Jewish
domination. Their past 1400 years of experience could make one wonder on what
basis they would agitate for its continuation as opposed to testing the claims
of Jewish tolerance. Equally, why should the international Christian community
fight to see local Christians placed under Muslim rather than Jewish rule?
Religious definitions raised awkward questions! For the Christians (who
desperately needed the international support of fellow Christians to show their
value to the Muslim community), these questions were then answered on the basis
of nationalism. Christianity became subservient to Arab nationalism at
precisely the same time that Arab nationalism became subservient to Islam. All ground
for mutual respect was gone.
What began as a
strategy to safeguard their newfound equality ended in the most traditional and
ingrained of relationships; the Christians cow-towing to their Muslim masters
and sticking the boot into the Jews. “Muslim and Christian children rarely
played with one another and would ‘only unite to persecute the poor little Jews.’"
Matthew 12:43-45 "When an evil spirit
comes out of a man, it goes through arid places seeking rest and does not find
it. Then it says, 'I will return to the house I left.' When it
arrives, it finds the house unoccupied, swept clean and put in order. Then it goes and takes with it seven other spirits more wicked than itself, and
they go in and live there. And the final condition of that man is worse than
the first. That is how it will be with this wicked generation."
With that sorted out,
beginning in 1933, external factors again became significant. Following the
establishment of the Nationalist-Socialist regime in Germany, there was a large
jump in Jewish immigration to Palestine, up from 9,553 the previous year to
30,327.
In general, Palestinian Muslims
became more extreme, while Palestinian Christians reluctantly followed. As will
be repeatedly seen, Christians had very little participation at the street
level. This lack of participation, of street cred, was most definitely noticed
by the Muslim community, and caused the already crumbling reputation of the
Palestinian Christians further massive harm. There were several reasons for
this lack of participation;
- The
majority of demonstrations were organized on Fridays following Islamic
prayers.
- Acts
of violence were also most likely during Muslim festivals.
- They
rightly feared Muslim mobs – they had been eyewitnesses to Muslim violence
in Syria and Lebanon in the 1860s, and of the ongoing anti-Christian
violence around them, Anatolia 1922 etc. (In 1924, Palestinian Muslims
collected for the Turkish victims of the Turkey/Greek war, while the
Palestinian Christians collected for the Greek, Christian victims.)
- Groups which linked
nationalist feelings with Islamic passions and were more fervent than
those organised by the Muslim-Christian Associations (itself a significant
and ominous development).
In this context, it is important to remember the 1931 blood libel which the Filastin tried to spread. Possibly in response to the growing Muslim charges of lack of involvement in the struggle, this Orthodox paper attempted to ferment a specifically Christian violence against the Jewish community.
On the surface, cooperation between Muslims and Christians continued, though not at the same level as during the early part of the Mandate. Muslim-Christian solidarity was most apparent in women's organisations. For instance, on 15 April 1933 (three weeks after Hitler became dictator in Germany via the passing of the Enabling Act of March 24), Muslim and Christian women organised a coordinated protest against Jewish immigration. In general, however, the great majority of Christian Arabs were not happy with the increased violence and Islamism growing within the Nationalist movement.[206] They were being forced back into a subservient and powerless dhimmitude. As noted, they also continued to emigrate in large numbers.
For their part, many Muslims became increasingly anti-Christian. The Istiqlal Party organised a demonstration in Nablus protesting the dedication of the Y M C A in Jerusalem.[207] Resentment at being ruled by a “Christian” power fed directly into this. In his 1924 letter to the Pope, Nassar had already expressed a concern that the good relations between "Muslims and Christians, who had lived side by side under Muslim rule for hundreds of years, would not survive a further twenty years under Christian rule.”[208]
The great majority of Christians still supported political moderation. The Christian-run paper Mirat al-Sharq went so far as to demonstrate a strong willingness to compromise with the Zionists.[209] Other Christians supported the Husseini camp, and a number were appointed to the party bureau for the Palestine Arab Party. These included Alfred Rok (as might be expected[210]), but also Emil al-Gawhri, a Latin Catholic and the Party's Secretary, and Michel 'Azar. This both reflected the historical tendency of Catholics to affiliate with the Husseini family, and the radical politics of these individuals. While the base of Hajj Amin's support was the Muslim peasantry, their inclusion could be seen as an attempt to reach out to the Christians, whom he valued for their contacts with the West.
The final factor in the increasing extremism which would lead to the General Strike and the Great Revolt was 'Izz-id-din al-Qassam. Al-Qassam was a militant Islamic reformer who led the Young Men’s Muslim Association based in Haifa. "He preached a reformed and more fundamentalist Islam and believed that only those who were themselves pious could be the salvation of the country.”[211] He appealed mainly to the rural and urban poor, and led a band based in rural areas outside Haifa. After several years attacking Jewish targets, in October 1935 he killed a Jewish police sergeant, and was himself killed in November 1935 by the British. At his funeral he was hailed as a national hero. His militia band anticipated and inspired the more general Arab Revolt of 1936. His grass roots popularity among conservative villagers and urban poor were immense, and it was these who would provide the backbone of the Arab Revolt. His was an explicitly and exclusively Islamic uprising against both the British and the Jews. Palestinian Christians as such had no role in this.
1936 Arab Revolt –
Spurred by increased Jewish immigration, the Revolt had three
specific demands.
(1) the prohibition of Jewish immigration.
(2) the prohibition of the transfer of Arab land to Jews.
(3) the establishment of a National Government responsible to
a representative council.
The Revolt itself had 3 stages.
Stage 1; April to October 1936.
This consisted of a
general strike, augmented by attacks against Jews, Jewish property and the government.
Led by the Higher Arab Committee (which included two representatives of the Christian
communities, the Greek Catholic Alfred Rok (affiliated with Hajj Amin's
Palestine Arab Party) and the Greek Orthodox Yaqub Farraj (of the Nashashibi
camp, who along with Nashashibi would support the idea of a small Jewish state
in 1937[212]).[213] The 6-month general strike was enforced by local committees, clubs,
associations etc. The Strike concluded due to Arab fatigue and the appointment
of a royal commission to address Arab concerns.
The violence included setting fire to Jaffa’s Jewish quarter, shooting attacks on Jewish civilians, spreading nails on streets, burning Jewish crops etc. It affected the whole country and was significant in the amount of rural/village participation. Foreign involvement from other Arab lands was also important, and included fighters from Syria, Jordan, Iraq as well as diplomatic representations by their governments in support of the Palestinians.
Stage 2. Between November 36 and July 37.
A lull while
everyone waited for the Peel Commission’s report.
Stage 3. July 37 to mid- 1939.
Arab rejection of
the Commission’s report led to renewed violence, starting with the murder of a
British official, Lewis Andrews, in Nazareth. The AHC was outlawed, and rural,
peasant leaders took over control of the revolt. The extremist/moderate Hussaini/Nashashibi
rift came out into the open. This in turn led to the Nashashibi’s
(including his Orthodox supporters) withdrawing from the AHC, and even to the forming
of “peace bands” to fight the AHC (with Zionist support). Calls were heard for
a Jihad and much of the rebellion was
encouraged by preaching from the mosques. By 1938, Britain had lost control of
major areas of countryside. This in turn led to a change in High Commissioners
(with the appointment of Sir Harold MacMichael), and a British military
crackdown.
By the summer of 1938, most of the Palestinian highlands were in rebel hands, and by September, even in the urban centres, government control had virtually ceased. As the Revolt progressed, its religious character became increasingly prominent. “As noted by the High Commissioner, Harold MacMichael, the leaders of the revolt were ‘more and more stressing the religious aspect of their struggle.’"[214] It was generally in the name of Islam, often as expressed by religious functionaries, that the masses were called upon to support the revolt and join its ranks. Much was made of alleged insults to the Qur'an and mosques by British troops. Likewise, it was asserted with great frequency that the Muslim Holy Places would be lost if Zionism were allowed to prevail.[215] The peasantry had never endorsed a secular brand of nationalism. As observed by the High Commissioner, 'among the village population Moslem religious sentiment is a stronger, more unifying and more universal sentiment than Arab nationalism.”[216] In any case, for most, their sense of Arab identity was defined primarily by its association with the period of 'Islamic glory,' when the Arabs were exalted as the carriers of the Islamic faith. In general, it would seem that, at least over time, the Revolt had the effect of heightening tensions between Muslims and Christians.[217]
The subsequent British military victory plus British diplomatic concessions led to its demise. The May 1939 White Paper limited Jewish migration and decided against partition.
The Paper was itself rejected by the Mufti, but the Palestinians were exhausted. Up to 200 Jews and 4,500- 5,000 Arabs died in total. A large number of Arabs (1200) were killed by Husseini's faction, which killed more Arabs than Jews. By the end of the Revolt, Arab attacks on other Arabs were nearly as common as attacks on British and Zionist forces.[218] Vast numbers of trees which had been planted by the Jews were also destroyed. On one occasion alone, “50,000 Jewish forest trees” were destroyed.[219]
The revolt has come to be seen as one of the rural peasantry allied with the Mufti, against the Zionists and the urban dwellers and those they labelled ‘collaborators.’[220] The roots of the revolt may very well be the formation of rural Fellahin parties in 1924, such as the Nablus Peasant Party and the Hebron Peasant Party. These rural parties were primarily Islamic, and none of them had any familiarity with Christians or the intellectual roots of Arab-nationalism.[221]
Christian Involvement in the Revolt
Christian involvement in the General Strike was initially fairly strong. Christian sports clubs helped to direct the strike at the ground level. “British reports in 1936 highlight Arab Christian participation in joint Muslim/Christian rallies (against Jewish immigration etc).”[222] These occurred in Gaza, Nablus, and Jaffa, with marchers often starting or ending at a church or Orthodox club. Christians also played an important role in perpetuating the general strike.[223] Leading Christian women were also notable in enforcing the boycott through violence. The Christian mayor of Nazareth was believed to be helping the Mufti’s men and pressing local Christians to assist them. “Occasionally Christian religious leaders also spoke out in favour of the rebellion.”[224] During the Arab Revolt [some] Christian women wore the veil to show unity with Muslims and that Arab culture is unified, despite religious differences. Also during this time, Christians de-emphasised their religion in order to promote Arabic and Arab culture.[225]In June of 1936 a total of 137 “senior Arab officials” had signed a letter to the Mandatory authorities stating that they were in sympathy with the Arab Higher Committee that was involved with the continuing violence. Many of these officials were Christians.[226]
On August 19, 1936, Christian leaders from across Palestine appealed to the world to recognise the danger of Zionist control of Palestine. They used traditional anti-Semitic arguments to insist that the international Christian community should prevent Jewish immigration, stop them from “defiling” the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem and prevent the neglect of the holy sites that would occur under Jewish rule. “An impressive list of Christian leaders from the Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, Anglican and Maronite communities signed a ‘Call of Palestinian Christians to the Christian World to Save the Holy Places from Zionist danger.’”[227] In a more local show of interdenominational support, Acre’s Christians united to demand that the government disarm the Zionists.[228]
The Mufti sent a delegation of Orthodox Palestinians to visit eastern European (Orthodox) cities to garner support.[229] He also included Christians in his delegation to London. Most interaction with European leaders at this time was carried out by Christians.
The notable exception to this inter communal solidarity was Haifa. This quickly became a source of tension. Muslim-Christian solidarity in Haifa had never been particularly strong. Instead of an MCA, Haifa had from the beginning two separate Muslim and Christian Associations. The Strike placed Arab government officials, the majority of whom were Christian, in a particularly difficult position. While some in the Public Works Department went on strike, they were the exception. The vast majority refused to join in, rather agreeing in the end to relinquish a tenth of their salaries to a strike fund.[230]
Christian enthusiasm for the strike diminished after a time, as Christians suffered from the disruption of economic activity more than the Muslim community. Before long, many were resisting compliance. It was also not uncommon that Christians were threatened by Muslim gangs demanding money as a demonstration of their loyalty. Towards the end, Christians were generally reluctant to carry on with the strike, something that again caused tension with the Muslim majority. The Christian-run Filastin was the first newspaper to call for its end.[231] While supporting the strike fully, the Anglican PNCC refused to resist the British violently, and as a result, were accused by the Muslims of being British spies.[232]
While most of the Christian population seems not to have been in favour of violence, early in the revolt, Greek Orthodox al-Sakakini wrote in admiration of a grenade attack on Jerusalem’s Edison theatre, which left three dead; “There is no other heroism like this, except the heroism of the Sheik al-Qassam. … They throw bombs, shoot, burn fields, destroy Jewish citrus groves, topple electric poles. Every day they block roads and every day Arabs display a heroism that the government never conceived of.” And, writing to his son; “Two anonymous heroes, threw a grenade at a passenger train full of Jewish civilians and the British soldiers who were escorting them. Who would have believed there are such heroes in Palestine? What a great honor it is, my Sari, to be an Arab in Palestine.”[233]
Concerning the Peel Plan, “For the most part, Christians were opposed to the partition plan, though to a large extent, this reflected the fact that the Galilee, an area heavily populated by Christians, had been allocated to the Jewish state. As soon as the extent of the territory being allocated to the Jewish state became apparent, most Christians came out against it. In the end, the partition plan actually had the effect of closing ranks between Christians and Muslims. Among other things, Christians were concerned about the impact partition would have in dividing what was already a small community.”
[234]This temporary closing of ranks did not last long. After some support for the first stage of the Revolt, very few Christian Arabs participated in the third stage, which was both much more violent, and often openly anti-Christian. Porath argued that the Christians remained “aloof.”[235] Nevertheless, unlike the Druze, the Christian community did not actively resist the rebel groups.[236] Many Christians simply moved to other countries. For example, during the revolt it was reported that “the rich families of Haifa departed en masse in August 1938.”[237] "The Christians [of Jaffa] had participated in the 1936 -1937 disturbances under duress and out of fear of the Muslims. The Christians' hearts now and generally are not with the rioting," reported the Haganah Intelligence Service.[238]
In this atmosphere, Christians increasingly felt a need to demonstrate that they were as committed to the nationalist cause as the Muslims. An article appearing in Filastin in July 1936, for instance, recounted an interview conducted by an American journalist in which a Christian youth indicated emphatically that he stood side by side with his Muslim brothers in his willingness to sacrifice everything for the national cause.[239] While they would not participate in the violence, the churches would issue an ecumenical appeal to the world’s Christians to support the goals of the revolt. The PNCC members “abhorred the tide of Jewish immigration.”[240]
Christian involvement in the various
militant groups was minimal. The great majority of the rank-and-file of came
from the Muslim peasantry. They were more inspired by Islamic sentiment than
secular nationalism.[241] Porath
notes that out of a total of 282 officers, only four were Christian (at a time
when Christians were approximately ten percent of the population).
Muslim organisations now led the Nationalist struggle. Disturbances, usually violent, were regarded by the Arabs as the primary expression of Arab nationalism. Organising and communications (where the Christians contributed) not so much. Separate Christian organizations were rejected, while common bonds with Muslims (enmity to Zionism) was emphasised. Palestinian Christians participated in the national movement, accepting the marginal and secondary position to which they were doomed as the result of being a religious minority group.[242]
Christian/Muslim violence
Controversy over the Missions
Conference in 1928 had almost led to a boycott of Christians and now in some
places the true feelings of many of the fellahin and other rebels came out.
They directed their slander and curses at the Palestinian Christians,
accusing them of being collaborators or not being sufficiently committed to
violence.[243] As
a result, the Christians found themselves increasingly subjected to harassment
and accusations of disloyalty. Relations deteriorated as the Revolt
lengthened. Muslims already resented
the over-representation of Christian Arabs in the government bureaucracy (jobs[244]),
and the presence of foreign Christian missionaries in the country.
Some rebel leaders sought to expand the boycott to
also target Christians. As early
as December 1936, a group called the “Carriers of the banner of al-Qassam”
called for a boycott of Christians; “Oh Muslims, Boycott the Christians.
Boycott them. Boycott them.”[245] They were accused of “a lack of dedication to nationalism.”
While rejection of the
Peel partition plan had temporarily closed the ranks between Christians and
Muslims, the resumption of the revolt quickly saw a revival of tensions between
Muslims and Christians. Muslims became outraged, for example, when Christian
priests refused to join in political demonstrations.[246]
Some Christian villages refused to supply food and arms to rebel bands. This
saw acts of retaliation against them, including the uprooting of vineyards and
the raping of two Christian girls.[247]
There were scattered attacks on Arab Christians by Muslim gangs.[248]
Another Zionist intelligence worker reported that Ahmed Salmeh al- Khalidi, a
member of the prominent Muslim Jerusalem family, ‘spoke with terrible
unhappiness about the Christians’, arguing that Muslim hatred for Christians
far outweighed their hatred of Jews.[249]
The Christian mayor of Bethlehem twice escaped
assassination. The Central Committee told the Christian mayor of Ramallah to resign.
Christian policemen were killed. According to one British police-officer, it was generally held among
Muslims that Christians were traitors to their own people. He described the
relationship between the two as being one of “savage and bitter feeling,”
Often, a British constable was posted to the house of a Christian Arab to act
as a bodyguard. Christian notables were targeted in particular and "were
suspected of all manner of anti-Moslem activities, such as helping the British,
or even selling land to Jews." The Nabi Musa festival, once considered an
expression of Muslim-Christian unity, now became an occasion during which
agitators "urged the multitude to fall upon the Jew and Christian infidels
and slay them."[250]
Christian schools in Jerusalem were harassed and the Terra Santa College was
forcibly closed. In 1938 two Christians Arabs were kidnapped in Kafr Yasif, one
a government worker and policeman. Christians were murdered in Nazareth and
Safad in 1939.[251]
One British official told 1937
Peel Royal Commission that Christians had "come to realise that the zeal
shown by the fellaheen ... was religious and fundamentally in the nature of a
Holy War against the Christian Mandate and against Christian people as well as
against Jews.”[252]
Christians were also greatly disturbed when a rebel band marching through the
Christian village of Bir Zeit sang “We are going to kill the Christians”
instead of the more usual “We are going to kill the British.”[253]
Note that in 1938, the Christian editor of Filastin, Isa al-Isa (editor since 1921), had to flee the country
due to fears of the Muslim village bands.[254] While very popular, Filastin was viewed by the population as
a Christian paper.[255] It nevertheless tried
hard to represent and to appeal to the broader community. Likewise, a report
from the 6th of November 1938 refers to “attacks on Christians.”[256]
In spite of all of this, the Christian community by and large continued in its support of the nationalist cause. The district commissioner of Jerusalem, Edward Keith- Roach received a letter demanding that the government guarantee the permanent appointment of a Muslim mayor. The letter was signed by two prominent Protestants. The Druze efforts to support the government against the rebels caused a serious rift between them and the Christian minority who inhabited the same towns in Galilee. “By and large, the Christian community maintained its support for the Palestinian Arab cause despite anti-Christian sentiments and incidents, and [because of] a fear of communal violence.”
[257]“A few even turned against the nationalist movement and supported the British or Zionists outright.”[258] Selim Ayyub, a Christian Arab, wrote in 1936 to a Zionist leader about Christian participation in the revolt; “80-85% of them were motivated by fear. They lived in mixed quarters and were afraid of the Muslims, but they really had nothing against the Jews.” He also said they preferred British rule to Muslim.[259] This is hard to evaluate. In general, Christians were inclined to blame the Jews for their situation. Thus, for example, the Greek Catholic bishop of Galilee, Yusuf Hajjar, blamed the weakening of the Christian position on Jewish immigration. Certainly, most Christians do seem to have preferred British rule. “Indeed, Christians took almost no part in the 1936–1939 rebellion.”[260]
In May 1938, Bishop Hajjar protested to the Mufti concerning “the Arab Christians of Palestine.” Also in May 38, the British district commissioner wrote that bishop Hajjar would speak on behalf of all Arab Christians to the Peel Commission, because “none dared speak for themselves.”[261] Likewise, the district commissioner for Jerusalem strongly believed in June, 1939 that the Christians were only supportive of Arab nationalism out of self-preservation, that they were “obliged to adopt publicly the policy of the Muslims.”[262] According to Morris, a major reason for the failure of the Revolt was that it ran out of money. He then notes that the wealthy were disproportionately Christian, and reluctant to support the Revolt.[263] Indeed, the Revolt was only able to continue for so long because of Nazi funding given in 1938.[264]
The Muslim leadership generally wanted the Christians on side, but at the local level, many gangs were quite independent, and anti-Christian. Hajj Amin and around 200 Muslim members of the Arab leadership did indeed try to counter this general sentiment. How successful they were in this respect is debatable.[265] On at least one occasion, the Mufti reportedly ‘directed mosque preachers throughout the country to preach for peace and brotherhood among Muslims and Christians.’[266] In both Lebanon and Damascus, Palestinian officials intervened to lessen Muslim/Christian tensions.[267] Again in September 1938, the Central Committee forbade the rebels from disturbing “Churches, convents, Patriarchate priests, monks, nuns, either by collecting money or by trespassing on their personal or religious liberty.”[268] Note that the Christian el-Issa was praised by Muslims for writing that “saving Palestine through an Islamic path is closest to saving it through a national road.”[269] He also called for the turning of the Easter services “into national demonstrations which shall prove to our opponents the power of the Arabs in Palestine.”[270] Note that Christians have again more recently cancelled Easter celebrations in Bethlehem to further nationalistic goals, and corrupted Christmas to become a vehicle of nationalist propaganda. Their faith must serve their nationalism. "No one can serve two masters. Either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will be devoted to the one and despise the other.” (Matthew 6:24).
The Round Table Conference
With the publication of the Woodhead Partition Commission report in November 1938 declaring partition technically infeasible, and the British government's accompanying announcement to hold a Round Table Conference in London, the Revolt lost momentum and eventually collapsed. The British Government proposed a drastic cutting back of Jewish immigration and land purchases, making future Jewish immigration dependent on Arab consent and the eventual creation of an independent united Palestinian state. Jews were to be given veto-power over the latter as a counterbalance to Arab control over immigration. In the end, the Jewish delegation walked out of the Conference. In lieu of a settlement, the Government issued a White Paper along the lines of what had been proposed during the Conference. What came to be known as the MacDonald White Paper (named after the Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald) was issued on 17 May.
The decision by the Higher Arab Committee to take part in a conference in London gave the Christians some temporary leverage with respect to the national movement, as it was considered imperative by the Arab leadership that the HAC should appear representative of a united Palestinian-Arab people. In a startling sign of just how serious the anti-Christian violence had become, when the Christian leadership was asked to downplay the less savoury aspects of the Revolt with respect to Christians, they threatened to send a separate delegation to the London Conference. The threat worked, and at the end of December, the Arab leaders in Jerusalem published a declaration condemning the various anti-Christian acts that had been committed in connection with the Revolt. (At the same time, they attributed such acts to renegade individuals whom they characterised as “rascals.”) Hajj Amin al-Husseini also tried to exert pressure on his followers to behave more tolerantly towards Christians. In the end, the Palestinian Arab delegation sent to the Conference did give the impression of a united front.[271]
After the Revolt, the Palestinians were exhausted, World War 2 was starting, Palestine became a British garrison (a vastly increased troop presence), and the Christian community withdrew into itself, and reflected upon what had just happened. They were aided in this reflection by the generational change in Palestinian Christian leadership which also occurred at this time. Many of the Christian notables had fled, along with the Mufti in the late 1930s. Many others were busy with the Palestinian agenda in London and New York.[272] This reflection could only go so far. Unhappy with the level of street violence they had both witnessed and increasingly experienced, they nevertheless remained committed to the cause of Arab nationalism, and anti-Zionism. This left them needing to prove their loyalty to an increasingly hostile Moslem majority, with no plan B except immigration. It seems that traditional Christian anti-Semitism meant that allying with the Jewish community was never seriously explored by the majority of the community. Indeed, Porath concluded that “In this way they [the rebels] were aided by two basic facts: Christian opposition to Zionism, and Christian self-identification, alongside their community identity, as Palestinian Arabs.”[273] The revised strategy that emerged was that they would continue to pursue nationalist goals (never really in question) but this time through organizations which were clearly identifiable as Christian. By stressing their religious affiliation as a primary label, they sought to ease communal tensions and draw Muslim attention to their participation in the nationalistic struggle. While an earlier generation of Christian leaders had eschewed such sectarianism, preferring that Christians and Muslims all simply join nationalistic organisations “as Arabs,” the Muslim violence that had been directed towards them necessitated this rethink, and a depressing retreat from their ideal, of Christians and Muslims all fully equal, religious affiliation not even noticed.
Palestinian Christian anti-Semitism and opposition to Zionism remained central in their desire for relevance and integration/acceptance into the wider Muslim society. Nor was this pattern unique to the Palestinian Church. To quote from my book on the Roles of the European Churches and the Holocaust; “much of the Catholic Church in Germany at this time viewed anti-Semitism both as part of the heritage, and also as “a vehicle for keeping in touch with the times.”[274] … This was also true in Austria, where “Members of the Roman Catholic hierarchy were anxious to convince young people that the church had been anti-Semitic centuries before anyone had heard of National Socialism.”[275] The majority of wider/international denominations with which the Palestinian churches were affiliated with were also theologically and institutionally anti-Semitic at this time. While these denominations may have repented of this anti-Semitism re Europe they emphatically have not done so re Israel.
Discussion
The Christian response to the Arab Revolt was profoundly nuanced and reflected a community which well understood its own identity and self-interest. Palestinian Christians were opposed to both Zionism and to Muslim domination. Christians generally saw the Mandate as a protecting power rather than a repressive yoke. It did not provoke in them the fundamental offence that it did among the Muslim community. The Christians liked British rule, it gave them good jobs, personal safety and the rule of law. They also liked the British. They had been educated in British mission schools, and often worked with and had friends among the British officials. They did not wish to kill them, or to drive British rule out of Palestine, hence their lack of support for the violence against the British during the third stage of the Revolt. The extent to which this divergence from the Muslim community was a thought-out strategy, as opposed to a more intuitive response, is unclear. The Christians had pursued separate foreign policies previously, and for all the hype, were not simply an indivisible part of the Arab nation. Their fallback position of contributing through clearly identifiable Christian organisations was in retrospect a more appropriate strategy. It better allowed for community distinctives.
How much should be read into the divergence being over violence? Did this simply highlight a difference of opinion over the British, or did it reveal a more profound rift? As already noted, (see the discussion on the 1921 Jaffa riot), the Palestinian Christian communities have not embraced violence against the Jewish community to the same extent that the Muslim community has, and this is a standing cause of offence to the Muslims. Christian violence is by no means unknown (see George Habash and the PFLP[276]), but a quantitative difference remains evident.
Their quarrel with British rule was far more narrowly focused. They wanted Jewish immigration stopped. In pursuance of these aims, they fully supported the general strike, but did not support the accompanying campaign of violence against the British. In these responses, we see the Christian community no longer defining themselves as an indivisible part of the Arab nation, but rather as a distinct subset of it, with their own priorities. Priorities which did not align with those of the Muslim majority. These differences would not be proclaimed from the rooftops, due to their fear of the Muslim mob, but are clearly seen in their actions on the ground. Many of the rioters were poor rural Muslims, while most of the Christians were urbanized and middle class and feared for their own property. At that point, the more crucial question became, would the Muslim middle class, the Nashashibi supporters, join with the mob, or with their own interests in safety and security. In its third stage, the Revolt directly targeted these moderates, and over one thousand were murdered. The Christians who had also failed to join in the violence were likewise targeted. That both moderate Muslims and Christians were relatively wealthy was an added incentive to the Islamic mob. Muslim political leaders tried to limit the damage, but the two communities moved further apart. Note also that when the British did indeed leave, the cause of the friction was removed, but the damage had been done.
For the Christian community the focus of the Arab Revolt of 1936-39 was not British rule as such, rather it was specifically related to one issue: Jewish immigration. It is this attitude which must now be considered. This immigration did not happen in a vacuum. By opposing Jewish refugees fleeing from Germany in 1936 onwards, the Palestinian Christian communities also force us to confront their views about;
Nazism and Hitler.
In 1938, an American writer wrote: “What is to be done with these people, with the millions who are clawing like frantic beasts at the dark walls of the suffocating chambers where they are imprisoned? The Christian world (not just Palestinians!) has practically abandoned them and sits by with hardly an observable twinge of conscience in the midst of this terrible catastrophe.”
What was known
About the war in general
The claim that the Palestinian Arabs were remote from and knew nothing about outside matters is false. Possibly, isolated rural areas such as the southern Hebron hills might have had little knowledge, but that is an argument unavailable to the Christians of Palestine, who were the most urbanised and best educated in the wider Palestinian community.
This idea that the Palestinians were largely unaware of events in Europe is again refuted by the great interest shown by the Palestinian press in the Spanish civil war. The Palestinian press gave extensive coverage of these event, with background pieces on the opposing sides, with emphasis and support for the Nationalist (fascist) forces. The Filastin devoted its back covers to photos of the war, described as “no small feat at the time.”[277] Palestinian sympathy was, as with Nazism itself, initially one of enthusiastic support, waning over time to disappointment and antagonism.[278] The Spanish Civil war began in 1936, just as the Palestinian Revolt and general strike were most popular. The Palestinians saw similarities between their own struggle and that of the Nationalist forces, the Filastin even stressing the roles of “Jewish soldiers”[279] in the Republican camp. Through this linkage, they both hoped to gain German and Italian support for their own cause, and to encourage their own supporters that the Spanish example showed that success was possible. In this vein, Filastin even described the Republican forces as “enemies of the Arabs.” All of which is to say that the Palestinian press and community were by no means unaware of events in Europe. The reference to “Jewish soldiers” in this conflict is also interesting. Jews comprised 0.018% of the Spanish population. Ideas of Jewish soldiers was a specifically Catholic charge[280] and intended to make the link between Jews and communists. Again, a specifically Christian anti-Semitism was being propagated by a Palestinian Christian paper, based on a mutual hatred of Jews.
Mary Wilson, a teacher at Biezeit throughout the revolt, noted that most of her students were pro-Nazi and approved of Hitler.[281] Zionist intelligence files cite numerous specific Arab Christians who were supportive of Germany.[282] Khalil al-Sakakini, a Christian Jerusalem educator, jotted down in his diary, "rejoiced [as did 'the whole Arab world'] when the British bastion at Tobruk fell in 1941 to the Germans." One of the first public opinion polls in Palestine, conducted by al-Sakakini's son, Sari Sakakini, on behalf of the American consulate in Jerusalem, in February 1941 found that 88 percent of the Palestinian Arabs favoured Germany and only 9 percent Britain.[283] Sakakini’s children learned the German national anthem. Discussing the growing popularity of Nazism, one British official that "the anti-Semitic character of present-day Germany, the pre-war German sympathies of the former Ottoman subjects, and a desire to seize upon any opportunity for change, were amongst the motives.”[284]
The war itself reached into Egypt, Lebanon and
Syria, and in 1940, the Italians bombed Tel Aviv, causing 137 deaths, including
seven Arabs. Palestine was a British troop garrison, its population had
ringside seats. “All Palestinian newspapers reported in detail on the progress
of the war.”[285] An editorial in Filastin pointed out the importance of the outcome of the war for
the Arab nations.[286] Filastin supported
the British against the Nazis, and also ran articles detailing Nazi acts
against Muslims in Russia. Clearly, informed Palestinian opinion was well aware
of the momentous events taking place all around them.
The question then has a more narrow focus;
“what did the Palestinian community know about Nazi anti-Jewish atrocities?”
The Palestinian community was initially sympathetic to Hitler because he hated Jews. In 1933, just after Hitler took power, the Mufti “conveyed his admiration and support to the Hitler government, praising in particular the anti-Jewish policies of the Nazis.”[287] Indeed, the Mufti contacted the German consul to declare his support and to offer his services.[288] The Palestinian newspaper al-Jami’a al-Arabiyya, the official paper of the Supreme Muslim council, wrote in 1933; “As is well known, Herr Hitler and his party are the most violent adversaries of the Jews … As far as the position of the Arabs … because the Jews are our enemies our wish and our hope rest of course on Hitler.”[289] Indeed, Palestinian notables met with the German Consul in Palestine in 1933 as they wished to learn more about the German boycott of Jewish goods, and to offer their help in this. The Consul reported that the Mufti wanted to join the boycott and offered to spread the word through special emissaries if necessary.
Also in 1933, Bishop Graham Brown wrote a discussion with his Palestinian theological students. “I was speaking to them about the position of Christian minorities in Iraq, and they fully approved of the need of securing that their rights as citizens should be maintained. When I applied the same principles to the rights of the Jewish minority in Germany at the present time they were unwilling to apply the principles accepted for the Christian minorities in Iraq and explained their reason for this was as the Jews had betrayed the Germans in the War they were now receiving their due punishment as God said it would extend even to the third and fourth generation.”[290] So much for their not knowing what was happening in Germany!!
Note that at this time, the Germans offered very
little to the Palestinians, when indeed, they were keen to expel their own
Jewish population. Indeed, up until late 1941, there were no practical reasons
or benefits to the Nazi/Palestinian relationship. Up till then Hitler’s
policies actually worked against Palestinian interests. It was more of an in principle supporting of a
likeminded fellow traveller – The Mufti could affirm the German goal of
expelling Jews as being identical (if not helpful) to his own. Indeed, in a
second meeting with the consul, the Mufti did try unsuccessfully to impress
upon him his demand for a cessation of Jewish immigration to Palestine from
Germany.[291] This rebuttal did not however cause a weakening of
the Mufti’s support for Hitler. It was not until the Revolt of 36, when the
Mufti became far more anti-British than before, that contacts with Germany
really began to deepen.
In 1936, the Arab Chamber of Commerce petitioned the German consul to stop Jewish migration. They were given a sympathetic reception (again, sympathetic because they both hated Jews!), but again without success. In 1937, a Palestinian delegation met with the German emissary to Iraq. This combined with the Peel report, which would have seen an independent Jewish state in Palestine, caused a rethink by the Germans. The German foreign minister announced his rejection of a Jewish state. This in turn led the Mufti to suggest sending a delegation to Berlin, an offer declined by the Germans. What you have at this stage is, rather than an alliance based on mutual self-interest, is an empathy based on mutual belief, and that belief was hatred of the Jews. They were united by their anti-Semitism, and this gave them a comradery which was still struggling for a more concrete expression.
In September 1938, Hitler told the Sudeten Germans; “Take the Arab Palestinians as your ideal. With unusual courage they fight both England’s British Empire and the world Jewry.”[292] Hitler could admire the anti-Jewish Revolt, but he still sought to avoid antagonizing Britain, with whom he hoped to avoid an all-out war. The Palestinians could admire Hitler’s anti-Semitic acts, but did not like one of its consequences, an increase in Jewish migration. With relations with Britain souring over Czechoslovakia, the idea of encouraging instability with the British empire became more appealing. Admiral Canaris of German counterintelligence met secretly with the Mufti in Beirut in 1938. Financial aid was given, as was an unsuccessful offer of military aid. All the while, Jewish immigration continued at an increasing rate.
Further sources available to the Palestinians
Hitler’s persecution of Germany’s Jews was also obviously widely reported in the Palestinian Jewish press. The Palestinian Jewish paper Ha ‘aretz carried an article titled “On Hitler’s rise to power” dated Feb 1, 1933. In it, the writer noted that Hitler “Has terrified all Jews in the world.”[293] “In February-April 1933, both Davar and Ha’aretz carried copious front-page reportage of the German authorities’ persecution of Jews and oppositionists.”[294] On March 17, the Palestine Post wrote; “It would be futile optimism and foolish blindness to conclude that there is nothing but hysteria and exaggeration behind the news pouring out of Germany about violence and murder, and a virtual reign of terrorism, aimed at the Jewish citizens of Germany.”[295]February 10, 1933, Do’ar ha-Yom noted “The Nazis’ mayhem in the streets, the assaults, the murders of little children.”
Outside of Germany itself, of all peoples, it was the Palestinians who had the greatest exposure and access to information as to what was happening to the Jews of Germany – Palestine was where the desperate refugees were going! They just had to ask!
How then did they respond to Jewish claims of persecution in Germany, especially as these persecutions were being used to justify Jewish immigration into Palestine? Sakakini mocked them as paranoid; they were “always wailing about being persecuted by the Germans.”[296] Nor did this change when confronted by the facts. Sakakini could not “forgive the Jews, even when he learned that the Nazis were killing them.” On reading of the sinking of the Sturma, he wrote that, had they had self-government, the Arabs would have mined the waters to prevent it reaching Palestine.[297] He ridiculed the public day of mourning held by the Jewish community in Palestine, and wrote a sarcastic article published on the front page of Falastin (the English language edition of Filastin); “Welcome cousins, we are the guests and you are the masters of the house. We will do everything to please you. You are, after all God’s chosen people.” The article was extremely popular, and he received widespread praise for it.[298] Reports of up to 60% of Palestine’s Arabs supporting the Nazis are difficult to evaluate, but Sari-al-Sakakini wrote at the time that the Arab national movement was pro German, not because of bribes or German agents, but because the Germans opposed the Jews, and so “the Arabs had turned to Germany.”[299] Indeed, after German army successes of 1939/40, Hitler was described as “an Arab hero.”
More diplomatically, writing from Jerusalem in 1938, leading Greek Orthodox thinker George Antonius (author of The Arab Awakening) wrote a draft letter to the president of the United States. In it (and formulating arguments that would be used extensively after the Holocaust) he argued that “we are shocked at the way Christian nations are treating [the Jews], … the treatment meted out to Jews in Germany and other European countries is a disgrace to its authors and to modern civilization …but the cure for the eviction of Jews from Germany is not be to sought in the eviction of the Arabs form their homeland.”[300] The degree to which Palestinian Arabs were shocked by the German treatment of the Jews is debatable, given that their leaders supported it and desired to emulate it, but they were useful sentiments to write to the Americans. Far more significantly, written in 1938 from Jerusalem, it again confirms that educated Palestinians were well aware of the horrors being visited upon the German Jewish community, and that they hardened their hearts and refused shelter to those who were dying. The English language Falastin also contained clear anti-Semitism, from its first edition which claimed that the Jews control the world’s media, to the edition which headlined “Bolshevism is Jewish.”[301]
The Palestinian community knew that Hitler was persecuting the Jewish people, and that some of these Jews were trying to flee to save their lives to Palestine. This elicited from them only mockery and ridicule.
Discussion
“British reports in 1936 highlight Arab Christian participation in joint Muslim/Christian rallies (against Jewish immigration etc).”[302]
On August 19, 1936, Christian leaders from across Palestine appealed to the world to recognise the danger of Zionist control of Palestine. They used traditional anti-Semitic arguments to insist that the international Christian community should prevent Jewish immigration, stop them from “defiling” the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem and prevent the neglect of the holy sites that would occur under Jewish rule. “An impressive list of Christian leaders from the Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, Anglican and Maronite communities signed a ‘Call of Palestinian Christians to the Christian World to Save the Holy Places from Zionist danger.’”[303]
The PNCC members “abhorred the tide of Jewish immigration.”[304]
Palestinian Arabs were intimately affected by the
Nazi persecution of the Jews. They were living with one of its consequences
(increased Jewish immigration), this topic really mattered to them. They were
concurrently the closest to the testimonies of the victims, and their own press
and the local Jewish press gave much information. When they found out, they did
not express horror or outrage, rather they gave massive approval. They inquired
as to how they might assist and emulated them. They clearly knew something
about Hitler’s April 1 boycott of Jews in 1933 and arranged to meet with German
officials to learn more. The Mufti congratulated Hitler in a way that showed he
knew and approved of Nazi anti-Semitism. How could this be if the Palestinian
Arabs knew nothing of what was happening in Europe? Clearly, they did.
Different options,
anti-Zionism verses anti-Semitism
Given that Jewish refugees arriving in Palestine during the British Mandate desired the formation of a “Jewish national home” within Palestine (something which occurred in no other land where Jewish refugees went), one can posit the proposition that in rejecting the arrival of Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Germany, the Palestinian community were anti-Zionist, but not necessarily anti-Semitic.
This could be a complicated theoretical discussion, but history gives us
a clear, unambiguous answer. Basically, to be anti-Zionist but not
anti-Semitic, the Palestinian Arab communities would have objected to the idea
of Jewish national home within Palestine, but wished Jews well, elsewhere. To
be anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic, they would have had to not only oppose the
Jewish community within Palestine, but to also oppose Jews wherever they lived.
In 1898 a German reader asked the Christian Arab
editors of al-Muqtataf for their
response to the first Zionist Conference. They replied that they thought the
prospects for Zionist success remote, and that they would “do better to
ameliorate the conditions of Jews in Russia, Rumania and Bulgaria.”[305] This attitude was also well represented within the
various Jewish communities of Europe during this time. For example, Edwin
Montague, the Jewish member of the British Parliament who served as Secretary
of State for India (1917-22) similarly thought Zionism should be rejected, and Jewish
energy put into improving their place within those lands where they lived.[306] This option would be tragically shown to have been
a false hope by the events of the Holocaust. That event was still in the future
however, and many people saw the idea of aiding Jews where they presently lived
as a legitimate counterproposal to Zionism.
Were the Arab communities then simply anti-Zionist, opposing the creation of a Jewish State, but wishing Jews elsewhere well? The Palestinian community might have held this view. Or were the two concepts, anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism, essentially identical for them? If they were not anti-Semitic, but simply anti-Zionist, then they would then have opposed an ideology (Nazism) which was responsible for increasing the very thing, Jewish immigration, that they were struggling with. Christian (and Muslim) Arabs could well have decided that their best option was indeed to help ameliorate conditions for Jews in Germany, as this would vastly reduce the number wanting to flee. While by no means an ideal position (such as welcoming and valuing the fleeing refugees), it could have been an option. They did not have to make common cause with Hitler. His early activities were profoundly detrimental to their own perceived best interests. Shamefully, the strong public support for Hitler from the 1930s to the present, shows the Palestinian and Arab communities to have been massively anti-Semitic, not just anti-Zionist.
Likewise, in early 1948, Arab governments uniformly threatened publicly at the United Nations that should the UN Partition vote pass (recognising a Jewish state), they would exact reprisals against the Jewish communities living in their lands. These reprisals, often starting with deadly riots, soon became mass expulsions. Roughly 850,000 Jews were forcibly driven from Arab lands, where they had lived for generations. Arab states punished local Jews because of Israel. Anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism were indistinguishable. Note also that, like the early effects of Nazi policy, these expulsions were to the direct detriment of Palestine’s Arabs. The expelled Jews found a home in Israel, greatly strengthening it.
One could fairly say that supporting anti-Jewish measures harmed the
Palestinian cause. No Arabs viewed it as such, however – attacking Jews was an
obvious reaction for them against the creation of the Jewish state. If any
distinctions can be drawn, they would be that anti-Semitism was a higher
priority than anti-Zionism for these communities, although again, I doubt they
saw it in such terms.
This distinction between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism is largely a
Western construct devised by people who wish to hate the Jewish state, but not
suffer the opprobrium of anti-Semitism. The Palestinian Arab community, like
the Arab communities in general, had no problem with hating Jews (that was a
European reaction to the Holocaust) and were generally both anti-Zionist and
anti-Semitic. The minute distinctions between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism
(or Jew-hatred) are simply not a pre-occupation for the vast majority of Arabs
(unless when talking to Westerners!). They have no qualms about hating Jews in
general and see such hate as part and parcel of their struggle against the
Jewish State.
In fact, they voted with their hearts. The Arab communities across the Middle East (in Iraq, Syria, Egypt and elsewhere), including the Christian Arabs in Palestine, saw in Hitler a kindred spirit, someone who shared their hatred of Jews, and they embraced him as such. Hitler got it. He understood. He shared their worldview. For this reason, they gave him their love. Al-Husseini, the official leader of the Palestinian Arab community, advised Hitler that the best way to win Arab hearts was to preach hatred of the Jews.[307]
Conclusion
The Arab Revolt was a seismic event in Palestinian history. The one demand of the Arab Revolt of 1936 that the Christian community full heartedly supported was the demand for the banning of Jewish immigration. When they made this demand, the Palestinian community in general, and the Christian Palestinian community in particular were well aware and even supportive of the anti-Jewish nature and policies of the Nazi government in Germany. The Christian Arab community, fully aware of what was happening, did not have to go along with this. Yet Palestinian Christian leaders unanimously supported the anti-immigration policies of the Revolt; opposed giving refuge to Jews fleeing Nazi Germany. It is hard to set the bar for morality lower than that. In supporting this cruel policy, they turned their backs on the refugees, on the commands of Jesus, and denied their faith.
Showing love to one's neighbour and love to the stranger, aid to one “fainting before murderers” should not have been beyond them! They could simply have acted on Psalm 37:3 “Trust in the LORD and do good;” Had the Christian community opened their doors and hearts to these people, and welcomed them in, how different history might have been! But even recently I have heard a well know Palestinian Christian defend the “Arab Revolt” of 1936 and the Christian participation in it; defend killings aimed at stopping Jews fleeing Nazi Germany from finding refuge! This cannot be defended in terms of their faith (which commands the opposite!), but only in nationalistic terms. It needs also be stressed that their failure was by no means unique! Jewish migration to Palestine indeed presented the Arab population there with unique challenges; nowhere else did Jewish immigrants desire a “national home.” Yet no nation on earth would receive them. With their initial widespread support of the Revolt and General Strike, the Christian community showed that not only were they prepared to place nationalism above their faith, they were prepared to choose it even when it directly opposed their faith. That the chaos they supported soon turned on them also shows only that “if you do not stand by faith, you shall not stand at all (Isaiah 7:9).”
In the 1930s, the Jewish people fell into the hands of robbers. "Which of these three do you think was a neighbour to the man who fell into the hands of robbers?" The expert in the law replied, "The one who had mercy on him." Jesus told him, "Go and do likewise." "Then the King will say to those on his left, 'Depart from me, … for I was a stranger and you did not invite me in.”
By 1936, when these Jews were fleeing clear Nazi persecution, we could have hoped that the local Christians would have given them refuge and helped and welcomed them, as the teachings of Jesus would require. To do so, however, would have required a renunciation of their own history from its very beginning. It would also have placed many of them in direct conflict with their wider denominational policies. Tragically, it did indeed prove to be beyond them. Their false theology, itself based in selfishness and venal self-interest, meant they stood with their ancestors who had stoned Jews trying to return to Jerusalem, and persuade a ruler to break his oath so that Jews might be murdered or expelled from Jerusalem. Who had persecuted them relentlessly, even as they themselves were being persecuted by Islam. Who had gone to a Muslim court 1847 (less than 90 years earlier) to demand of the Muslim rulers their right to kill Jews who walked past their main church, and who had beaten a Jew who stepped inside as little as 9 years earlier. This is the grief and the tragedy of the Arab church in Palestine. Like the churches in Europe, the churches in Palestine raced forward towards inevitable failure.
For the Palestinian Christians, preventing
Jewish immigration before and during World War 2 was the priority, not
British colonialism. In the late 1930s, Jewish refugees were trying to enter
the only place on earth that might give them refuge. Local Christian leaders played a prominent role in the 1936 General
Strike opposing refuge for these Jews fleeing Nazi Germany, a fact approved of
by many in the Christian the anti-Israel crowd of today. Given that those Jews were trying to flee the
genocide of the Holocaust, that those who could not flee were murdered, how
should we view this Palestinian stance? Palestinians need to own up to their
Jew hatred and repent.
During the War
On April 28, 1939, Hitler made a speech to the Reichstag violently attacking British policy towards Palestine. The speech “electrified” Palestinian opinion. With the defeat and exhaustion of the Palestinian forces in the Revolt however, even the Mufti counselled that the Arabs should remain neutral in the coming war unless an Axis victory was assured.[308] In June 1940, the Mufti, then residing in Iraq, sent a letter to the German embassy in Turkey. It congratulated Hitler on his victory in France, and asked that he now address the Arab question. He signed it as the president of the Arab Higher Committee of Palestine. The German ambassador showed a distinct lack of interest in this overture.[309] Again in August 1940, an envoy was sent, this time to Berlin. He sought assurances from the Germans, including “a recognition of the Arabs right to solve the Jewish problem in Palestine in a manner which conforms to the national interest of the Arabs.”[310] In return, he promised the resumption of the Arab revolt in Palestine, a cause for which he then requested money and munitions. On October 21, the Germans finally committed themselves to “full sympathy” to the cause of Arab independence. This was less than the Arab leaders were hoping for. In an interesting move, the Mufti then wrote again to Hitler in January 1941, this time essentially abandoning demands for Arab independence from (Vichy) France, and Italian north Africa. In now mentioned only those parts of the Arab world under British rule. The German reply in April stressed their common enmity towards Britain and the Jews.
On November 28, 1941, in response to a request from the Mufti, Hitler stated that the objective of a German advance in the Middle East would be the destruction of Judaism in Palestine.[311] During the war, the Mufti broadcast on over 6 stations, telling his listeners to “kill the Jews.”[312]
The Mufti and the Holocaust
The Mufti was not in Palestine during the war, so his views and actions are not necessarily representative. That he would return to Palestine after the war[313] and is revered by them to this day (his photo is given pride of place in the offices of PA president, Mahmoud Abbas) is what makes his actions during the war of wider significance. “In November 1943, when he became aware of the nature of the Nazi final solution, the Mufti said: It is the duty of Muhammadans in general and Arabs in particular to … drive all Jews from Arab and Muhammadan countries…. Germany is also struggling against the common foe who oppressed Arabs and Muhammadans in their different countries. It has very clearly recognized the Jews for what they are and resolved to find a definitive solution for the Jewish danger that will eliminate the scourge that Jews represent in the world.”[314]
Finally, in November 1941, the Mufti arrived in Berlin, where he would stay till the end of the war. He was given an official reception, luxury accommodation at the Castle Bellevue, and an annual stipend of the equivalent of $12 million a year.[315] In their first meeting, Hitler agreed with the Mufti that they were fighting a common enemy, “the Jews.” The Mufti approved of and visited concentration camps and desired one for Palestine.[316] Already in 1937 he had issued an ‘Appeal to all Muslims of the World’, urging them to “cleanse their land of the Jews.”[317] By May 1942, both Hitler and Mussolini had officially agreed to his request to liquidate the Jews of Palestine.[318] Again during the war, he urged “the expulsion of all the Jews from all Arab and Muslim countries”, and stated that the Germans had found a definite solution to the Jewish problem.[319] This was not Anti-Zionism, simply wishing that Jews lived happily elsewhere, but not in Palestine. This was global genocidal anti-Semitism. Again, the Mufti pressured the Axis forces to murder the Jews of the Middle East wherever they were able. Walter Rauff, who had invented the mobile gassing vans, visited Rommel in 1942, but was thrown out. He nevertheless was appointed head of the Gestapo in Tunis, and in this capacity murdered 2,500 Jews in Tunisian, and deported to Europe a further 350. After the war, he worked for Syrian intelligence. On June 24, German forces crossed into Egypt. The next day al-Husseini’s “Voice of the Free Arab” radio station told its listeners in Cairo to start making lists of the home addresses and workplaces of every Jew there, so they could all be annihilated.[320]
The Mufti wrote that Eichmann (the architect of the Holocaust) was “a rare diamond, … the best redeemer for the Arabs.”[321] He intervened numerous times to prevent Jews from fleeing Axis lands and specified that they should be sent to Poland instead, a destination he knew equated to death. Writing of his efforts to prevent Jewish Bulgarian children from being allowed to flee Europe, German Foreign Office Councillor, Wilhelm Melchers, who worked closely with him in this, stated “the Mufti was a sworn enemy of the Jews, and made no secret of the fact he would rather see them all killed.”[322] Writing of these events after the war, the Mufti viewed them favorably “my letters had positive and useful results for the Palestinian problem.”[323]
Within Palestine, during the war sentiment generally appears to have become more pro-British, especially as the Nashashibis were present and the Mufti was in exile.[324] This is interesting, as the Arab revolt against the British had just ended. There were several factors responsible for this. The largely middle class urban Palestinian population had been alienated by the extremism of the last stages of the Revolt. Equally, the Nashashibi support for the British had delivered an obvious victory in the form of the British White Paper, which halted Jewish immigration and cleared the way for Palestinian statehood.[325]
With the Jewish immigration out of the way, the Palestinian urban middle class, of whom the Christians were a large portion, found British rule by no means unbearable. Most Palestinians were essentially content with a British rule leading to eventual independence. For the Christians especially, the Mufti’s anti-British stand did simply did not resonate. The Christians liked the British but wanted them to be more anti-Jewish. A nuance well captured in Sakakini, who worked for the mildly pro-British Arabic radio station in Ramallah, yet also wrote that Hitler “opened the eyes of the world”[326] to the true position of the Jews. The massive British military presence in the country also had a calming effect. Indeed, after the fire and fury of the Arab Revolt, the war years, full of fire and fury elsewhere, were looked back on by the Palestinians as a time of calm between the storms.
Elsewhere in the Middle East.
In Egypt, there was “diffuse pro-German sentiment as widespread at the outbreak of the war.”[327]Also during the war, fascist forces sacked the Jewish quarter of Benghazi, and over 2,000 Jews were deported to European concentration camps. In Syria, the New York Times wrote that “the whole country is a hotbed of Nazi propaganda.”[328] In June 1941, there was a pro-Nazi coup in Iraq, and during the anti-Jewish riots known as the Farhud, hundreds of Jewish men, women and children were murdered. Pro-Nazi movements expressed themselves in anti-Jewish riots. It was precisely this aspect of Naziism which most appealed to them. In 1939, King Ibn Saud sent one of his government ministers, Khalid al-Qarqani to meet with Hitler in Berlin. When Hitler told him of his plan to expel all German Jews, Qarqani repeated the King’s view that Muhammad had carried out the identical policy in the Arabian Peninsula centuries before.[329] Hitler told the representative from Saudi Arabia that Germany had warm sympathy for the Arabs “because we are jointly fighting the Jews.” All this is absolute anti-Semitism, not just an objection to Zionism. Also, in Syria, posters in Arabic stating "In heaven God is your ruler, on earth Hitler" were frequently displayed in shops in the towns.[330]
Note also the pan-Arabic intellectuals who affirmed the Iraqi army in 1933 when it ‘supressed’ the Assyrians, and the Baath party covenant which called for the expulsion of non-loyal non-Arab minorities.[331]
There was therefore significant support for the Nazis across the Middle east, and Nazi anti-Semitism was an explicit reason for that support.
After the war
On June 2, 1946, the Mufti returned to the Middle East and resumed leadership of the AHC. In 1948, Anwar Nusseibeh wrote that the Mufti had not gone beyond the principles of Arab patriotism by collaborating with the Nazis.[332] What is also highly relevant here is Rubin’s comment about the Nazi collaboration of the Mufti and his circle; “Yet al-Husseini and the other Arab and Muslim collaborators would emerge from the war not only unscathed but with their political careers intact. Indeed, their prospects actually improved.”[333] Whatever false claims for Palestinian ignorance during the war existed, none existed now, yet still there was no repentance, no second thoughts.
On May 12, 1947, the AHC Secretary-general, Palestinian Christian Emile Ghouri addressed this very issue at the United Nations General Assembly’s special session on Palestine; “The Jews are questioning the record of an Arab spiritual leader. Does that properly come from the mouth if a people who have crucified the founder of Christianity?”[334] To this day, Hitler and Mein Kamph remain popular across the Middle East, and among Palestinians. In 1999 for example, Mein Kampf was “sixth on the Palestinian best-seller list."[335] Recently a Palestinian journalist was fired from the BBC for posting that “Hitler was right.” (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/05/23/bbc-investigating-palestinian-journalist-tweeted-hitler-right/) There is a deluge of posts on Facebook, TicToc etc by Palestinians proclaiming their love for Hitler In Gaza there is a fashion store named Hitler. Young Palestinians who visited the shop told Reuters they were drawn to the place as a symbol of their solidarity "The name of the shop is 'Hitler' and I like him because he was the most anti Jewish person.” (https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/name-of-shop-is-hitler-and-i-like-him-because-he-was-the-most-anti-jewish-person-432190) and in June, 2021, the “official Palestinian Authority daily Al-Hayat Al-Jadida had warm words for a member of the Atwan family who chose to name his son Eichmann, after SS-Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann, one of the key Nazi major officials who propagated the Holocaust.” (https://www.jwire.com.au/pa-official-daily-lauds-family-who-named-son-eichmann-to-anger-zionism/).
This popularity is iconic. It is not because of the political and economic theories laid out in Mein Kampf, it is due solely to Hitler’s hatred and murder of Jews, a hatred and a goal shared by far too many. They continue to recognise in him a kindred spirit. This again gives lie to the idea that Palestinians are anti-Zionist, but not anti-Jewish. Had they been so, they would have opposed Hitler and hoped that the Jews remained happy in Germany.
This support highlights the hypocrisy of the many Arab calls for Jews to “go back to Europe.” They supported the Nazis in Europe! “Go back to where we supported your murderers” means only one thing – widespread Arab support for eliminationist anti-Semitism.
Intercommunal relations after the Revolt, after WW2, before the War of 1948
From the heights of the CMAs in 1919, Christian/Muslim relations had reached their nadir by the end of the Revolt. Mutual distrust and intercommunal acts of violence, overwhelmingly Muslim against Christian, became common. After the Revolt, relations settled down somewhat. The Christian communities went out of their way to swear fealty to the Muslim majority, under the banner of nationalism. The Muslims meanwhile were becoming increasingly focused on the looming war with the Jewish community, and likewise had less reason to rock the boat.
The anthem of the Orthodox Union Club, Jerusalem, 1942 declared; “We are the army of the nation … Arab is our core, brothers in the jihad … our blood is for the country.”[336] In 1944, the Union of Arab Orthodox Clubs decided to adopt a logo. All patterns considered combined a cross with the Palestinian flag. The majority of Union committee members rejected them all, “if an emblem with a symbol of the cross is adopted, … their Moslem brothers would become angry.” “Christians of all denominations, who had witnessed the increase in sectarian violence and communal identification during the Revolt, even the Orthodox community, whose members had generally insisted on their Arab-ness, were shaken by the increased anti-Christian sentiments.”[337]
Muslim Arabs during this time also complained about the Christians. There was a decrease in Muslim/Christian violence, but the rift from the Revolt continued. Arif al-Arif, the district commissioner in Beersheba, spoke against Arab Christians. They held too many government jobs, and “cheated” on the Muslims, putting on “the national cloak as an excuse,” but in reality, shying away from open revolt or sacrificing anything important. “Zionist intelligence also claimed that Arab Christians were fearful of Muslims: ‘Jews who are close to the Christian circles’, a 1941 report suggested, say that ‘Christians are starting to fear that the Muslims will inflict punishment on them when the opportunity arises.’ A report from Tiberias in the same year attributed Christians’ ‘lack of loyalty’ directly to Muslim pressure on that community, suggesting that the two ideas are directly connected, without revealing which one drove the other. An informant recounted a conversation he had with a Christian mukhtar in Bethlehem about recent ‘cases of theft by Muslims’. As he spoke, the report explains, ‘one could sense the fear in which Christians live because of Muslims. Although [Christians] are a majority in Bethlehem, in the region they’re a minority and that puts them under constant fear.’”[338]
The imploding
situation still did not lead any Christian institutions to question their
fundamental loyalties. “Christians were no more likely that the Muslims to
support the Zionists.”[339] Interestingly, with
nationalism having failed to provide an embracing, secular identity in which
Palestinian Christians could live as equals, a significant number of Christians
now turned to the Arab Communist party in the hope that it in turn would
deliver a secular alternative. Arab Orthodox comprised 50% of its membership
into the 1960s.[340]
In 1940 the Melkite Bishop Hajjar died and was replaced by the Reverend George Hakim as the new Melkite bishop of Galilee. He continued Hajjar’s tight-rope act of both strongly supporting Palestinian nationalism while also trying to stand up for the rights of his confessional community. In 1945, he appealed to the British for help against what he called “anti- Melkite activities” in some villages in the Galilee. Having asked for British help, he then blamed the British occupation for increased hostilities between Muslims and Christians (who had lived “for hundreds of years past in perfect harmony”), and demanded that the government step in to protect the Christian population. He further wrote that he had worked with the Muslims of the area to alleviate anti-Christian behaviour, and had even paid a large sum to them, but his efforts were in vain. “Despite this issue, there is no evidence that the Melkite community diverged from its consistent support for the national project. Bishop Hakim continued to present the Melkite position as identical to that of the rest of the Palestinian community.”[341]
In early 1946,
speaking on behalf of the Christian Arabs of Palestine, Reverend Hakim made a
statement before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. His prepared speech
had no objective other than to demonstrate Christian solidarity with Muslims.
He began by asserting that in spite of being Christian, he was an Arab;
“I am an Arab and my connections with the Byzantine Church do not deprive me of
being an Arab with Arab blood running in my veins-just as an Englishman is
English whether he is Roman Catholic or Anglican.”[342]
Beyond that, he
“limited his statement” to three points, which clarified the basis and extent
of Christian involvement in the nationalist movement.
First, that "the
Christian Arab in Palestine had everything in common with their Moslem brethren
and that religious beliefs did not in any way make of them two peoples."
Second, that
"Zionism was a menace to the Christian as well as to the Moslem population
in Palestine.
Third, that "the
Zionists claim to Palestine was based on Biblical promises in the Old Testament
and that all promises given to the
people of Israel in the Old Testament have been annulled by the advent of
Christ.”
The Reverend Nikola al-Khury, Secretary of the Arab Greek Orthodox Clergy, immediately added that: “we Christian Arabs in Palestine are very happy living in this country with our Moslem brethren. We are being treated well, and we have been living for hundreds of years amicably together, with no differences between us, and our Holy Places have been guarded, and we have no molestation from any sect so far. I believe that the country should be left to its inhabitants, whoever they are, as they are living well together. As far as the Moslems and Christians are concerned, we have been living very well together, and there have been no differences between us for many hundreds of years. We are all as one nation.”[343] As already noted, Anglican Bishop Stewart also wrote to the Anglo-American Committee in March 1946 that “there was no truth to the Zionist claims to Palestine, based on Old Testament history and prophecies. As far as the Christian understanding is concerned, the church became the new spiritual Israel and heir to the promises, where racial and other barriers are broken down.”[344]
So, a year after the situation
between Melkites and the Muslim majority were so bad that, after bribes had
failed, he was compelled to ask the British for help, Reverend Hakim told the public
Inquiry that they were one with the Muslims, and the Secretary of the Arab
Greek Orthodox Clergy likewise proclaimed that “As far as the Moslems and
Christians are concerned, we have been living very well together, and there
have been no differences between us for many hundreds of years.” That is, they
lied in open inquiry to spare their communities further violence. They embraced
their slavery and affirmed their dhimmitude. They and the Anglican Bishop all
opposed Jewish self-determination in religious terms, thereby affirming the
theological anti-Semitism common to all three, Orthodox, Catholic and
Protestant.
In May 1946, the AHC and the opposing 'Arab Higher Front' were replaced with the AHE ('Arab Higher Executive') to represent Palestinian Arabs. The chairman of the AHE was Haj Amin al Husseini.[345]
In 1947 at meeting of Arab Orthodox clergy in Jerusalem, Reverend Ya’qub al-Hanna stated; “the hour has struck to participate with the people in repelling the dangers encircling the dear homeland.” The Conference sent out 3 telegrams; 1st to the Arab Higher Executive, led by Haj Amin al-Husseini (the wanted Nazi war criminal!) expressing “absolute confidence in its leadership”, and announcing “to the whole world the cooperation of the Arab Orthodox Community in weal and woe, with its sister, the dear Muslim community.” 3rd to the British High Commissioner, the community “supports the faithful leaders and the Arab Higher Executive, and rejects partition categorically, announcing its preparedness to safeguard Palestine’s Arabism and the Holy Places at any cost.”[346]
The Arab Anglicans also pushed a strong nationalist agenda throughout the 1940s. Bishop Stewart (who also opposed a Jewish state) feared that “their nationalist spirit is both strong and wrong.”[347] “However Bishop Weston Henry Stewart, who was in Palestine during the 1948 war, protested a pro-Arab document circulated by the Christian Church Union in Palestine that claimed the Christian community was ‘in complete agreement both in principle and in deed with the Moslems[sic]’ and was signed by members of the Arab-Anglican community.”[348]
“There is no
evidence that the Melkite community diverged from its consistent support for
the national project.”[349]
In 1947 the Latin Patriarch’s secretary wrote to the AHC assuring it that they would never sell land to the Jews.[350]
After the War, as noted, there was no change of heart, no repentance. No grief that millions had indeed died, just as the Jewish community had been so desperately saying. No shame that multitudes had died who might have lived, had the Palestinians not closed their hearts and borders to them. Rather, there was a continued total affirmation of the Nationalist/Muslim agenda, and public proclamations of loyalty to the known war criminal who led it. Their only response once the horrors of the Holocaust were known was to publicly support an enthusiastic advocate of that very Holocaust! The Latin Catholics, meanwhile, the official representatives of the Vatican, felt compelled to inform this wanted Nazi war criminal that they would in no way help the Jewish survivors of said Holocaust. No guilt, no remorse.
In the fleeting years
of 1945-47, the consequences of what they had done in working to prevent Jews
finding refuge among them in the 1930s, combined with the Muslim majority
opting for the leadership of a Nazi war criminal did not cause the Christian
communities to re-think the direction they had chosen. While many Palestinian
villages throughout the country signed “non-aggression pacts”[351]
with Jewish villages, in violation of the Arab national leadership, no such
overtures or peace feelers were extended by the Christian communities. Given a
last chance to reconsider their ways, and the starkest of choices over whom to
follow, they hardened their hearts, excluded compassion and doubled down on
wickedness. And then war engulfed them.
Jeremiah 13:16-17 “Give glory to the LORD your God before he brings the
darkness, before your feet stumble on the darkening hills. You hope for light,
but he will turn it to thick darkness and change it to deep gloom.
But if you do not listen, I will weep in secret because of your pride;
my eyes will weep bitterly, overflowing with tears, because the LORD's flock
will be taken captive.”
A different option
In 1945, the Christian Arab community could have said to the Jewish refugees; “In 1936 we ignored your cries for help, we shut our doors in your faces, and now we know that you died there in your millions. Please forgive us, come, take the best of the land (Genesis 45:18), come, your survivors will always have a home with us.” Had the Palestinian Christians shown mercy and generosity to the struggling Jewish refugees, what a blessing might have resulted! What unbreakable bonds of friendship and love might have been forged! They would always have had an honoured place within the land of Israel. See the endless mutual generosity, mutual blessing in the economy of God! Jews are blessed through Gentiles, Gentiles are blessed through Jews, all together praising God! God indeed has no favourites (Romans 2:11), rather we are in an endless cycle of love and affirmation!
Franklin Littell wrote concerning the Christians during the Holocaust; “Those Jews who suffered and died in Hitler’s Europe perished for what the Christians would have suffered for had they remained Christians: the truth that the initiative, the direction and the judgment of history lies in the hands of the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. The Jew was recognized by the Adversary, the enemy of humanity, even when he did not (personally) understand himself, as a sign of the Holy One of Israel. The Christian, who had been grafted into that history by virtue of his baptism, could take on again the protective coloration of heathen ethnicity, could betray his baptism and retreat into non-history, could become an apostate and betrayer. And millions did so, leaving the Jews of the first covenant and a few faithful Christians of the second covenant exposed to the wrath and destruction of the demonic power in whose countenance confessors like Barth and Bonhoeffer recognized the outlines of the Anti-Christ ... For the Christian, the agony of the religious crisis is the inescapable record that while the church ran away in the hour of her visitation, the Jewish people bore the burden of being witnesses in the flesh to the Truth which both peoples professed with their lips. And now the voice of our brother’s blood cries out to God from the ground.”
The Palestinian Christians likewise found themselves
in a profoundly difficult situation. They (especially their leaders) had
recourse to their faith, to their understandings of God and history, yet they
chose to respond as Arabs, rather than as Christians, and their leaders
encouraged this! That the mainline church denominations in Europe and America
now support them in this is a doubling down on their own complicity in the
Holocaust.
“If you suffer, it
should not be as a murderer or thief or any other kind of criminal, or even as
a meddler. However, if you suffer as a Christian, do not be ashamed, but praise
God that you bear that name.” Christians are repeated warned; “do not be
conformed to this world … go beyond the city walls … narrow is the path.”
1948
James 1:15 “and sin, when it is full-grown, gives
birth to death.”
Two adjectives never used to describe the Palestinian Christian communities were “warlike” and “violent.” Thirteen hundred years of being forbidden to bear arms, and having to endure endless robberies, rapes and other humiliations were in part responsible for this. Christian marriages were required by Islamic law to be quiet, while the Muslim marriages were full of guns being fired into the air. Equally, full equality came under British rule, which stressed the rule of law. They were urban middle class, with no tradition of arms. While their enthusiastic support for the General Strike would be indirectly responsible for countess deaths, they had not participated in the more violent aspects of the Arab Revolt. All of which virtually guaranteed that they would fail to carry their weight in a cause to which they were fully committed, the Palestinian side of the 1948 war between Arabs and Jews.
“The Christians, concentrated in the towns, were generally wealthier and better educated. They prospered under the Mandate.”[352] “It is likely that the majority of Christians would have preferred the continuation of the British Mandate to independence under Husseini rule; some may even have preferred Jewish rule. All were aware of the popular Muslim chant: ‘After Saturday, Sunday’ (meaning after we take care of the Jews it will be the Christians’ turn). To compensate, Christian community leaders repeatedly went out of their way to express devotion to the Palestinian national cause; indeed, a coterie of Christian notables was prominent in the Husseini camp.”[353]
As the level of violence increased, many
Christians, scarred by the failure of an inclusive Arab identity, and fearful
and mistrustful of any future in Palestine, sold up and left. For the majority
who stayed, increasing random violence and failure of basic municipal services
bore witness to the escalating degradation of life as it had been. Gangs of
irregular Muslim fighters, some hired from Palestinian villages, others armed
groups from Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, were suddenly everywhere, purportedly to
fight the Jews. They came from cultures where plunder was still held to be a
worthy aim of battle,[354] and their feelings of
loyalty or kinship with urban middle-class Christians were virtually zero. The
Christians indeed were more likely to be plundered than protected. This in turn
further weakened the Christians desire and ability to take part themselves in
the armed struggle, even as their religious leaders proclaimed their devotion
to the Arab nation. In truth the Christians had been feeling increasingly
marginalized since they failed to join in the Great Revolt, and Muslim
suspicions of them only grew during this war.
“When the battles began, interfaith tension
worsened.”[355]
“In 1948, as some Muslims had anticipated, the
Christian community leaders, notably in Haifa and Jaffa, by and large were far
less belligerent than their Muslim counterparts. Zionist leaders repeatedly
tried to exploit the rift[356] but at the last moment
the Christians almost always shied away from advancing from conciliatory
private assurances to moderate public action. During the first weeks of the
war, Christian-Muslim relations deteriorated against the backdrop of
Jewish-Arab violence and Muslim suspicions that the Christians were
collaborating or might collaborate with the Jews. A report in Jerusalem found; ‘The
Christians continue to complain about bad behaviour by Arabs towards them. Many
of them wish to leave their homes. The gang members [i.e., Arab irregulars]
indeed threaten to kill them after they finish with the Jews.’ The Christians
further complained that the Muslims were ‘incapable of any sort of organisation
and every activity turns into robbery. The only ones capable of organising are
the Christians and they are denied access to these positions [of power].”[357]
“There were Muslims
who argued that the Christians did not take part in the national struggle and
ignored the boycott of the Jews. Sometimes it was true. On the other hand, the centrality
of Islam in the Palestinian national movement was among the reasons for this
alienation.”[358]
“There were Druze and Christians who feared that,
after an Arab victory, the Muslim’s weapons would be directed at them. This was
sufficient reason for them not to take part in the fighting.”[359]
In Jaffa, the situation between the Muslims and the
Christians was “not good, though outwardly appearances of coerced friendship
were maintained. …there was no contact (apart from commercial relations)
between the two communities … The Christians hearts now and generally are not
with the rioting, because most of them are in commerce and might be harmed.”[360] By early February, Jaffa had no "housing for the refugees and no
hospitalization for the wounded, and commerce was paralysed. ... In Jerusalem
there was complete chaos. The fighting had deepened the traditional
Muslim-Christian rift. In Jerusalem, the Christians were eager to leave, but
the Muslims threatened to confiscate or destroy their property. Outside the
town, Muslim villagers overran the monasteries at Beit Jimal and Mar Saba, in
the former "robbing and burning property," in the latter
"murdering [monks] and robbing." The daughter, living in England, of
one middle-class Muslim, identified as "Dr. Canaan" — possibly Tawfiq
Canaan, a well-known physician, political writer, and folklorist — of Musrara
(Jerusalem), wrote to her father: "Yes, daddy, it is shameful that all the
Christian Arabs are fleeing the country and taking out their money."[361]
In February 1948, a
Muslim leader in a national committee called all Christians “traitors and pimps
for the Jews.”[362] The Christians of Haifa
were accused of treason, and a battalion commander in the Arab Liberation Army
ordered that only Muslim volunteers be allowed in his unit.[363] This inter-communal
tension affected the cities’ morale.[364] Christians in Nazareth
and the Orthodox in Jerusalem formed their own defence forces.[365]
All this did not lead the Christian communities to aid the Zionists. “Yet as Arab Christians show over and over throughout the Mandate, fears of intercommunal violence did not lead Christians to aid Zionists during the war. Rather, the Christian community rallied against Zionist aggression.”[366]
In March 48, the heads the Greek Orthodox, Latin, Coptic, Anglican, Melkite, Armenian and Maronite churches in Jaffa wrote to the High Commissioner complaining about acts of violence from the Zionists.[367] In June (shortly after the declaration of Israeli statehood), the Christian Union “composed entirely of Arab Clergy who identified themselves completely with the aims of the Arab Higher Committee” was established.[368]
The North
Early in the
1948 war, Arab Christians in the Nazareth district were robbed by Husseini
gangs, forcing many to flee to Lebanon.[369] Already in early November 1947, an official reported chaos in the
largely Arab-staffed Nazareth District administration; the offices had ceased
to function. “The Christians in Nazareth, among them most of the high officials
in the district administration, live in fear for their property and lives (in
this order) from the Muslims. The Husseini terror has increased lately, and
large sums of money are extorted from the Christians. Christians with means are
trying to flee the country, especially to Lebanon and the United States."[370]
According to the IDF, in July 48, during the Ten
Days truce, many of the Nazareth townspeople were unhappy with the ALA [Arab
Liberation Army], "who had behaved tyrannically toward them . . . especially
toward the Christians."[371] Against the backdrop of ALA demoralization and disintegration and the
flight of Husseini-supporting families, Israeli agents maintained continuous
contact with Nazareth's notables about a quiet surrender. Nazareth, with its
Christian majority, had traditionally been non-belligerent toward the Yishuv
(though sometime in June or early July some locals had murdered a Jewish farmer
and dragged his body through the streets behind a motorcycle, to the cheers of
bystanders), and the IDF had no reason to unleash its firepower on the town.[372]
Nazareth fell on 16
July, almost without a fight. Thousands of inhabitants, most of them Muslims,
streamed out, in cars and by foot … "A wave of true happiness passed over
the town, joy mixed with dread in expectation of what was to come. The
inhabitants really were joyful that they were rid of the regime of tyranny and
humiliation of the [ALA] Iraqi [troops] who used to hit, curse, shoot, and jail
the quiet inhabitants without reason. The dread stemmed from [fear] lest the
reports they had received about Jewish behaviour in previously occupied areas
should prove true;[373]
In Galilee, Christian villagers were more likely to avoid resistance and stay in their homes. They (therefore) also received better treatment than the Muslims. “A number of Israeli officials specifically noted this difference and encouraged better treatment of Christians than Muslims.”[374] “Christian villages, which were usually friendly or not hostile to the Yishuv (Jewish community), were generally left in peace by Yishuv forces.”[375] In operation Hiram, 1948, most Moslems fled to Lebanon, most Christians stayed.[376] Also during operation Hiram, twelve Christians were executed by the Israeli forces.[377] In general, they were less likely to resist Israeli forces, and also less likely to be expelled.
Shefaʿamr
The history of the small village of Shefaʿamr traces the history of
Muslim/Christian relations during the Mandate. They began with Christian
solidarity for a Muslim religious cause;
In 1929, “Muslim, Christian and Druze representatives
from Shefaʿamr
(where there was a Christian majority) gave the issue [Muslim riots at the
Western Wall] a nationalist interpretation by confirming their support for Arab claims to al-Buraq”[378] The relationship soured, however, and
in October 1946, Arab boycott inspectors in Shefa’amr found Jewish goods
in two businesses, one owned by a Christian, the other by a Muslim. The
Christian was humiliated in public and forced to pay a fine. No action was taken
against the Muslim. The inhabitants were convinced that this was religious
discrimination. Another resident
reported a wave of thefts against Christians, justified on the basis that the
goods came from Zionists.[379] In February 1947, after the murder of a Christian by Muslims in the
village of Shafa ‘Amr, inter-communal relations there became toxic. “The mutual
boycott between Christians and Muslims is stronger than that between the Arabs
and the Jews. Therefore the Christians are thinking of leaving Shafa ‘Amr and
building for themselves a new village.”[380] In July 1948, in Shefa’amr, the Christian mayor encouraged the Druze and
Christians to stay, while the Muslim minority fled.[381]
Haifa
“Every effort is being made by the Jews to persuade
the Arab population to stay and carry on with their normal lives, to get their
shops and businesses open and to be assured that their lives and interests will
be safe.” British district superintendent of Police, April 1948[382]
Of the three main cities, Haifa had the most
problematic relations between its Christians and Muslims yet was also a centre
of Christian nationalistic support for an Arab Palestine. Reality had not
behaved in the way their ideology had hoped for. Inter-communal relations had
worsened after the murder of al-Bahri. The local Muslim community had never
shown real interest in friendship and were quick to make accusation of
disloyalty towards the Christians. For all this, the Christians would
nevertheless abandon their homes and livelihoods and follow the Muslims into
self-imposed exile.
At the start of 1948, Haifa had about 70,000 Arabs
and 74,000 Jews. Of the Arabs, there were about 40,000 Muslims and 30,000
Christians. From as early as October 47, the British noted the leaving of Arab
notables and their families from the city. These people generally believed that
war was coming, and that while the Arab forces (probably those of the
surrounding Arab states) would win, it would be messy and dangerous, and wise to
be elsewhere while this occurred. A month before the
UN Partition resolution, a meeting of Christian leaders resolved to set up a
Christian militia to “protect the lives and property of the Christians.
Outwardly the call [for recruits] would be to prepare for attacks by the Jews,
but in truth they want to defend themselves against attacks that the Muslims
might launch against them if a situation of anarchy prevails during the
withdrawal of the British army.”[383] By November, “many
Arabs” were reported to be “evacuating their families to neighbouring Arab
countries in anticipation of the disorder they foresee.” By mid-December, the
number who had left had risen to between 15 and 20,000, and it increased to
25,000 in January. Karsh notes that Haifa’s “Muslims and Christians [led] a
mutually antagonistic and largely segregated existence.” As urban Arab life
crumbled, each community withdrew further into itself for self-preservation.
“The Christians, erecting clear boundaries between
themselves and the Muslims, refused to feed the Arab Liberation Army’s Syrian
Lebanese and Iraqi fighters.” They also declared that they would not initiate
violence with the Jewish forces and established a special guard to protect
themselves from Muslim violence.[384] When supporters of the
Mufti broke a local truce and bombed a Jewish commercial centre, a new wave of
hundreds of mostly Christian families left. As the situation in Haifa worsened
further, a group of Christian residents beat up a group of Arab fighters who
were trying to use their street to shell Jewish targets.[385] In March, the AHC
ordered the removal of women and children from Haifa.[386] Shabtai Levy, mayor of
Haifa, who had tried to negotiate a local truce in December 47, now issued
another plea to his Arab colleagues to return to the city.[387] On the eve of renewed
fighting, sparked by news of a British withdrawal from major parts of the city,
the Arab military commander and two of his deputies also fled the city,
prompting a new wave of Arab departures.
On April 22, 1948, after having been defeated
militarily in Haifa, the remaining Arab leadership (a mixture of Muslim and Christian
notables, led by the local Muslim Brotherhood leader, Sheikh Murad) asked the British to negotiate a
truce with the Jews. Under the auspices of the
British, the
leaders of its Arab community then met with the
leaders of the Jewish community. The Jewish community offered them a future “as
equal and free citizens of Haifa.”[388] The Jewish Mayor,
Shabtai Levi, further expressed his desire that the two communities continue to
“live in peace and friendship” and gave “an impassioned plea for peace
and reconciliation.” After breaking to consult,
the Arab notables, now all Christian,[389] re-assembled and stated
that could not sign the truce, and that the Arab population wished to evacuate
Haifa. Levi begged them to reconsider, he said they should not leave the city
“where they had lived for hundreds of years, where their forefathers were buried,
and where, for so long, they had lived in peace and brotherhood with the Jews.”
Both the Jewish mayor and the commander of the Jewish forces in Haifa
then asked the Arab negotiators to reconsider this course of action. They said
they were committing “a cruel crime against their own people”, and that, if
they stayed, “they would enjoy equality and peace.” The British mediator at the
talks added; “You have made a foolish decision. Think it over, as you will
regret it afterwards. You must accept the decision of the Jews. They are fair
enough. Don’t permit life to be destroyed senselessly. After all, it was you
who began the fighting and the Jews have won.” The truce terms included that
Arabs were expected to “carry on their work as equal and free citizens of
Haifa.” The Christian Arab leaders replied that they had no
choice, and within a few days, only 3,000 Arabs remained within the city.
Strenuous efforts were then made by the Jewish community to convince the Arab population to stay.[390] Bizarrely, the Arab leadership saw the departure (rather than agreeing to a truce), as a victory, and the Jewish community saw their leaving as a defeat. Force was used by the Arab leadership to compel some Arabs to leave. For example, “shortly after announcing their intention to remain in their workplace, the Christian employees of the British army’s northern headquarters began leaving en masse. Asked for the reason for their sudden change of heart, they said they had been threatened with severe punishment if they did not leave.”[391]
“Without doubt, the notables were chary of agreeing to surrender terms out of fear they would be dubbed traitors or collaborators by the AHC.” One of the participants subsequently told how they had been instructed or brow-beaten by Sheikh Murad, who did not participate in this second part of the townhall gathering, to adopt this rejectionist position.”[392]
The reasons for the Arab decision to evacuate Haifa were stated at the time. The British withdrawal was almost complete, and once they left, the Arab armies of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon would invade. Better to leave for a few days, than sign a treaty with the soon to be defeated Jews. The Palestinian militias might have lost their battle with the Jewish forces, but the Arab armies were expected to win.[393] One of the Arab negotiators told his Jewish counterpart; “they had instructions not to sign the truce … as this would mean certain death at the hands of their own people, particularly the Muslim leaders guided by the Mufti.”
Flight
Mass departures prior to the violence were by no means confined to the Christian population. Across Palestine, the drift of the middle class out of Palestine, especially the sending of their sons to get them away from the war, concerned the AHC. On March 8, the Mufti raised the issue with the governments of Lebanon, Syria and Egypt. He wrote about the preference “of a great number of Palestine’s sons to leave their cities and settle in neighbouring Arab countries.” He wrote that the AHC had decided that no one would henceforth be allowed to leave Palestine without it approval, and that “the numerous Palestinians who had left since the start of the fighting” were to be compelled in the national interest to return. Typical of the corruption that has always been endemic to the Palestinian leadership, the Lebanese consul to Jerusalem wrote in the same month of the growing bitterness among the population towards the AHC, whose leaders were fleeing the country.[394] It is hard not to contrast this with the moral seriousness of the Israelis. At the end of his last meeting with her, the British High Commissioner spoke with Golda Meir about her family. “I understand your daughter is in a kibbutz in the Negev. There will be war and they stand no chance in those settlements. The Egyptians will move through them no matter how hard they fight. Why not bring her home to Jerusalem?” Golda Meir replied “Thank you, but all the boys and girls in those settlements have mothers. If all of them take their children home, who will stop the Egyptians?”[395]
Also, while not a majority, many Arabs (not just
the Christians), including many regional leaders throughout Palestine rejected
the leadership of Amin Husseini, and did not take part in the attacks upon the
Jewish community in 1947/8. Hillel Cohen notes the “very low participation of
Arabs in the armed struggle against the Jews in 1948 … Only a few thousand
Palestinians out of a population of 1.3 million volunteered for the Arab
Liberation Army led by Fawzi al-Qawuqji, or the local militias that went by the
name Holy Jihad. It also helps explain the non-aggression pacts that were
reached between Jewish and Arab villages throughout the country, in violation
of the Arab national leadership’s orders.”[396] Regardless,
the passivity and flight of the Christian community was noticed and denounced
by the Muslim majority.
Other options
Unlike their
denominational leaders, the Palestinian Christian population was far from
monolithic. Different individuals and different communities explored different
possibilities. A few Christians did work
with the Israeli forces.[397] Such heretics have
been largely ignored and forgotten. A Haganah list from the mid- 1940s of Arabs
with a "tendency to cooperation with the Jews" included "many .
. . Christians" but few Muslims.[398] The same report
continues; “The reason for this is that the Christians suffered a great deal
under the Muslims . . . But there are few willing to express their opinion
publicly for fear of the reaction of the Muslims.”[399]
In general however, the Christians continued to state their support for the Palestinian cause but were also more likely to surrender to the Jews. This again led to charges of disloyalty. Christians were accused of having aided the Western 'imperialist' powers in establishing the state of Israel. In Jerusalem though, Christians fared no better than their Muslim neighbours.[400] Those Christians who did stay in Israel were also accused of adjusting too easily to their new circumstances. Even now, among Israeli-Arabs, Christians are generally seen as being more moderate, and in fact, they have been known in some cases to volunteer to serve in the Israeli army.
In other cases,
resentment was felt over the fact that Christian refugees tended to be absorbed
into the larger existing populations much faster than Muslim ones. At the same
time, many Christians, particularly from the Orthodox and Protestant Anglican communities,
have continued to act on behalf of the nationalist cause, even in some cases,
taking part in and leading militant activities.
Conclusion
Once again, the
Christians would not abandon the cause they failed to aid. Why did the majority
of Palestinian Christians publicly and loudly affirm their total solidarity
with the Muslims against the Jews? Why for example did the Christian
communities of Haifa flee with the Muslims rather than stay with their homes
and jobs, under an honourable peace with the Jews? There are several answers to
this. Many, especially among the early evacuees, left because they could see a
better long-term future for their families in South America or elsewhere. Of
those who left in April, some were forced out by Muslim threats, others by a
belief in the standard Arab view of the time that a violent war was coming, and
it would be better to be elsewhere during it, and to return after the Arab
armies had destroyed the Jews, still others left because they also believed in
the Arab victory and were afraid of Muslim retaliation if they stayed. For
many, it was a combination of all of the above. The Christians of Haifa had
been the first to object to the Jewish return. They were not close to the
Muslim population, but the idea of siding with the despised Jews against the
Arab cause, the idea that the Jews might actually win against the massed Arab
armies, was simply unthinkable. Everything in their past and present spoke
against it.
Whatever the reason, in general the Christian Palestinians would neither fight with the Muslims, nor stay without them. They proved incapable of acting decisively on their own behalf. They were incapable of waging either war or peace. They would remain what they had always been, impotent dhimmis. A minority despised and mistrusted by the Muslim majority they reluctantly left everything to follow.
From 1919-1939, Christian Arabs moved from being a full part of the Arab nation back to being dhimmis of their Muslim overlords. The shock of the Muslim Ottoman empire being replaced by “Christian” British and French rulers, and the sudden usefulness of their Christian minority enabled the golden years of the MCAs. With the rise of the Supreme Muslim Council, the World Islamic Conference, and, at the grass roots level, the popularist al-Qassam movement, this brief age was over. From now on, they would be increasingly despised, perceived as disloyal, and periodically threatened. The same pattern, in fact, as was being played out across the Arab Muslim world, both then and through to today. Across the Middle East, Christian communities would continue to be annihilated. For the Palestinian Christian community, the one saving factor was Zionism, the return of the Jewish people to their homeland. The Christian British then American support for this movement meant that the local Christians, who had initially raised the alarm, could be very useful in attacking the religious basis for that support within those nations. This was a role the local Christians and Churches were only too happy to play – they not only believed in it, it also gave them a paper-thin commonality with and usefulness to the Muslim masses that their co-religionists in the rest of the Arab world lacked.
Historical summary
From 1831 to 1948, the sectarian communities of Palestine lived through a cascade of tumultuous event. The previous 1300 years had taught the Christians a humiliating, servile obedience to their Muslim masters. The Muslims had likewise learned to treat all others with utter contempt; the Christians existed for Muslims to rob, rape and murder. Any objections to this would be answered with genocide. Into this situation, under western pressure which also saw the opening of western mission schools, came first the Tanzimat reforms, granting equality to all. This led to those Christians who had indeed been educated in those schools suddenly rising socially and financially, and actually prospering. This in turn enraged the Muslim majority. The reforms were cancelled, and the seeds of the 1880-1921 genocide of over one and a half million Christians were planted.
The very weakness which led to the Ottomans granting such reforms in the first place persisted, however, and as Ottomanism and Turkish rule faded, Arab nationalism was seen by both Palestinian Muslims and Christians as the way forward. For Muslims because it promised a return to an Arab Caliphate and to the good old days before the reforms, and to the Christians because secular nationalism, as practiced in the west, held out the hope of a more equal relationship with the majority Muslim community; “we are all Arabs, regardless of our religion.”
Having already experimented with such a strategy during the dying days of the Ottoman rule, and especially through the terrifying early days of World War 1, the Christians then carried it over into the new shock, that of Christian British rule during the Mandate. This new upset seemingly put the whole Muslim/Christian relationship up for re-negotiation. MCA’s were formed, Arab unity was treasured, and the Christians rejoiced. The Muslim motivation for this however was not Christian happiness (at best an irrelevance to them) but rather the shock of the loss of Islamic rule, and the emergent threat of Zionism. As go-betweens to the English, their Christians had become useful.
Failing Jewish migration in the mid-20s, and the murder of a Christian notable by a Muslim leader in 1930 served to clarify this new nationalistic relationship for both the Muslims and the Christians. Failing Jewish migration lessened the external threat, and therefore the value of Christian intercession. Its temporary and wholly pragmatic nature became evident to both. The specifically Muslim riots of 1929, and the murder of al-Bahri showed up even more clearly the limits of any Christian/Muslim partnership. It must be based on Muslim (not Palestinian or Arab) issues, and any hopes of equality were gone. For the Christians, a return to dhimmitude, as the only basis for an unequal coexistence re-emerged. That, or emigration.
In all this, the other obvious possibility for a
minority was never explored. An alliance with the new and growing power of the
Jews. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, the Christians, especially
the numerically dominant Orthodox, lived as a minority within Muslim villages
and suburbs. They were far more intermingled than the more discrete Druze. A
pact with the Zionists would therefore see riots and the losses of their
property and many lives. Pre-dating this concern, and far more importantly, it
never occurred to the Christians because if the Muslims had spent 1400 years hating
and despising them, the Christians had spent 1900 years hating and despising
the Jews. They actually led the Muslims in their rejection of a larger Jewish
presence. They would prefer what they knew, a grovelling dhimmitude to Muslims,
rather than explore equal or near equal relations with the Jews. Even though
their own religion contained the promise of a Jewish restoration that would be
a blessing to all mankind, and also commanded them to love the stranger and
their neighbour. At the end of the day, they would prefer to be abused by
Muslims than to be embraced by Jews.
This above all is the catastrophe, or nakba of
Palestinian Christianity.
Discussion
We can see the Christian community in Palestine behaving
as a minority community, stressing commonalities and hoping to avoid violence. A local bishop at the 2018 Christ at the Checkpoint stated that Christians should
not witness to Muslims or Jews. (Arab Anglicans refusal to share their faith
goes back to the 1900s).
What we do not see is any of the Christian communities
responding (morally or theologically) as Christians! Palestinian
Christians (rightly?) complain that they have been largely invisible to
Christian Zionists, but as far as their faith is concerned, Palestinian
Christians have all too often, by their own deeds, chosen to be invisible. As
already seen, there could be enormous significance and blessings for them if
they can now place Christ, and not their own ethnicity, first. Equally we need
to acknowledge that the Western churches likewise failed in this area, and
under far less stress than that faced by the Palestinian Christians. This is a
Christian problem, not just a Palestinian Christian one!
In general, the local Christian communities in the
Land of Israel did not show compassion and welcome to refugees fleeing certain
death, did not then show love to their Jewish neighbours, and are presently
waging a campaign of spiritual and political opposition to the Jewish state.
Their official support for the BDS also means in practical terms that they
desire their people to neither buy from nor sell to their Jewish neighbours.
Rather than encouraging social contacts, sports meetings etc, in a hope of
overcoming hatred, they have chosen to support the opposite.
They did not deviate from their earlier,
supersessionist founding and history.[401] God’s promises to the
Jewish people, found within the Scriptures the Christians also claim to revere,
do not seem to have played any role whatever in influencing how the Palestinian
Christians initially viewed the return of the Jewish people. They never seem to
have wondered if this might, indeed, be of God. Instead, it was called a great
catastrophe – a great catastrophe of faith! Nor were they encouraged to do so
by their expatriate governing religious bodies. Theirs was an almost inevitable
failure, as, like the majority of their co-religionists in Europe, they
betrayed their baptism and retreated into the protective colouration of their
ethnicity.
This is the story of the Palestinian churches.
Rather than seeking council in the words of their God, they chose to be like
the nations. False pride in their flesh, (“we are the original church”) a false
defining themselves by their ethnicity (“we are Arabs”), not their faith
(“their mind is on earthly things”), disobeying the commands God’s re
witnessing, and re hospitality, a refusal to acknowledge the promises of God to
Israel.
Conclusion
Some Palestinian
Christians believe that within Christian Zionism, God either wants them gone,
or ignores them – nothing could be further from the truth! They are in fact in
a place of enormous blessing and responsibility! But by acting in selfishness
and out of fear of men, many have squandered the promises God had waiting for
them! Christian Zionism believes that no fight between Jews and Palestinians
was ever necessary – that the return of the Jewish people could have been (and
for many Christian Israeli Arabs, has been) a blessing for both peoples. It is
only as Palestinians opposed the Jewish return that Christian Zionism finds reason
to grieve. Christian Palestinians need to reject the narrative that says this
conflict is inevitable – they could then live this out, by showing love and
welcome to the Jewish communities within the West Bank, rejecting BDS, and
gladly trade with their Jewish neighbours.
They ask; “where are we?” in Christian Zionism. To be honest, they (and we!!) had 1800 years to ask this question! “Are you Israel’s teacher and do not understand these things?” Some of the British Anglicans in Jerusalem were Christian Zionists – did no one ever ask; “where do the local Arab Christians fit in?” Ask in faith, not doubt, reading Romans 11 etc?? “I’d read through the Scriptures several times. How could I doubt that God loved the Jewish people? It was all over the Bible.” “I was not prepared for the complete fulfilment of this prayer. Jesus not only took away my hatred for Israel and the Jews, but he replaced it with a love for them. This was unexpected.” They had the Bible, they had prayer! They were the first to sense the finger of God, and they were the first to oppose it. “then the Romans will come and take away both our place and our nation." Did they fear Muslim violence should they support the return, that God was not able to guard them and accomplish his will?
In terms of their overall representation within the
wider Palestinian community, their numbers have shrunk from around 11% total
(27% in Jerusalem) to now about 1.5%. Pastor Salman in 2018 estimated a mere
1200 Evangelical Christians among the 3 million Palestinians in the West Bank. From
playing a central role in 1917 to being totally marginalised by 1948. Post 1948,
Christians have continued to migrate at twice the rate of Muslims. Christians
emigrated from the Jordanian occupied West Bank, and in Jerusalem their population
more than halved between 1948-61, falling from 29,300 to 10,982.[402] Within
Israel, their percentage within the Arab community fell from 21% in 1950 to 9%.
At present, three times as many Christians as Muslims planned to emigrate out
of Israel. They have indeed been reduced to a stump in the land. Isaiah 6:13,
11:1. As the Lord told Ahaz; “If you do not stand by faith, you will not stand
at all.” Isaiah 7:9. Indeed, by seeking their own safety, (“it is better for
you that one man die for the people than that the whole nation perish.")
they have lost what they surrendered their faith to keep.
The Palestinian Christian community disappeared because it chose nationalism/ethnicity over faith. What we are left with today is a tiny remnant, most of whom are likewise apostate. Until our Lord returns, Christians will always be a minority within the Middle East, but too many Palestinian Christians would rather be a minority among Muslims than a minority among Jews. Recent Mid East history has shown the folly of that approach.[403]
Internalized dhimmitude
For nearly 100 years, Palestinian Christian, like many other of the Christian communities of the former Ottoman Empire, have looked to secular nationalism as a way out of the oppression and humiliation of living as a persecuted minority under Islamic law. From welcoming the Tanzimat to advocating for a “secular, democratic state of Palestine”, this has been their preferred alternative. It is never going to happen. It conflicts with a fundamental aspect of Islam. The Tanzimat led to the 1894-1924 genocide of Ottoman Christian communities. Conquest by a supposedly Christian power in 1918 led to a brief possibility explored from 1921-23, but then Islam reasserted its dominance, and the Christians were left always backing the least Islamic of the various Muslim contenders. Having spent the past 40 years backing the PA, many are now turning to Hamas, and hoping that they can ingratiate themselves sufficiently to survive. Dhimmitude however entails a spiritual as well as a social enslavement. Criticism of Islam was prohibited. Being subservient, keeping quiet, submitting to countless minor humiliations, not resisting even when beaten or community members are raped, all of this has profound effects upon the self-image of those subjected to it. They come to believe that they are indeed inferior, that Muslims are indeed superior.
“Dhimmis can appear to collude to conceal their own condition, finding themselves psychologically unable to critique or oppose it. The psychology of gratitude and inferiority can manifest in the dhimmi as denial or concealment of the condition. … the psychology of inferiority can mean that people from a dhimmi background are themselves the least able to analyse or expose their own condition. A powerful silence rests over the whole subject like a thick blanket or a strong dose of anaesthetic.”[404]
“Christian communities native to the Middle East today exhibit the scars of centuries of inferiorization and marginalization. They constitute living relics of the ravages of a system that, although technically abolished in many modern Arab states, continues on the level of official as well as popular attitudes and practices. The Christians of the Holy Land, for example ‘Palestinian Christians’ are symptomatic of this dhimmi genre and its attendant complexes.”[405]
Sadly, the Palestinian Christian communities, their leadership, and many of their members, witness to this internalized oppression all too frequently. They may well rationalize it by believing that by agreeing with the Muslims, they are protecting their communities from even greater harm, but their calling is to preach the truth, not to fear men.
Being generally better educated, and qt the same time, desperate to ingratiate themselves, Palestinian Christians have indeed often taken the lead in defending Islam to the west. Western Christians all too often view such Christians as co-religionists, an unbiased, but knowledgeable reference for all things Muslim, especially on the treatment of Muslims to non-Muslims. They also trust their views on the Arab Israeli conflict for the same reasons.
Bat Ye’or notes how Syrian Christians have “dedicated themselves to extolling at both a political and a literary level the greatness and tolerance of Islamic civilization.”[406] This is also seen in Palestinian Christian Edward Said’s book Orientalism.[407] Muslim/Christian relations have “all too often been mythologized by intellectuals and clergymen who never tire of insisting that harmony has always prevailed between Muslims and Christians in Palestine. The Anglican Bishop of the Diocese of Jerusalem Riyah Abu-‘Assal stated emphatically to this author: ‘The entire history of Palestine never witnessed any religious conflict between Christians and Muslims.’ In her book This Side of Peace , Hanan Ashrawi declares that while growing up she felt no difference between Palestinian Christians and Muslims: ‘We did not know who was what, and it was not an issue.’”[408]
History
Failure
Conclusion
Remnant
Hope!
At present, confession and repentance are required. Beyond that, the very truths they have resisted hold out the promises they need. The restoration of Israel shows that the gifts and calling of God are irrevocable! If they are able to repent, then our God is able to restore and bless them likewise.
References
[1] Lowe, Malcolm. The Myth of Palestinian Christianity.
[2] Bernard Lewis, The Middle East, 210. See also Stalder, 84, fn 16 for further reading, as well as Mark Gabriel, Islam and the Jews, 122-23 for the rules of Umar concerning people of the book. “Dhimmi status and payment of the Jizya tax could place great financial strain on Christian communities. The application of Shari’a law on non-Muslims further restricted the personal freedoms of Christians. They wore distinguishing clothes, they were forbidden to practise certain trades and from taking positions of responsibility in politics or the army. They were permitted to worship freely, but processions, public Christian symbols and proselytisation were forbidden. Marriage between Christians and Muslims was only allowed if the Christian party converted to Islam. Conversion the other way around was forbidden.” Ashdown 46.
[3] https://www.firstthings.com/article/1999/01/003-christians-in-the-land-called-holy
[4] Hashemi and Postel, 2017, p. 27.
[5] Ashdown, 48.
[6] Freas, 52. Note that the new constitution was brought in on December 23, 1876 and was itself based on the incremental legal reforms which had started in 1836. Two years later, in 1878, the constitution was suspended, parliament dispersed, and the new freedoms curtailed.
[7] Freas, 61.
[8] Non-Muslim happiness has always offended Islam – hence the bombings on Sabbaths, Holy days, weddings, celebrations of any sort etc.
[9] The emancipation of supressed communities generally has this effect on members of the once dominant community. For a shameful parallel, occurring at the same time, in 1843, The Pope noted “the scandal of seeing Jews pretending to be living the same as others.” D. Kertzer, The Popes against the Jews, 84. In 1901, a letter to the Minister of Justice in Germany stated that “one need not be an anti-Semite in order to confirm the fact that a Jew in the role of a magistrate, barrister, notary public, etc. awakens in a German a feeling of loathing ... the very sight of a Jew is at times unbearable.” Tal, Christians and Jews, 142.
[10] “some Muslims, particularly amongst the Ulama, opposed the principle of freedom of worship and feared that the equal status given to Christians would damage the Islamic character of the Ottoman state, and damage their political influence in the government institutions.” Ashdown, 49.
[11] Morris and Ze’evi, 49/50. This led to the massacre of these Armenians.
[12] Morris and Ze’evi, 78.
[13] Ashdown, 16. Quoting from Ma’oz, 2014, pp. 242–243). Ma’oz, M. (2014). Communal conflict in Ottoman Syria during the reform Era: The role of political and economic factors. In B. Braude (Ed.), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire (pp. 241–256). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
[14] Bat Ye’or, 1985; 224.
[15] The Tanzimat reforms were in part at least “meant for international consumption at a time when the Ottomans desperately needed Britain’s help” (Reilly, 2019, p. 56). Ashdown 47.
[16] Freas, 89.
[17] Stalder, 86.
[18] See Lewis, 293., see also the Kurds in Syria 2019.
[19] Freas, 33.
[20] Freas, 32.
[21] Freas, 89.
[22] Farah, 18.
[23] Frantzman, 22.
[24] Kimmerling, 5.
[26] Freas, 39.
[28] Freas, 33.
[29] Hollingsworth, 4.
[30] Farah, 19.
[31] Rafiq Farah, 11.
[32] Farah, 11.
[33] Raphael Israeli, Green Crescent over Nazareth, 11. (See also Bat Ye’or, 1985; 252.) Taken from the official dispatches of James Finn.
[34] Bat Ye’or, 1985; 254, Israeli, 11. Again, taken from the dispatches of James Finn.
[35] Robson, 19.
[36] Freas, 32. Robson, Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine. 8.
[38] Freas, 54.
[39] Ruth Kark, American Consuls in the Holy Land. page 245.
[40] Freas, 33.
[41] Farah, 19.
[42] Freas, 55.
[43] Robson, 19.
[44] Frantzman, 22.
[45] Farah,74.
[49] Emmett, 22.
[50] Emmett, 23.
[51] Farah, 11.
[52] Emmett, 24.
[53] Farah, 12.
[54] Emmett, 24.
[55] Emmett, 25.
[56] Emmett, 29.
[57] Emmett, 29.
[58] Israeli, 11., quoting James Finn.
[59] Bat Ye’or, 1985; 244-5.
[60] Robson, 19.
[61] Farah, 52.
[62] Makhoul, 23.
[63] Bat Ye’or, 1985; 254.
[64] Bat Ye’or, 1985; 246-8.
[65] Bat Ye’or, 1985; 250.
[66] Freas, 54.
[67] For examples, see Robson, 19.
[68] Bat Ye’or, 1985; 235.
[69] Bat Ye’or, 1985; 235.
[70] Morris and Ze’evi, 41/42.
[71] Freas, 95.
[72] Ashdown, 16.
[73] Bat Ye’or, 1985; 235.
[74] Ashdown, 50.
[75] Radai, 499.
[76] Ashdown, 12. Awad, N.G. (2012). And freedom became a public-square: Political, sociological and religious overviews on the Arab Christians and the Arabic Spring. Zurich: Lit Verlag. p. 89.
[77] Freas, 89.
[78] Tom Segev, One Palestine Complete, 15.
[79] Freas, 90.
[80] Freas, 93.
[81] Farah, 83.
[82] Farah, 82.
[83] Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version: And Other Middle Eastern Studies. 339.
[84] Freas, 154.
[85] Daphne Tsimhoni The Arab Christians and the Palestinian Arab National Movement during the Formative Stage, 73.
[86] Tsimhoni, 78.
[87] Brandon Moist, Palestinian Christians and their Identity and Resistance in the Twentieth Century. https://www.armstrong.edu/history-journal-palestinian-christians-and-their-identity-and -resistance-in
[88] Stalder, 87.
[89] Stalder, 88.
[90] Freas, 152.
[93] Freas, 99.
[94] Ashdown, 51 quoting Reilly, 2019, p. 97.
[95] Freas, 99.
[96] Freas, 101.
[97] Tsimhoni writes that Arab Christians expected an improvement in their situation, and even some preferential treatment as co-religionists of holders of the Mandate.” Tsimhoni, The Status, 166. Saul Colbi notes that the Protestant churches did “exceptionally well in the thirty years of the Mandate, both in numbers and in establishments.” Stalder, 151.
[99] Tsimhoni, 142.
[100] Haiduc-Dale, 69.
[101] Haiduc-Dale, 73.
[102] Haiduc-Dale, 88.
[103] Bretts, Robert Brenton. Christians of the Arab East. 159.
[104] Ori Stendal The Arabs in Israel page 249.
[105] Haiduc-Dale, 41.
[106] Freas, 147.
[107] Haiduc-Dale, 37.
[108] Emmett, 39.
[109] Nerel, 30.
[110] Cohen, Army, 19.
[111] Robson, 42/3?
[112] Haidoc-Dale, 46.
[113] Makhoul, 42.
[114] Freas, 142.
[115] Haidoc-Dale, 47.
[116] Robson 71.
[117] Tsimhoni, 74.
[118] Interestingly, in the 1880s James Finn saw this Muslim festival, held one week before the Orthodox Easter, as a flashpoint between Muslims and Christians. “the influx of devout Moslems was doubtless intended to counterbalance the effect of so many thousands of sturdy Christians being present in Jerusalem.” Finn, 222-223.
[119] In justifying this, the Christian editor of al-Karmil noted that it was Muhammad who had made the Arabs great, and that it was because they had "stopped following his teachings [that] they had become divided and weak and of no account" Al-Karmil, 9 September 1927. Freas, 279.
[120] Tsimhoni, 75.
[121] Frantzman, 49.
[122] Tsimhoni, 75.
[123] Freas, 279.
[124] A. Bostom, The Mufti’s Islamic Jew-Hatred, 24.
[125] "the most important Muslim pilgrimage in Palestine" Gonen, Rivka., Contested Holiness, Ktav Pub & Distributors Inc (2003) 138.
[126] Makhoul, 54.
[127] Freas, 137.
[128] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1920_Nebi_Musa_riots
[129] Noah Haiduc-Dale, 43.
[130] Freas, 305.
[131] Noah Haiduc-Dale, 43.
[132] Tour guides from the Bethlehem Bible College say that it is a Muslim tradition that Moses is buried there, but then proceed to justify this by giving the following as possible explanations; “Moses so much wanted to be in the holy land that his body rolled underground until it reached here. Another explanation is that the holy land is Jerusalem. So he did make it until here but he did not reach Jerusalem.” Given that the Bible specifies that he was buried in Moab, a site in northern Israel is impossible. They are simply trying to accommodate a Muslim falsehood. https://storiesfrompalestine.info/2020/11/16/on-the-road-to-jericho/
[133] Freas, 189.
[134] Freas, 316.
[135] Frantzman, 55.
[136] Frantzman, 55.
[137] https://mosaicmagazine.com/picks/history-ideas/2016/05/remembering-jaffas-forgotten-pogrom/ For a more personal account, see https://www.haaretz.com/1.5114529
[138] It needs to be acknowledged that Islam celebrates violence in a way foreign to Judaism and Christianity. It is not about “winning hearts and minds,” a foreign concept, it is about imposing control. When I was in Pakistan, the leading cleric in a major mosque in Islamabad stated from the pulpit that they would throw acid in the faces of any women who drove a car. One simply cannot imagine any mainstream Pastor or Rabbi making a similar statement from the pulpit.
[139] “The commitment to nonviolence distinguishes the Christian leadership and a large number of Christians from the Palestinian majority.” Christians, Christmas and the Intifada. Drew Christiansen, https://www.americamagazine.org/issue/341/article/christians-christmas-and-intifada “During the second intifada, Palestinian Christians deviated from the mainstream resistance and away from violence and militarization.” Palestinian Christians and the Defence of Equal Human Rights, Yusef Daher. SUR, International Journal for Human Rights, https://sur.conectas.org/en/palestinian-christians-and-the-defence-of-equal-human-rights/
[140] Nerel, 30-31.
[141] Makhoul, 55.
[142] Haidoc-Dale, 27.
[143] Haiduc-Dale, 4.
[144] Tamir Sorek. “Calendars, Martyrs, and Palestinian Particularism under British Rule” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 43, No. 1 (Autumn 2013), pp. 6-23. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2013.43.1.6?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
[145] Haidoc-Dale, 27.
[146] Frantzman, 56.
[147] Freas, 109.
[148] Cohen, Army, 46.
[149] Cohen, Army, 48-50.
[150] Freas, 164.
[151] Radai, 490.
[152] Frantzman, 57.
[153] Frantzman, 61.
[154] Freas, 199.
[155] C.S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters, chapter 7; "Begin by treating his Patriotism as a part of his religion. Then let him, under the influence of his partisan spirit, come to regard it as the most important part. Then quietly and gradually nurse him on to the stage at which the religion becomes merely part of the “cause”, in which Christianity is valued chiefly because of the excellent arguments it can produce in favour of the cause … Once you have made the World an end, and faith a means, you have almost won your man, and it makes very little difference what kind of worldly end he is pursuing. Provided that meetings, pamphlets, policies, movements, causes, and crusades, (partisan political pundits and partisan media, "my addition") matter more to him than prayers and sacraments and charity, he is ours-and the more “religious” the more securely ours."
[156] Cohen, Army, 57, 15.
[157] Freas, 200.
[158] Radai, 499.
[159] Freas, 272.
[160] Freas, 273.
[161] Freas, 274, quoting Filastin, 8 December 1932.
[162] Freas, 274.
[163] Freas, 278.
[164] Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " P. 75. https://christiansandisrael.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/tsimhoni-arab-christians.pdf
[165] Stalder, 164.
[166] Freas, 283.
[167] Cohen, Army, 30.
[168] Freas, 189.
[169] Freas, 191.
[170] Freas, 193.
[171] For a parallel case, from Germany; Julius von Jan, a Confessing pastor who did speak out, also admitted after the war: “We were all of scared of crossing the Nazi regime at its most sensitive point.” R. Gutteridge rightly commented: “it may not unfairly be added that it [love for one’s neighbour] was undeniably one of the most sensitive points where the church itself was concerned.” Barnes, 395.
[172] Freas, 215.
[173] Freas, 218-19.
[175] Frantzman, 19.
[176] Freas, 232-3.
[177] See https://www.facebook.com/eappiukireland/photos/a.787540614697339/3870859693032067/ for a statement in 2021 by the heads of the churches in Jerusalem supporting the “status quo” whereby Christians and Jews are banned from praying on the Temple Mount. For a similar Palestinian Lutheran statement, see https://www.facebook.com/colin.a.barnes.1/posts/4214031271964050:10.
[178] Haiduc-Dale, 101.
[179] Haiduc-Dale, 101.
[180] Haiduc-Dale, 101.
[181] Freas, 235.
[182] Freas, 234.
[183] Freas, 220.
[184] Haiduc-Dale, 110.
[186] Freas, 269.
[187] Haiduc-Dale, 114.
[188] Haiduc-Dale, 114.
[189] Yehoshua Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929, 303.
[190] Freas, 283.
[191] Haiduc-Dale, (2015) Rejecting Sectarianism: Palestinian Christians' Role in Muslim–Christian Relations, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 26:1, 75-88, 80.
[192] Haiduc-Dale, 2015, 80.
[193] Haiduc-Dale, (2015) 80.
[194] Haiduc-Dale, 2015, 82.
[195]Frantzman, 75.
[198] Freas, 242.
[199] Tsimhoni, 81.
[200] Freas, 116.
[201] Freas, 251.
[202] Freas, 263.
[203] Freas, 263.
[204] Freas, 239.
[205] Freas, 239.
[206] Freas, 281.
[207] Freas, 283.
[208] Freas, 229.
[209] Freas, 289.
[210] Freas, 289.
[211] Freas, 301.
[212] Aidan, Belief and Policy Making in the Middle East. 34.
[213] Freas, 303.
[214] Freas, 312.
[215] Freas, 312.
[216] Freas, 313.
[217] Freas, 315., Frantzman, 70 “The religious aspects of the rebellion further alienated Christians.”
[218] Haiduc-Dale, 148.
[220] Frantzman, 68.
[221] Frantzman, 68.
[222] Haiduc-Dale, 146.
[223] Haiduc-Dale 149.
[224] Haiduc-Dale, 159.
[225] Moist
[226] Frantzman, 71.
[227] Haiduc-Dale, 147, 160.
[228] Haiduc-Dale, 147.
[229] Haiduc-Dale, 161.
[230] Freas, 305.
[231] Freas, 306-7, The article appearing 16 September 1936. See also Filastin, 16 July 1936, concerning attacks on Christian homes in Acre.
[232] Stalder, 164.
[233] Segev, Tom (1999). One Palestine Complete, 365, 368.
[234] Freas, 311.
[235] Haiduc-Dale, 141. He disputes this description as overly simplistic.
[236] Radai middle class 503. During the revolt, similar assaults on the Druze drove the community to seek an alliance with the Zionists. Frantzman, 72.
[237] Frantzman, 68.
[238] Morris, 1948, 13.
[239] Freas, 317.
[240] Stalder, 165.
[241] Freas, 304.
[242] Tsimhoni, 90.
[243] Frantzman, 73.
[244] Freas, 163. “An interesting observation of the situation at the time is that of Ben-Zvi, who argued that through their positions in the administration, Christians were effectively ruling over Muslims.” Freas, 164.
[245] Haiduc-Dale, 131.
[246] Freas, 318.
[247] Freas, 318.
[248] Frantzman, 71.
[249] Haiduc-Dale, 179.
[250] Freas, 316.
[251] Frantzman, 72.
[252] Freas, 318.
[253] Freas, 318.
[254] Mustafa Kabha, Arabic Palestinian Press between the Wars, 103. https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&lr=&id=TmiDDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA126&dq=%22Studies+in+Zionism%22+falastin&ots=4KQJoU5rkE&sig=CJxdVoSw_isizDDAApIFjgPW1fs#v=onepage&q=%22Studies%20in%20Zionism%22%20falastin&f=false
[255] Kabha, 106.
[256] Cohen, Army, 291 n84.
[257] Haiduc-Dale, 155.
[258] Haiduc-Dale, 151.
[259] Haiduc-Dale, 151.
[260] Morris, The Birth, 24.
[261] Haiduc-Dale, 154.
[262] Haiduc-Dale, 167.
[263] Morris, 1948, 83.
[264] Rubin and Schwanitz, Nazis, Islamists and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 97.
[265] Freas, 316.
[266] Haiduc-Dale, 166.
[267] Haiduc-Dale, 166.
[268] Haiduc-Dale, 166.
[269] Haiduc-Dale, 143
[270] Haiduc-Dale, 154.
[271] Freas, 324.
[272] Haiduc-Dale, 171.
[273] Frantzman, 74.
[274] Barnes, They Conspire Against Your People, 26.
[275] Barnes, 27.
[276] While generally viewed as a secular, Marxist group, its founder George Habash, was a Greek orthodox (the founder of the DFLP, Nayef Hawatmeh, was Catholic). A disproportionate number of their membership is also drawn from the Christan community, to the point where Presbyterian missionary Marthame Sanders once related how an Israeli crackdown of the PFLP was viewed by the Christian population of Zababdeh as an attack on Palestinian Christians http://www.saltfilms.net/update.html. As seen, Christians generally preferred secular organisations, and local perceptions often differ from Western analysis. Note also that Anglican priest Elias Khoury was convicted in Israel of carrying explosives for the PLO. These were later used to bomb a supermarket in a Jewish area, and the British Consulate, killing two people, and wounding eleven. When the Israelis allowed him to go to Jordan, he was made Anglican Bishop of Amman, and appointed to the executive council of the PLO.
[278] Gershoni, 134.
[279] Gershoni, 135.
[280] Modras, 165. Jewish volunteers did form about 10% of the International Brigades, again begging the question, why single them out? See also G. Besier, “Anti-Bolshevism and Anti-Semitism: The Catholic Church in Germany and National Socialist Ideology 1936-1937” Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 43 (1972) 451.
[281] Haiduc-Dale, 178.
[282] Haiduc-Dale, 178. Segev, One Palestine, 411.
[283] Morris, 1948, 21.
[284] Freas, 228.
[285] Gershoni, 115.
[286] Gershoni, 115.
[287] Alfassa, Reference Guide to the Nazis and Arabs During the Holocaust. 22.
[288] Basheer M. Nafi, The Arabs and the Axis:1933-1940 Arab Studies Quarterly Vol. 19, No. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 1-24, 1.
[289] Black, 229.
[290] Stalder, 172.
[291] Nafi, 4.
[292] Rubin and Schwanitz, 96.
[293] Benny Morris, “Response of the Jewish Daily Press in Palestine to the Accession of Hitler, 1933” https://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%203221.pdf 10.
[294] Morris, Response 12.
[295] Morris, Response, 17.
[296] Segev, One Palestine Complete, 462.
[297] Segev, 461.
[298] Segev, 462.
[299] Segev, 463.
[300] Segev, 465.
[301] Fred Lawson, Falastin, an experiment in promoting Palestinian nationalism through the English language press. 126, 135. https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&lr=&id=TmiDDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA126&dq=%22Studies+in+Zionism%22+falastin&ots=4KQJoU5rkE&sig=CJxdVoSw_isizDDAApIFjgPW1fs#v=onepage&q=%22Studies%20in%20Zionism%22%20falastin&f=false
[302] Haiduc-Dale, 146.
[303] Haiduc-Dale, 147, 160.
[304] Stalder, 165.
[305] Mandel, 44. Note the rejoinder to this article by Rashid Rida, who described the editors as; “complacent nonentities.”
[306] Segev, 47.
[307] Rubin and Schwanitz, 138.
[308] Nafi, 9.
[309] Nafi, 14.
[310] Nafi, 15.
[311] Alfassa, 38.
[312] Alfassa, 35. Or, "Kill Jews wherever you find them for the love of God, history, and religion." Lukasz Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East 311, 364.
[313] A wanted war criminal, he was released by the French (to annoy the British) in an act of political cynicism that would have made Machiavelli blush!
[315] Rubin and Schwanitz, 5.
[316] Rubin and Schwanitz, 138, 163 see also 123, 125, 127, 133.
[317] Rubin and Schwanitz, 94.
[318] Rubin and Schwanitz, 138.
[319] Black, 148, Rubin and Schwanitz, 172.
[320] Rubin and Schwanitz, 140.
[321] Black, 345.
[322] Black, 349.
[323] Black, 350. For insight into the profoundly Islamic religious basis for this anti-Semitism, see Black, 338, 347, 309-10. See also Rubin and Schwanitz, 95 and 165 especially.
[324] Gershoni, 116.
[325] The White Paper was nevertheless rejected by al-Husseini. Churchill called it a cowardly “surrender to Arab violence.” Morris, 1948, 20.
[326] Haiduc-Dale, 178.
[327] Gershoni, 219. Quoting Beinin and Lockman.
[328] Alfassa, 39.
[329] Black, 313.
[330] https://wikivisually.com/wiki/Relations_between_Nazi_Germany_and_the_Arab_world
[331] Nafi, 2.
[332] Segev, 465.
[333] Rubin and Schwanitz, 172.
[334] Karsh, 90.
[335] https://skeptics.stackexchange.com/questions/30433/is-hitlers-book-mein-kampf-a-bestseller-in-muslim-countries see also https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1388161/Mein-Kampf-for-sale-in-Arabic.html
[336] Haiduc-Dale, 163.
[337] Haiduc-Dale, 163.
[338] Haiduc-Dale, 166.
[339] Haiduc-Dale, 167.
[340] Haiduc-Dale, 170.
[341] Haiduc-Dale, 184.
[342] Freas, 326/7.
[343] Freas, 326/7.
[344] Farah, 124.
[346] Robson, 99. At the 2016 CATC conference, Kakish, president of the Council of Evangelical Churches in the Holy Land, showed his submission to the Palestinian Authority (whose uniformed representatives were sitting in the front row) by declaring that Evangelical churches in the Holy Land “are working on the intellectual and ideological rejection of modern Zionism and racism against our people.” This is the type of propaganda that one would expect from Mahmoud Abbas himself.
In 2018, Kakish put Palestinian Evangelicalism at the service of the Palestinian national cause by declaring that “We as Evangelicals believe in the righteousness of the Palestinian cause” and that “We have full confidence in our beloved president Mahmoud Abbas.” Van Zile, Dexter. Three Things You Need To Know About Christ At The Checkpoint https://www.camera.org/article/three-things-you-need-to-know-about-christ-at-the-checkpoint/
[347] Haiduc-Dale, 185.
[348] Frantzman, Glueckstadt, Kark, 7.
[349] Haiduc-Dale, 184.
[350] Haiduc-Dale, 183.
[351] Hillel Cohen, Army of Shadows, 3.
[352] Morris, The Birth, 24.
[353] Morris, The Birth, 25.
[354] Looting was not limited to the irregulars – Ramat Rahel was twice captured by the Egyptian army, and each time the counter-attacking Jewish forces found the Egyptians busy looting (as opposed to setting up a defensive perimeter etc.).
[355] Cohen, Army, 238.
[356] A Zionist objective since 1920. Cohen, Army 17.
[357] Morris, The Birth, 25-26.
[358] Cohen, Army, 310, n25.
[359] Cohen, Army, 238.
[360] Morris, The Birth, 25.
[361] Morris, 1948, 94.
[362] Cohen, Army, 254.
[363] Cohen, Army, 238.
[364] Cohen, Army, 254.
[365] Haiduc-Dale, 185.
[366] Haiduc-Dale, 186.
[367] Haiduc-Dale, 186.
[368] Haiduc-Dale, 186.
[369] Morris, 1948, 93.
[370] Morris, 1948, 93., Morris, The Birth, 25.
[371] Morris, 1948, 280.
[372] Morris, 1948, 281.
[373] Morris, 1948, 281.
[374] Haiduc-Dale, 186.
[375] Morris, The Birth, 479.
[376] Haiduc-Dale, 186.
[377] Morris, 1948, 345.
[378] Haiduc-Dale, 101.
[379] Cohen, Army, 223.
[380] Morris, The Birth, 24.
[381] Haiduc-Dale, 186.
[383] Morris, The Birth, 25.
[384] Karsh, 125.
[385] Karsh, 129.
[386] Karsh, 130.
[387] Karsh, 132.
[388] Karsh, 138.
[389] Morris, 1948, 145.
[390] See Karsh, 138-140 for details.
[391] Karsh, 140.
[392] Morris, 1948, 146.
[393] Again, see Karsh, 141-42 for details.
[394] Collins, Lapierre, 204. “During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the Palestinian-Arab middle class in the three larger cities – Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Haifa – was among the first groups to leave the country, in the initial stage of the war. https://www.academia.edu/5572552/The_collapse_of_the_Palestinian_Arab_Middle_Class_in_1948_The_case_of_Qatamon_Middle_Eastern_Studies_2007?auto=download&email_work_card=download-paper
[395] Collins, Lapierre, 322.
[396] Cohen, Army of Shadows, 3. The whole book is devoted to this topic.
[397] Cohen, Army, 241, 245.
[398] Morris, 1948, 13.
[399] Morris, The Birth, 24.
[400] Haiduc-Dale, 186.
[401] For a discussion on the present continuation of replacement theology within the Orthodox church, see Stalder, 67-74.
[402] Robson, 162.
[403] As well as the depredations of ISIS, see https://greekcitytimes.com/2019/09/07/september6-7-1955-turkeys-kristallnacht/?amp&fbclid=IwAR1oK5AWR3vdxG5GtzeHpx8uky7gZ9BIVUfPt3Jg8dO_pThEKm99w_EEK5c
[404] M. Durie, 181.
[405] https://www.firstthings.com/article/1999/01/003-christians-in-the-land-called-holy
[406] M. Durie, 201.
[407] See M. Durie, 201-2.
[408] https://www.firstthings.com/article/1999/01/003-christians-in-the-land-called-holy
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