Example 1, A New Identity – Arab nationalism
On 30 October 1918, the campaign in the Middle East officially came to an end. Turkish rule and Ottomanism, had collapsed. The details of its successor, Arab nationalism had yet to be worked out. The British took over a society which was profoundly disunited. Sir Mark Sykes Arab Latin Catholic advisor, Yiisuf Albina (himself a resident of Jerusalem), described the situation in Palestine at the beginning of the British military administration as "a pot-pourri of sects and heterogeneous elements bearing an innate hatred against each other and in perpetual conflict against themselves."
“Arab Christians joined the emerging Palestinian National movement in the hope of breaking the yoke of their marginality in a Muslim society.”
So, after the Ottoman empire, rather than just returning to being disparate religious communities, millets (“we are Muslim, or Christian or Jewish”) for the Christian community, secular nationalism (“We are ALL Arabs [except you Jews]!”) was a way of securing their place in the wider society, of protecting their new-found freedoms/equality/prosperity. It helped that secular Arab nationalism was also the solution being offered by the Western, Christian powers that they were close to. The push for Arab nationalism came initially from the Greek Orthodox, supported by the Melkites. They put much effort into trying to craft a broader Arab identity which would encompass and unify it’s various Christian and Muslim components. “The Arab Christians wholly identified themselves with their Muslim countrymen.” Greek Orthodox community leader Khalil al-Sakakini frequently met with the Grand Mufti, Haj Amin al-Husseini. Al-Sakakini was an “ardent anti-Zionist and Palestinian nationalist.” “This religious unity would prove to be an essential goal of Palestinian Christians throughout the mid-20th century.”
Palestinian Christians hoped for a role in determining the actual character of the state. Shomali lists the five aspects of the Arab cultural revival in Palestine, and Christian Arabs were leaders in the first four; education, the printing press, literary clubs and newspapers. Stalder writes that, “benefiting from the educational opportunities presented [by Western missionaries] to them, they [Christian Arabs] were active in their role in the incipient Arab Awakening and subsequent rise of Arab nationalism.”
At the same time, but for very different reasons, Muslim Arabs were also attracted to Arab nationalism. They viewed it quite differently however and sought contradictory outcomes. The Christians hoped for a secular version which would guarantee their rights as Arabs, regardless of their religion (as an enshrinement of the Tanzimat equality) while the Muslim majority viewed it as a means to return to the pre-Tanzimat days of total Muslim dominance – as a total repudiation of the Tanzimat. Many Muslims saw Arab nationalism as a means to restoring Islamic government (as opposed to the secularism of the Young Turks). This was particularly evident in the emphasis given the idea of resurrecting an Arab caliphate. Pan-Arabism was attractive, but with Islam as its core. For the Christians and Muslims, therefore, the struggle would be over which type of nationalism, secular or religious, would prevail. Given the overwhelming disparity in their numbers and power, this discontinuity was never going to end well for the Christians. Here the Christians would fight an endless series of rear-guard actions, as each fall-back position was overwhelmed, and the hope of secular nationalism crumbled.
From the start, many Muslim Arab nationalists were sceptical of Christian intentions. For an Arab Muslim, to be an Arab was to be a Muslim. The two concepts were identical. The Arabic speaking Christian minority were seen as definitely inferior, possibly traitors, at best an insignificant, defective anomaly. 'Arif al-'Arif, a prominent Muslim nationalist, stated that in his view, the so-called unity with Christians had had no practical foundation; moreover, the Christians had preferred to cooperate with the British, who are Christian like them. Many in the Muslim majority still viewed Christians as uppity and disloyal, a pro-western 5th column (a view formed during Ottoman days). Clearly, these negative views would be exacerbated during the British Mandate.
In spite of their differing definitions and uneasy misgivings, both Muslims and Christians came to support Arab nationalism. Their unity was essentially a profoundly temporary marriage of convenience. So, why have a marriage at all?
Enter the Zionists. They presented a common threat, forcing them both together. "The Christian editors of Falistin would call on all Palestinians, both Muslim and Christian, to unite against Zionism on grounds of local patriotism." As noted, Zionism not only gave them a common enemy, it greatly increased the Christians value re soliciting outside, Western Christian help. Their faith gave them access that the Muslim community simply did not have. Zionism both provided a means of showing their loyalty to the Arab nation, and also, due to initial British support of the Zionists, handed them the task of influencing both the British government and British (Christian) public opinion. Anti-Zionism was great for Palestinian Christians! And this at a time when Christian Arabs were having their loyalty questioned, their identity as Arabs doubted, and their ties to the West mistrusted! It was expedient to throw the Jews under the bus to save their own community. John 11:50. The Muslim community likewise [for pragmatic and short-term political reasons] sought to include the Christian community “hoping to use their Palestinian Christians’ religious heritage to appeal to British Christians for support against Zionism.”
Many Christians did quietly indicate a preference for indefinite British rule. Once it became clear that British rule also entailed Zionism however, Christian support for an independent Palestine increased. The Muslim threat was greater, but they preferred Muslim Arab rule to Jewish. While British colonialism may have gone, the bargain continues to have currency to this day, as Muslim Palestinians still see value in using the Palestinian Christians to undermine American Christian support for Israel. Even as Christian communities across the Middle East are decimated, the Palestinian Christians continue to seek out their own security on the basis, not of their faith, but of their utility to the Muslim majority. With the collapse of their numbers, their influence has shrivelled. There is no organic reason to grant them any rights, their only value remains as a means of soliciting Western support for the Arab cause. Without that, they are indeed nothing.
Sample two,
1929 Western Wall Riots; Islam supreme, Christians submissive
The decisive event as far as the nationalist movement's Islamisation, however, would not involve Christians at all. The 1929 Riots began in August of that year at the Western Wall. The disturbances soon spread to the rest of Palestine. The worst attacks took place in Hebron, where more than sixty Jews were murdered, and the rest forced to flee. By 30 August, the disturbances had finally come to an end. To quote from Wikipedia; “The riots took the form, in the most part, of attacks by Arabs on Jews accompanied by destruction of Jewish property. During the week of riots from 23 to 29 August, 133 Jews were killed and between 198–241 others were injured, a large majority of whom were unarmed and were murdered in their homes by Arabs, while at least 116 Arabs were killed and at least 232 were injured, mostly by the British police while trying to suppress the riots, although around 20 were killed by Jewish attacks or indiscriminate British gunfire. During the riots, 17 Jewish communities were evacuated.”
The Western Wall Riots had a major impact on the internal political struggle within the Arab leadership, increasing the power of Haj Amin al-Husseini. They again intensified religious sentiment among Muslims and showed that religious sensibilities ran a good deal deeper than nationalistic ones. There was virtually no Christian involvement. In a few cases, they helped to limit the violence. The city of Acre, for instance, was largely spared the worst of it thanks to the actions of the Christian Arab District Officer there. Wasserstein however noted that “Christian involvement was slight. Indeed, we may properly call these riots Muslim-Jewish rather than Arab-Jewish since Christians in general remained ostentatiously neutral.”
“For Christian Arabs, the riots presented a dilemma. On the one hand, they were under great pressure to demonstrate their solidarity with their Muslim compatriots. On the other hand, many found it difficult to condone the religiously fanatical violence of the incident. Such fanaticism might just as easily be directed against them. Muslim chants during the rioting of ‘Friday... death to the Jews; Saturday, death to the Christians... and Sunday, death to the Government officials’ must have been concerning. At the same time, they also felt the need to show some support. The Christian press therefore put the blame on the Jews. Additionally, they stressed the incident's nationalist aspect.”
This stressing of the “nationalistic aspect” of what was clearly primarily a religious dispute over the Western Wall would see the Christian community capitulate to the Muslim majority to the point where Muslim Palestinian religious demands became by definition Palestinian nationalist demands. This extended to the Muslim ban (still in effect during this time) on both Jews and Christians praying in the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron. It still extends to supporting the ban on Jews (and Christians!) praying on the Temple Mount. Official Palestinian Christian support for this ban has again been restated in 2021. Given that Jesus said, “My house will be called a house of prayer for all nations” (Mark 11:17), this support for their own being banned from praying on it (in the name of Palestinian nationalism) highlights the apostacy of the Palestinian Church leaders.
On the 27th of October, 1929, the president of the Arab General Assembly, Yacoub Farraj (an Orthodox Christian), stated; “The Buraq (Western Wall) is a purely Moslem Place and is part of the Masjid al-Aksa. The rights of the Moslems in the Buraq are indisputable. … In the cause of the Buraq the Moslems and Christians are one and the same racially, nationally and politically.” Filastin editor Issa el-Issa signed and published a similar statement declaring that “Moslems and Christians alike are concerned [about al- Buraq] from a national, patriotic and political point of view.”
In a joint letter to the Arab Executive, “Muslim, Christian and Druze representatives from Shefaʿamr (where there was a Christian majority) gave the issue a nationalist interpretation by confirming their support for Arab claims to al-Buraq and blamed British inaction for allowing the violence to erupt. The ‘Christians and Muslims of Birzeit’ (another largely Christian village) sent a telegram to the high commissioner protesting the government’s position. Those branches of the MCA still in operation also filed protests in support of Arab claims. Christians certainly wanted to make it clear to the wider Palestinian population that they stood behind Muslim concerns about Zionist designs for the Western Wall and temple area. … Episcopal lawyer Mughannam Mughannam was among the signatories of an Arab Executive telegram to the high commissioner declaring the innocence of all Arabs in the August violence. Husseini supporter, Arab Executive member and head of the Christian Committee for the Relief of Moslem Sufferers at Jaffa, Alfred Rok (a Latin Christian) also organised a meeting of Muslims and Christians in Jaffa to send formal protests to the Colonial Office.”
Palestinian Christian testimonies to the Shaw Commission also asserted Muslim ownership of the Western Wall as an integral part of al-Aqsa Mosque. The Supreme Muslim Council made much of these supposedly unbiased testimonies, complaining after the release of the Commission's findings that “the Moslem side [had] procured unbiased witnesses, Palestinian Christians as well as foreigners, including Priests, Monks and guides to prove that [Jewish claims to the Wailing Wall were unfounded]... [but] the Commission [had] paid no heed to such evidence although the majority of these witnesses were impartial non-Moslems, Palestinians as well as foreigners."
Christian Arabs began to recognise the need to accommodate this decidedly Muslim concern. Articles began to appear in the Christian press explaining why Christians should care about the Muslim holy sites on nationalistic grounds. They argued that Islam was an 'Arab' religion, and since the Christians living in Palestine were Arabs, they had a duty to respect Islam and preserve its holy places. They kowtowed to the violent majority and became dhimmis once again.
This marked an important moment for the Christians. Their hopes of promoting a largely secular nationalism had failed. Dreams of equality and a common cause with the Moslems likewise. Till then, it had been possible for Christians to see for themselves a role in helping to direct the nationalist movement; in shaping the nature of Arab identity and in determining the nature of any future Arab state. From this point on, Christians would become increasingly marginalized, able to do little beyond following the lead set by their Muslim compatriots. “There had always been a concern that aroused Muslim feeling might turn against them. But from now on, there was no way to prevent Muslim leaders from using religion as a means of appealing to the masses. The only way for Christians to maintain a role for themselves within the nationalist movement was to somehow demonstrate that a special relationship existed between them and Islam. By the end of the 1930s, Christian Arabs would be more concerned with trying to define their relationship to Islam than with defining a model of Arab identity intrinsically inclusive of non-Muslims.” “For many months the national movement focused on a specifically Islamic issue. Christian identification with the nationalist movement required a greater willingness to accept Islam, rather than Arabism, as a central focus of the movement. … An important result of these riots was that the Zionist–Arab conflict became a Jewish–Muslim conflict in the eyes of many Palestinians.”
The Palestinian Christian’s response to these deadly attacks by Muslims upon Jews was to support the Muslims. One hundred and four Jews were murdered by Muslims, and the Palestinian Christians justified it. Romans 1:32 “Although they know God's righteous decree that those who do such things deserve death, they not only continue to do these very things but also approve of those who practice them.”
They were on the side of the Moslems, and they supported the Muslim claim to the Western Wall. Once again, speaking “as Christians” they towed the Muslim line, and white-washed murder. They also willingly offered themselves to the Muslim community, to be presented as “impartial” witnesses to the British (thought by the Muslims to be Christian) government. They were Arabs first, Christians second or purely in a community sense. They conformed to this world. Note recently (September 2015) Naim Ateek has echoed the Muslim charge that “the settlers are out of control, they are assaulting the Haram area on a continual basis.”
Following the murders, 58 men were convicted of murder or of abetting murder, and 26 of these (including one Jew) were sentenced to be hung. The British High Commissioner then commuted all but three of these sentences, deciding that only those who had committed the most serious crimes should be executed. On June 17, 1930, henceforth known as “Red Tuesday” in Palestinian iconography, three Palestinians were indeed hanged for the crimes of murder. At each death, church bells rang throughout Palestine. A funeral procession of thousands then escorted the bodies to the Acre cemetery. The parade was led by school children, followed by members of the Muslim-Christian Association.
